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Summary 
The objective of this thesis is to establish whether the notion of public nuisance has 
a legitimate purpose in post-apartheid South African.  
Public nuisance originated in English law in the 12th century as a tort-based crime 
called tort against land and was used to protect the Crown against infringements. 
This special remedy of the Crown was used in cases of unlawful obstruction of public 
highways and rivers, damage or injury causing an inconvenience to a class or all of 
her majesty‟s subjects and a selection of other crimes.  
The notion of public nuisance was adopted in South African law during the late 19th 
century. Between its inception and 1943, the notion of public nuisance was applied in 
line with its original aims, namely to protect and preserve the health, safety and 
morals of the public at large. Public nuisance regulated unreasonable interferences 
such as smoke, noise, violence, litter and blockage of roads which originated in a 
public space or land, as opposed to a private space or land. 
However, the public nuisance remedy was indirectly used, in a number of cases 
during the 1990s, by private individuals to apply for an interdict to evict occupiers of 
informal settlements. In so doing, these private individuals bypassed legislation 
regulating evictions and in the process disrupted or frustrated new housing 
developments, especially those provided for in land reform programmes. In fact, it 
was established that this indirect application of public nuisance is unconstitutional in 
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
Most of the public disturbances originally associated with the public nuisance 
doctrine are currently provided for in legislation. Since the remedy is now mainly 
provided for in legislation, the question is whether the doctrine of public nuisance as 
a Common Law remedy is still relevant in modern South African law. 
It was concluded, especially after an analysis of two cases during 2009 and 2010, 
that the notion of public nuisance only has a future in South African law if it is applied 
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in the absence of statutory nuisance or any other legislation covering public nuisance 
offences and where it is not used as an alternative mechanism to evict occupiers.  
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Opsomming 
Die doel van die tesis is om vas te stel of publieke oorlas as gemeenregtelike 
remedie „n geldige doel in post-apartheid Suid-Afrika het. 
Die remedie bekend as publieke oorlas het ontstaan in 12de eeuse Engelse reg. 
Hierdie remedie het ontwikkel as „n delikteregtelike en kriminele remedie, met die 
doel om land wat aan die Kroon behoort te beskerm. Publieke oorlas het, onder 
andere, toepassing gevind waar daar onwettige obstruksie van publieke hoofweë en 
riviere was sowel as skade of nadeel wat vir die breë publiek ongerief sou 
veroorsaak. Ander misdade was ook gekenmerk as „n publieke oorlas. 
Publieke oorlas is teen die laat 19de eeu in die Suid-Afrikaanse regoorgeneem . 
Tussen die oorname van die remedie in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg en 1943 is die 
remedie van publieke oorlas toegepas in lyn met sy oorspronlike doelwitte, naamlik 
om optrede wat die gesondheid, veiligheid en moraliteit van die breë publiek in 
gedrang kon bring, te verhoed. Volgens sy oorspronklike doel reguleer publieke 
oorlas onredelike inmenging soos rook, geraas, geweld en obstruksie van paaie wat 
op publieke grond of „n publieke spasie ontstaan het. 
Die remedie van publieke oorlas is, in ‟n  reeks sake gedurende die 1990‟s, deur 
privaat individue indirek gebruik om okkupeerders van informele nedersettings uit te 
sit. Sodoende het privaat individue die wetgewing wat spesiaal ontwerp is om 
uitsettings te reguleer vermy en in die proses nuwe behuisingsontwikkelinge ontwrig 
en gefrustreer, veral in gevalle waarvoor in grondhervormingsprogramme 
voorsiening gemaak word. Hierdie indirekte toepasing van publieke oorlas is 
ongrondwetlik omdat dit nie met artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet versoenbaar is nie.  
Die meerderheid van steurnisse wat gewoonlik met publieke oorlas geassosieer 
word, word tans deur wetgewing gereguleer. Aangesien die remedie nou hoofsaaklik 
in wetgewing vervat is, ontstaan die vraag of die leerstuk van publieke oorlas as „n 
gemeenregtelike remedie nog van enige nut is in die moderne Suid-Afrikaanse reg. 
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Die slotsom, veral na die analise van twee sake in 2009 en 2010, was dat die 
publieke oorlas remedie slegs „n toekoms in Suid-Afrikaanse reg het, indien dit 
toegepas word in die afwesigheid van statutêre oorlas of enige ander wetgewing wat 
publieke oorlas oortredinge dek en waar dit nie as „n alternatiewe meganisme 
gebruik word om okkupeerders uit te sit nie.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Outlining the research problem 
1.1 Background 
The aim of the thesis is to establish whether the doctrine of public nuisance still has 
a legitimate purpose in South African law. The major part of this investigation entails 
an analysis of the application of the public nuisance doctrine in a series of cases. 
The case law in which the doctrine of public nuisance has been applied is divided 
into four series extending from the late 19th century to 2010. The different periods of 
the cases in which the notion of public nuisance has been applied are distinguished 
to illustrate the difference between cases in which the doctrine was applied 
according to its original aims and where it was not.   
 Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs 
and others,1 a case in the fourth and most recent series, could be used as an 
illustration to show which nuisances constitute a public nuisance, the origin of such a 
nuisance, the courts‟ interchangeable use of the common law notion of private and 
public nuisance and, finally, the role of legislation that covers public nuisance 
offences. 
 In this case, Intercape and the majority of applicants, together with the first 
and third respondent, owned or occupied premises in Montreal Drive, situated in 
Airport Industria, Western Cape. The first applicant was Intercape Mainliner, a luxury 
bus operator. The first respondent was the Minister of Home Affairs. The Department 
of Home Affairs (DoHA) rented premises for the purposes of running a refugee office 
                                                     
1
 (20952/08) [2009] ZAWCHC 100 (24 June 2009). Hereafter referred to as Intercape. 
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on land belonging to the third respondent, Cila.  The applicants alleged that the 
operation of the refugee office by the DoHA contravened the applicable zoning 
scheme of the City of Cape Town and that it constituted a nuisance. 
 According to the facts, the office was visited by approximately four to five 
hundred asylum seekers on a daily basis. Because the officials at the DoHA can only 
help a limited number of people per day, applicants who were not assisted remained 
there overnight in order to be in the front of the queue the following day. As a 
consequence, there was an increased amount of litter, the streets were filled with 
remains of material to provide shelter and there was always a remainder of human 
waste and food. The large crowd of asylum seekers attracted illegal street vendors, 
who contributed to the increased amount of litter in the streets. The applicants 
complained that the increased littering and presence of human waste constituted a 
serious health risk, seeing that there were no refuse and sanitation facilities available 
to rectify the unhealthy conditions.2  
 The applicants further complained that the refugee office contributed to an 
increased level of noise. The noise generated by the crowd of approximately four to 
five hundred people was more than an industrial area would normally have to 
tolerate. Taxis that provided asylum seekers with transport to and from the office 
were a further source of noise, as they played loud music and hooted excessively to 
attract potential customers and warn people to clear the streets as they moved to or 
from the office.3 Another source of noise was the large crowds outside the office, 
who screamed and shouted frantically. The noise stemmed from situations where 
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 Par 35. 
3
 Par 38-39. 
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tensions between asylum seekers and criminals were about to erupt into violence. 
The police, who were called upon to restore order, made use of teargas, pepper 
spray and rubber bullets, which caused the crowd to scatter in various directions, 
with some entering the premises of the applicants.4  
 Applicants further complained that the operation of the refugee office 
detrimentally affected safety and security in the area. Although asylum seekers were 
robbed and mugged by criminal elements, the applicants only reported incidents 
where their employees fell victim to the same crimes, adding physical violence and 
intimidation to the list of complaints. In fact, conditions were of such a nature that 
some of the employees resigned and clients became disinclined to visit their 
premises. Moreover, the police interference as a consequence of the tensions 
between the asylum seekers and criminal elements posed an imminent threat to all 
who used the street and surrounding properties.5 
 Regular blocking of the roads by taxis, predominantly as a result of illegal 
parking, was intolerable and consequently added to the applicants‟ list of complaints. 
Intercape, being a bus company, complained that free-flowing traffic was no longer 
possible after the office had been opened. Traffic and police vehicles called upon to 
restore order in times of anarchy contributed to blocked roads.6  
 The first issue the court addressed was to determine whether the refugee 
office contravened the zoning scheme. The court established that Montreal Drive is 
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 Par 36-37. 
5
 Par 45. 
6
 Par 38, 44. 
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subject to the Land Use and Planning Ordinance7 (hereafter referred to as LUPO) 
and that the scheme was zoned for „Industrial General‟ purposes. On the issue of 
whether the respondents complied with the zoning scheme, the court found that the 
scheme had been contravened. 
 The most interesting and relevant part of the judgement, for the purposes of 
this thesis, is the issue whether a nuisance was constituted. While the court was 
ready to grant relief on the basis that the zoning scheme had been contravened, it 
still addressed the cause of action based on nuisance. Without identifying which of 
the two categories of nuisance (private or public) would be applicable, the court 
accepted that the alleged nuisance was of a private nature when it stated:  
„In the context of the present case, the term nuisance connotes a species of delict 
arising from wrongful violation of the duty which our common law imposes on a 
person towards his neighbours, the said duty being the correlative of the right which 
his neighbours have to enjoy the use and occupation of their properties without 
unreasonable interference‟.8  
 The court distinguished the facts in the East London case9 from the facts it 
had to deal with. The court was of the opinion that in the East London case the 
unreasonable interference was an action by the respondent which infringed the 
rights of a neighbouring owner (applicant). On the other hand, on the facts in dispute, 
the unreasonable interferences not only affected the neighbouring owners, but in fact 
                                                     
7
 15 of 1985. 
8
 Par 141. 
9
 East London Western Districts farmers’ association v Minister of Education and Development Aid 
1989 (2) SA 63 (A). 
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„attract people to public areas immediately adjoining the property‟.10 This suggests 
that the nuisance in this case was of a public nature. However, the court stated that 
this distinction does not matter. 
 The court concluded that the continuous activity was objectively 
unreasonable. Therefore, the court found that a nuisance was constituted.  
Consequently the court ordered that using the premise for the purposes of a refugee 
office was unlawful and granted an interdict as an order to cease the operation of the 
office. However, the court suspended the interdict and allowed the DoHA time to find 
alternative premises.   
 According to Church and Church, a public nuisance can be defined as „an act 
or omission or state of affairs that impedes, offends, endangers or inconveniences 
the public at large.‟11 In other words, the aim of the remedy based on the doctrine of 
public nuisance is to protect the health and safety of the general public. In the 
Intercape case all the unreasonable interferences complained of, such as litter and 
noise, could constitute either a private or public nuisance. However, blocked roads 
and violence on public streets are usually associated with a public as opposed to a 
private nuisance. The court nevertheless found it difficult, and also unnecessary, to 
determine whether a private or public nuisance was established in this case. As a 
result, the court used the terms „private nuisance‟ and „public nuisance‟ 
interchangeably, without distinguishing between these two species of nuisance.  
                                                     
10
 Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others (20952/08) 
[2009] ZAWCHC 100 (24 June 2009) par 155. 
11
 Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 
115-145 par 163. 
6 
 
 In the process, the court failed to identify a crucial distinguishing factor 
between these categories of nuisance, namely that all the nuisances in the case 
occurred in a public area, namely the street. All those who were subject to contact 
with the nuisances were automatically victims thereof, and not just the owners or 
occupiers of neighbouring land. Therefore, it can be said that because the nuisance 
occurred in a public space or area, the nuisance affected the community at large and 
thus constituted a public nuisance, as opposed to the court‟s finding of a private 
nuisance.  
 Moreover, the court reached its conclusion that the running of the refugee 
office was unlawful on another basis than nuisance, namely the refugee office‟s 
failure to comply with legislation (LUPO). This raises the question whether the 
doctrine of public nuisance still has a legitimate purpose when legislation covers all 
the relevant offences. Many legislative measures known as statutory nuisance 
regulate unreasonable interferences which would normally be associated with the 
creation of public nuisance. In fact, the last time the common law notion of public 
nuisance was applied legitimately in South African law, in the absence of legislation, 
was probably as far back as 1943, in Queensland v Wiehan.12 
 
1.2 Research question, hypothesis and methodology   
Apart from the problems arising from the Intercape case, the notion of public 
nuisance was applied erroneously in what is categorised as the second series of 
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 1943 EDL 134. 
7 
 
cases, which consists of just one case,13 as well as in a series of cases between 
1989 and 2001, here described as the third series. In all these cases private 
individuals inhabiting private land alleged the existence or possible future presence 
of a public nuisance, while it was clear that the nuisance affected them in their use of 
private land rather than on public land. 
 In view of these problematic applications of the doctrine, the research 
question is whether the common law remedy of public nuisance14 has a legitimate 
purpose in post-apartheid South African law. This will be determined by testing its 
constitutional compatibility against sections 25(1), 25(2) and 26(3) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.   
 My hypothesis is that the use of the doctrine of public nuisance, in series one 
to four, is problematic on three counts. Firstly, the courts used the species of private 
and public nuisance interchangeably, as in the Intercape case. As a result the courts 
often in fact resolved the issue from a private nuisance as opposed to a public 
nuisance perspective. As a consequence, in the cases where the court found the 
existence of a public nuisance, this was not according to its original definition.  
 Secondly, most of the public disturbances originally associated with the public 
nuisance doctrine, which derived from English Common Law,15 are currently 
provided for in legislation.16 The legislation serves as a mechanism for governmental 
                                                     
13
 Von Moltke v Costa Aroesa (Pty) Ltd 1975 (1) SA 255 (C). Hereafter referred to as the Von Moltke 
case. 
14
 Hereafter only referred to as public nuisance. 
15
 See 1.2 below. 
16
 See footnote 56 in chapter 3 below. 
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institutions to regulate public order. Actions resulting in infringements that disturb the 
rights of the public at large, in public spaces or on public land, are regulated by 
prohibiting or criminalising them.17 Since the remedy is now mainly provided for in 
legislation,18 the question is whether the purpose of public nuisance as a common 
law remedy is still of use in modern South African law. 
 Finally, the purpose for which the doctrine of public nuisance was used is 
especially problematic in a particular group of recent cases. The public nuisance 
remedy was indirectly used, specifically in the third series of cases, by private 
individuals to obtain an interdict to evict members of informal settlements. In so 
doing, these private individuals bypassed legislation regulating evictions19 and in the 
process disrupted or frustrated new housing developments, especially those 
provided for in land reform programmes.20  
 In order to determine the legitimacy of public nuisance in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the following methodology will be followed: an examination of the origin and 
history of the doctrine of public nuisance; a comparative analysis of US and English 
law to determine the current use of public nuisance doctrine in those jurisdictions; an 
examination of the adoption of the public nuisance doctrine in South African law; an 
                                                     
17
 Smoke, noise, air pollution, security and health risks to the public. See the definition of public 
nuisance in chapter 2 below. Also see fn 8. 
18
 In Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA, Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 
115-145 par 163 it is called a statutory nuisance, which is defined as a condition or state of affairs 
which a legislative authority has declared to be a nuisance. 
19
 For example, the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
20
 Section 25(5) – (9) of the Constitution provides land restitution and redistribution programmes for 
those who were subject to past discriminatory practices during the apartheid period. Examples of 
legislation promulgated to achieve this goal are the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 
and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
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investigation of recent developments in South African case law; and a consideration 
of the constitutional compatibility of the public nuisance doctrine. The overview of 
each chapter follows below. 
1.3 Chapter overview 
Chapter 2, entitled the history of public nuisance and its adoption in early South 
African law, will commence by offering definitions of private and public nuisance, 
followed by an analysis of the differentiating factors between private and public 
nuisance. The rest of the chapter covers two main themes: an historical overview of 
the origins and development of the public nuisance doctrine in English and US law, 
followed by a discussion on the adoption and development of public nuisance in 
South African law.  
 The term „nuisance‟ is derived from a French word which means harm. 
Nuisance may be defined as an interference with the use and enjoyment of land21 or 
an action that causes annoyance, discomfort or inconvenience to another human 
being.22 Anglo- American law divides nuisance into two categories, namely private 
and public nuisance.23 The focus of this dissertation is on public nuisance in South 
African law. Private nuisance usually occurs between owners or occupiers of 
adjoining land (neighbours) or land in close proximity. According to Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert, private nuisance could be defined as „conduct whereby a 
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 Prosser WL „Private action for public nuisance‟ (1966) 52 Virginia Law Review 997-1027 997. 
22
 Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA, Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 115-
145 par 163. 
23
 Milton JRL „The law of neighbours in South African law‟ 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 128. 
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neighbour‟s health, well-being or comfort in the occupation of his or her land is 
interfered,‟ in so doing causing damage or harm to the owner or occupier of land.24 
 Gray and Gray define the doctrine of public nuisance as follows: „Public 
nuisance may arise in connection with an unlawful act which endangers lives, safety, 
health, property or comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed in the 
exercise or enjoyment of any right common to all Her Majesty‟s subjects.‟25 Public 
nuisance originated in English law in the 12th century as a tort-based crime called tort 
against land26 and was used to protect the Crown against infringements. This special 
remedy of the Crown was used in the following circumstances: unlawful obstruction 
of public highways and rivers, damage or injury causing an inconvenience to a class 
or all of her majesty‟s subjects and a selection of other crimes. Therefore it is clear 
that the public welfare (health and safety) and public morality was protected by the 
remedy.27 In the 14th century public nuisance was extended to the public through the 
protection of individual rights to use public property, such as having a safe passage 
in public roads28 and the abatement of noise and smoke in a market.  
                                                     
24
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM, Mostert H, Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (2006) 111. 
25
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1358; also defined as 'A nuisance whose 
harmful effect is so extensive as to affect the general public at large, or at least a distinct class of 
persons within its field of operation‟ in Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and others v Northern 
Metropolitan 2000 (4) SA 377 (W) 380B-C.  
26
 Schwartz VE & Goldberg P „The law of public nuisance: Maintaining rational boundaries on a 
rational tort‟ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541-583 543. 
27
 Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA , Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 
115-145 par 212. 
28
 Schwartz VE & Goldberg P „The law of public nuisance: Maintaining rational boundaries on a 
rational tort‟ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541-583 545. 
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 The rest of the sub-section will briefly describe the development of public 
nuisance after being extended to the general public in the 14th century. In so doing, I 
aim to provide a better understanding of the doctrine when determining the adoption 
and development of public nuisance in South African law.  The comparative study, of 
which an overview is given below, will serve as a means to determine whether the 
notion of Common Law public nuisance, besides that promulgated in legislation, still 
had a legitimate purpose in English law and in the United States of America during 
the 20th century. US law, like South African law, also adopted the notion of public 
nuisance; therefore, it may be worth investigating what use the remedy had in that 
jurisdiction during the 20th century. In conclusion, it will be established whether this 
notion could still legitimately be applied in South African law.  
 In a recent article by researchers from the University of the West of England,29 
it was argued that the common law remedy of public nuisance could be used to 
protect the environment against „uncontrolled scallop dredging‟30 and so serve a 
legitimate purpose as a Common Law remedy that complements legislation. 
Dredging damages the seabed that ultimately damages the ecosystem. The damage 
will affect the use of the seabed for recreational divers and commercial fisheries. 
According to the researchers, the available legislation gives little protection against 
the damage of the ecosystems through dredging.31 It is therefore suggested that the 
Common Law remedy of public nuisance should be used until legislative action is 
                                                     
29
 See University of West England ‟Public nuisance laws can control damage to ecosystems‟ 
http://info.uwe.ac.uk/news/UWENews/article.asp?item=1454 (29 June 2009).  
30
 Scallop dredging is the use of a kind of dredge which is towed along the bottom of the sea by a 
fishing boat in order to collect oysters, starfish and other species. 
31
 See University of West England ‟Public nuisance laws can control damage to ecosystems‟ 
http://info.uwe.ac.uk/newsUWENews/article.asp?item=1454 (29 June 2009).  
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taken. Therefore, in the absence of environmental and other legislation that protects 
public interests, the notion of public nuisance could possibly also serve a legitimate 
purpose in South African law by providing a remedy for actions that harm the public, 
until legislation is amended or promulgated to cover the situation, as is suggested in 
English law. The possibility to do so will be established in chapter 2. 
 In the United States, public nuisance is mainly provided for in legislation 
(statutory nuisance).32 However, „in the absence of regulation, public nuisance 
became a substitute for governments that could not anticipate and explicitly prohibit 
or regulate through legislation all the particular activities that might injure and annoy 
the general public.‟33 United States lawyers relying on the doctrine of public nuisance 
filed lawsuits in the areas of environmental law34 and product liability,35 where it is 
not effectively provided for in legislation. 
                                                     
32
 Example: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA). 
33
 Schwartz VE & Goldberg P „The law of public nuisance: Maintaining rational boundaries on a 
rational tort‟ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541-583 545. 
34
 Schwartz VE & Goldberg P „The law of public nuisance: Maintaining rational boundaries on a 
rational tort‟ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541-583 548-549. In Diamond v General Motors Corp 
97 Cal Rptr 639, 639 the applicants filed lawsuits for injunctive relief and damages against companies 
that allegedly contributed to air pollution. The court denied the application with the reasoning that 
„public nuisance is ill suited for this type of litigation‟. In Alaska Native Class v Exxon Corp 104 F3d 
1196 (9
th
 Cir 1997) the court denied an application for injunctive relief and damages by way of public 
nuisance for an oil spoil caused by Exxon. In United States v Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp 776 
F2d 410 (2d Cir 1985) the public nuisance remedy was successfully used to clean up a toxic dump; 
also see Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with 
private nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399 392. In New York 
v Shore Reality Corp 759 F2d 1032 (2d Cir 1985) there was a successful application or the removal of 
a toxic dump by way of public nuisance as a remedy. 
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 As in English law, the possibility to use the notion of public nuisance for a 
legitimate purpose not provided for in legislation therefore exists in US law. The 
possible implications of this development in South African law will be examined in 
chapter 2 to establish whether public nuisance could still have a legitimate and 
constitutionally valid purpose outside of legislation.  
 The final theme in chapter 2 is the adoption and development of public 
nuisance in South African law. The Common Law public nuisance remedy was 
derived from English law and was partly provided for in legislation36 and partly 
adopted in South African judicial decisions.37 The term „public nuisance‟ was used in 
judicial decisions as early as the late 1800s. In Dickson v Town Council of Cape 
Town and another38 it was found that dirt in a barrel drain on the ground constituted 
                                                                                                                                                                     
35
 In Detroit Board of Education v Celotex Corp 493 NW2d 513 (Mich Ct App 1992) the court found 
that the notion of public nuisance cannot be used to keep sellers, manufacturers and installers of 
defective products liable. In the tobacco litigation case of Texas v American Tobacco Co 14 F Supp 
2d 956 (ED Tex 1997) the court dismissed a claim that the public‟s rights were infringed on the basis 
of public nuisance, stating that the claim was not within the boundaries of the public nuisance theory. 
Also see Schwartz VE & Goldberg P „The law of public nuisance: Maintaining the rational boundaries 
on a rational tort‟ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541-583 553- 556.  
36
 See Cape Act 2 of 1855 (‟for abating public nuisances‟); Cape Municipal Ordination Act 20 of 1974 
as referred to in Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA, Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 
19 (2006) 115-145 par 213; R v Paulse (1892) 9 SC 422 (statutory provision used to abate a public 
nuisance in the form of a brothel); CP v Reynolds (1901) 22 NLR 89 (pollution of a public stream). 
37
 In London & South African Exploration Co v Kimberly Divisional Council 1887 HCG 287 the court 
granted an interdict against the construction of a tramline on the property of the London & South 
African Exploration Co for Mylchreest, after the argument was raised that the construction constituted 
a public nuisance. In Queenstown Municipality v Wiehan 1943 EDL 134 stray dogs constituted a 
nuisance after killing Wiehan‟s dogs and Wiehan then argued that the municipality was responsible. 
Also see Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in WA Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 
(2006) 115-145 par 213. 
38
 (1868) B 13. 
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a public nuisance and an interdict was granted accordingly.39 Dell v Town Council of 
Cape Town40 is another example where a public deposit of rubbish amounted to a 
public nuisance. However, in Redelinghuys v Silberbauer41 the plaintiff argued that 
the erection of a flour mill would constitute a public nuisance and attempted to 
prevent the erection thereof. The application for the interdict failed as the applicant 
couldn‟t prove that the mill posed a threat to the health of the public and would cause 
an inconvenience to the rest of the neighbourhood. One might conclude that the 
remedy was denied in this case because the nuisance was held to be private rather 
than public, indicating that the remedy was still applied according to its original aims. 
 More examples of where a public nuisance was constituted and relief was 
granted include where a brothel was kept,42 pollution of a public stream,43 dirt in a 
barrel drain on the ground,44 and noise caused by a blacksmith,45 a business trading 
in animal skins46 and stray dogs.47 An overview of the abovementioned examples 
creates the impression that any offence interfering with the public health and safety 
constitutes a public nuisance. Certain public nuisances were even seen as criminal 
wrongs and the perpetrators were prosecuted accordingly.  
                                                     
39
 Milton JRL „The law of neighbours in South African law‟ 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 139. 
40
 (1879) B 2. 
41
 (1874) B 95; See Milton JRL „The law of neighbours in South Africa‟ 1969 Acta Juridica 123-
269 139. 
42
 R v Paulse (1892) 9 SC 422. 
43
 R v CP Reynolds (1901) 22 NLR 89. 
44
 Dickson v Town Council of Cape Town (1868) B 13. 
45
 Holland v Scott (1882) 2 EDC 307. 
46
 Windhoek Municipality v Lurie & Co (SWA) (Pty) Ltd 1957 (1) SA 164 (SWA). 
47
 Queenstown Municipality v Wiehan 1943 EDL 134. 
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 Therefore, public nuisance could be said to have been adopted in early South 
African case law and to have served two functions: firstly, regulating normal 
nuisances like smoke, noise and obstruction of a highway, which interfered with the 
public health and welfare of the public at large and, secondly, to stop any 
unacceptable moral and social behaviour regarded as a criminal offence (like 
keeping a brothel).  
 Public nuisance is currently used mostly by municipalities and city councils to 
regulate nuisances that affect the public. It is mainly provided for in legislation 
(statutory nuisance)48 to regulate public nuisances,49 where a specific action or 
situation poses a threat of or where actual harm already occurred to the broader 
public. The local authorities have to institute proceedings for the abatement of a 
public nuisance.50 
 The analysis in chapter 2 of the remedy of public nuisance in early South 
African judicial decisions (from the late 19th to mid-20th century) will determine the 
public nuisance remedy‟s original field of application in South African law, the 
relation of the application of public nuisance (in judicial decisions) between English 
and South African law and how far the Common Law remedy of public nuisance was 
promulgated into legislation.  
                                                     
48
 See footnote 6 for a definition of statutory nuisance. 
49
 For example the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965; National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998; Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972; Health Act 63 of 1977. 
50
 Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA, Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 115-
145 par 211. 
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 Chapter 3 will establish that the use of common law public nuisance in more 
recent South African case law is problematic. This is mainly as a result of the 
detrimental effect that the notion of public nuisance had when it was used in recent 
case law (which will be explained below) in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 As indicated above, public nuisance was originally used for the abatement of 
ordinary public nuisances (protecting the general public health and safety) and also 
in extreme situations, where it was used to prosecute members of the public against 
actions that were morally and socially unacceptable.51 The Common Law remedy of 
public nuisance was not used for a long time after the decision of Queensland v 
Wiehan in 1943,52 except in a series of recent cases from 1989. This is largely due to 
the aims of the remedy being embodied in legislation, as was indicated in chapter 2.  
 However, in recent case law, public nuisance has been used in a unique set 
of facts and circumstances. In most of these cases, private individuals, in 
predominantly white residential areas, formed landowners‟,53 farmers‟,54 
                                                     
51
 It is concluded in Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA, Harms LTC (eds) 
LAWSA 19 (2006) 115-145 par 214 that „the practice of prosecuting certain public nuisances as 
criminal offences at common law has fallen into disuse, largely as a result of the enactment of 
equivalent statutory offences.‟ 
52
 1943 EDL 134. The judicial decision of Von Moltke v Costa Aerosa (Pty) Ltd 1975 (1) SA 255 (C) is 
one exception where the Common Law remedy of public nuisance was used in the period between 
1943 and 1989. The applicant contended that eradicating vegetation (in his vicinity) for the 
development of a new shopping mall would constitute a public nuisance. He applied for an interdict to 
restrain a public nuisance and had to show special injury/reason in order to have locus standi. The 
applicant failed because he could not show that „he is suffering or will suffer some injury, prejudice or 
damage or invasion of right peculiar to himself and over and above that sustained by the members of 
the public in general.‟ 258D-F. 
53
 Diepsloot Residents’ Landowners Association and another v Administrator Transvaal 1993 (1) SA 
577 (T); 1993 (3) 49 (T); 1994 (3) SA 336 (A). Hereafter referred to as Diepsloot. 
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ratepayers‟55 and environmental associations56 and applied for an interdict to abate 
future or present disturbances, alleged to constitute a public nuisance, caused by 
informal settlements being established or developed on state-owned land.57 The 
applicants in these cases argued that establishing or developing an informal 
settlement in the vicinity of their properties would threaten their health, pose a safety 
                                                                                                                                                                     
54
 East London Western Districts Farmers’ Association v Minister of Education and Development Aid 
1989 (2) SA 63 (A). 
55
 Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and others v Northern Metropolitan 2000 (4) SA 377 (W). 
Hereafter referred to as Three Rivers. 
56
 Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and another 
(Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) (hereafter referred to as Kyalami Ridge). However, 
in Rademeyer and others v Western Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE) the private 
individuals never formed a specific group but still brought a joint application for the removal of 
occupiers believed to be causing a nuisance. 
57
 See East London Western Districts Farmers’ Association v Minister of Education and Development 
Aid 1989 (2) SA 63 (A), where the application for an interdict to abate a public nuisance, as a result of 
an informal settlement, was granted. In Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and another 
v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (3) SA 336 (A) an application for an interdict preventing the 
establishment of the formal settlement was denied after the court considered policy considerations 
(see the statements made by Smallberger J, referred to in chapter 3). In Rademeyer and others v 
Western Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE) the application for an interdict to 
prevent the establishment of an informal settlement was denied because the occupiers of the informal 
settlement were protected as „occupiers‟ under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. In 
Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and others v Northern Metropolitan 2000 (4) SA 377 (W) an 
application for an interdict was granted after the local authority could not prove that it had taken 
reasonable steps to prevent a possible public nuisance caused by an informal settlement being 
established in the vicinity of the properties owned by the members of the Three Rivers Ratepayers 
Association. In Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and 
another (Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) the court denied an application for an 
interdict to prevent a temporary transit camp from being established in the vicinity of farms and 
residential areas. Amongst the arguments presented by the applicants was that of a public nuisance 
being constituted, however, but no evidence could be given to support that argument and it failed in 
the Constitutional Court.  
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hazard and decrease the value of their property.58 In fact, however, these 
applications were always aimed at protecting the individual interests of the property 
owners who were members of the associations that brought the applications. In 
addition granting the applications would always have the implication that new 
settlements would be prevented from being established and, in some cases that 
already settled residents of the new developments would have to be evicted. 
 Some of the cases in this third series preceded the constitution and land 
reform legislation, and in some the effort to obtain indirect eviction orders failed. The 
use of the public nuisance doctrine as a cause of action was successful in two of the 
five decisions, namely East London and Three Rivers. In both cases the courts 
suggested that the applicants‟ private right in land had been infringed and that, 
according to the principles of neighbour law, they were entitled to the reasonable use 
and enjoyment of land. Despite the applicants‟ alleging the presence of a public 
nuisance, the above-mentioned courts never established the existence of a public 
nuisance according to its original definition.  
 In contrast, the doctrine‟s use contrary to its original aims was not allowed in 
the Diepsloot,59 Rademeyer and Kyalami Ridge cases.60  
                                                     
58
 In Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and another v Administrator Transvaal 1993 
(1) 577 (T) the applicants applied for an interim interdict prohibiting the Administrator to establish the 
informal settlement. The applicants argued that establishing an informal settlement would cause a 
health and safety hazard and a drop in the value of their property. The court granted the interim 
interdict and referred the matter to trial. 
59
 Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners Association and others v Administrator, Transvaal and others 
1993 (3) SA 49 (T). 
60
 See 3.2.2. 
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 As seen in the South African and English judicial decisions, the remedy of 
public nuisance has been mainly used to abate a public nuisance that infringed or 
interfered with public health and safety. Public nuisance was never used to evict or 
prevent formal or informal settlements from being established, as happened in the 
recent case law. The decision to evict current occupiers or to prevent establishment 
of a new development is a drastic measure, since the state could prevent some of 
the problems complained of, for instance by installing proper services (water, tarred 
roads, sanitary services and electricity).61  
 Furthermore, the protection of public health and safety is mostly promulgated 
in legislation and regulated by local authorities. Therefore, there has to be 
extraordinary circumstances in order to use the Common Law notion of public 
nuisance to apply for an interdict to abate a nuisance that is largely regulated by 
legislation already. Such extraordinary circumstances were not proved in the cases 
referred to. The fact that there are no other reported cases where the notion of public 
nuisance was used after 1943 suggests that the legislation that has been 
promulgated to protect residents against new developments in their vicinity was 
largely successful. Reliance on the doctrine of public nuisance in these cases is 
therefore questionable. 
 More importantly, the use of public nuisance is especially problematic in the 
context of the new constitutional dispensation. The Bill of Rights specifically 
promotes land reform in section 25(5)–(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
                                                     
61
 Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours: Landownership, land reform and the property clause‟ 
(2002) 19 SALJ 816-840 822. 
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South Africa.62 The land reform programme provides protection to those who were 
subject to past racially discriminatory laws or practices (predominantly black South 
Africans).63 The land reform framework in section 25(5)–(9) and legislation 
promulgated to give effect to it, such as the Extension of Security of Tenure Act64 
and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Occupation of Land Act,65 now 
provide rules and procedures that have to be followed before anyone can be evicted 
from their homes (whether they are there lawfully or unlawfully).66 These rules and 
procedures are in effect bypassed by the use of public nuisance in the recent 
decisions such as Three Rivers. This is certainly a problem, as there is an urgent 
need for housing and a reciprocal duty on private landowners to act responsibly, 
especially in the view of transformation and increased urbanisation.67 
 Finally, the use of the public nuisance remedy to bypass eviction legislation 
leaves members of informal settlements homeless, in a process that is reminiscent 
                                                     
62
 1996. Hereafter referred to as the Constitution. 
63
 Section 25(6)–(9). 
64
 62 of 1997. Hereafter referred to as ESTA.  
65
 19 0f 1998. Hereafter referred to as PIE. 
66
 Section 4(6) of Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 state that 
courts may only grant an eviction order if all the relevant circumstances were taken into account, 
including the rights of children and women-headed households. In Rademeyer and others v Western 
Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE) the court denied an application to evict people, 
due to the eviction process in the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 not being complied 
with. 
67
 See Diepsloot Residents Landowners Association and another v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (3) 
SA 336 (A) 348-349. See further Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours: Landownership, land 
reform and the property clause‟ (2002) 19 SALJ 816-840 825. 
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of previous discriminatory practices which should be avoided at all cost, as stated by 
Van der Walt:68 
„Given the history of forced removals and the explicit commitment in the Constitution, 
and in the land reform programme as a whole, to eradicating the legacy of apartheid 
land law and preventing its recurrence, we have to be conscious of and sensitive to 
this particularly unhappy history, and bear in mind that a substantial part of the land 
reform programme is aimed at dismantling the very structures and imbalances 
brought about, and cemented into current land holding patterns, through something 
akin to indirect planning and nuisance evictions.‟  
 Chapter 3 will ultimately establish that the role that Common Law public 
nuisance played in the recent case law is problematic in the new constitutional 
dispensation and raise the question whether this doctrine has any other legitimate 
purpose in modern South African law, considering the fact that the remedy is largely 
provided for in legislation and that the current use of the remedy has detrimental 
effects on the housing process in South Africa.  
 As seen in chapter 3, it could be argued that the recent application of public 
nuisance in case law is problematic in South African law.69 According to section 2 
and section 39 (3) of the Constitution, common law that is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights is invalid. On the other hand, section 39(2) encourages the development of 
the common law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution. Read 
with section 39(2), section 173 gives the inherent power to specified courts to 
develop the common law.  However, the development of public nuisance as a 
common law remedy is uncertain, as it is not clear whether it has any further use in 
                                                     
68
 Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours: Landownership, land reform and the property clause‟ 
(2002) 19 SALJ 816-840 827.  
69
 See text at footnote 76 and 77. 
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South African law, especially in the light of the case law discussed in chapter 3. This 
uncertainty will be investigated further in chapter 4, entitled the constitutional 
compatibility of public nuisance. The development of non-statutory public nuisance 
will be determined after testing its constitutional compatibility against sections 25(1), 
25(2) and 26(3) of the Constitution in chapter 4. 
  Section 25(1) provides that no one may be deprived of property except in 
terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property.70 Van der Walt defines a deprivation as the restriction of the „owner‟s use 
and enjoyment, exploitation and disposal of the property and so diminish its value or 
profitability, and is „usually not compensated‟.71 There are two requirements for a 
lawful deprivation in section 25(1). Firstly, the deprivation must take place in terms of 
law of general application. Secondly, no law may permit arbitrary deprivation. Van 
der Walt suggests that, together with the two requirements, there is a third implicit 
requirement that a „deprivation should serve a legitimate public purpose or public 
interest.‟72  
 According to Van der Walt, the requirement of „law of general application‟ in 
section 25(1) does not only refer to legislative provisions but is also applicable to 
common or customary law.73 The question whether the use of a common law remedy 
such as public nuisance could also constitute an arbitrary deprivation, will be 
determined in chapter 4.  
                                                     
70
 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
71
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 124-125. 
72
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 137. 
73
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 144. 
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 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance74 the Court explained that „arbitrary‟ meant that there was insufficient 
reason for the deprivation of the property. What could constitute sufficient reason is 
explained in the FNB case as follows: „It is to be determined by evaluating the 
relationship between means employed, namely the deprivation in question and ends 
sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question.‟75 Whether the 
reasons for a deprivation are sufficient has to be determined with reference to the 
circumstances under which the deprivation took place, the purpose of the deprivation 
and the relationships affected by it.  
 As indicated above, the common law notion of public nuisance qualifies as 
law of general application. It is therefore necessary to establish whether public 
nuisance, as applied in the case law, amounts to an arbitrary deprivation. In the 
recent case law mentioned in chapter 3, the occupiers of informal settlements were 
prevented from occupying land, or in some instances, lost their right to occupy the 
land. In some cases this effort to rely on public nuisance failed,76 in others the 
Constitution, specifically section 26(3), and anti-eviction legislation did not apply 
yet.77 In essence, loss of occupation is a deprivation of land, however, it has to be 
                                                     
74
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); hereafter referred to as the FNB case. 
75
 Paras 99-100. 
76
 Rademeyer and others v Western Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE); Minister of 
Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Another (Mukhwevho 
intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC).  
77
 See East London Western Districts farmers’ association v Minister of Education and Development 
Aid 1989 (2) SA 63 (A); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and Another v 
Administrator Transvaal 1993 (1) 577 (T); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and 
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established whether the deprivation was arbitrary. It is known that the public 
nuisance doctrine was employed as the means to abate disturbances. However, it 
could be argued that the end sought was not a legitimate one. After a period of 40 
years, the doctrine of public nuisance was wrongfully reincarnated by the various 
applicants to suit their specific needs. The original purpose of this remedy, the 
abatement of disturbances, became an ancillary objective. Further analysis will 
determine whether there is an arbitrary deprivation.  
  Once the deprivation passes scrutiny under section 25(1)78 one can establish 
whether the notion of public nuisance infringes the rights envisaged in section 25(2). 
There will be no inquiry, testing the compliance of the deprivation with section 25(2), 
„if the deprivation proves to be unconstitutional in terms of section 25(1) or if it cannot 
be justified‟ in terms of section 36 (the limitations clause).79 At this stage I am of the 
opinion that the deprivation caused by an eviction order based on Common Law 
public nuisance would be arbitrary and therefore, no inquiry with regard to possible 
section 25(2) infringement would be necessary. However, that remains to be 
established in the remainder of chapter 4. 
 Furthermore, it will be argued in chapter 4 that the use of public nuisance in 
recent case law is an infringement in terms of section 26(3). Public nuisance is a 
remedy for the purpose of abating nuisances, not to allow private individuals to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Another v Administrator Transvaal 1993 (3) 49 (T); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association 
and Another v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (3) SA 336 (A). 
78
 Ackermann in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 59 concluded that „the deprivation passes scrutiny under section 
25(1) if it does not infringe section 25(1) or, if it does, is a justified limitation.‟ 
79
See the text of section 36(1) below. 
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bypass anti-eviction measures provided for in ESTA and PIE.80 Therefore, this 
chapter will test the constitutional compatibility of public nuisance in light of section 
26(3).  
 To summarize, the focus of the analysis is to establish whether the Common 
Law remedy of public nuisance is compatible with the Constitution and to determine 
the continued legitimacy of this remedy in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
1.4 Remarks 
The primary focus of this thesis is on the continued legitimacy of the common law 
notion of public nuisance. Therefore no in-depth discussion on private nuisance is 
presented. However, throughout the thesis reference to private nuisance is made 
where it is necessary to illustrate the difference between a private and public 
nuisance. 
 Furthermore, there is no specific chapter dedicated to a comparative study in 
the thesis. However, a comparative analysis on English and US law is done in 
chapter 2. The aim of the analysis is to determine whether the notion of Common 
Law public nuisance, besides that promulgated in legislation, still had a legitimate 
purpose in English and US law during the 20th century.  
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 See footnote 62 and 63 above. 
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Chapter 2: The history of public nuisance and its adoption 
in South African law 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter will commence by offering definitions of private and public nuisance, 
followed by an analysis of the differentiating factors between private and public 
nuisance. The rest of the chapter covers two main themes: an historical overview of 
the origins and development of the public nuisance doctrine in English and US law, 
followed by a discussion on the adoption and development of public nuisance in 
South African law.  
 The aim of the analysis is to establish in what context and for which purpose 
the common law notion of public nuisance originated in England and South Africa. 
The analysis will include an overview of various unreasonable interferences 
categorised as public nuisances; interferences not categorised as public nuisances; 
implementation of statutory nuisance; and available remedies for successful 
applicants who sought relief by using the public nuisance doctrine as a cause of 
action. 
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2.2 Definition of, and differences between, private and public nuisance 
The term „nuisance‟ is derived from the French word nusans, which means harm.1 A 
nuisance is constituted when an act or omission unreasonably interferes with the 
rights of other private individuals or the general public.2  
 Nuisance is traditionally classified into two categories, private and public. 
Private nuisance can be defined as „conduct whereby a neighbour‟s health, well-
being or comfort in the occupation of his or her land is interfered with.‟3 According to 
Spencer, public nuisance can be defined as „an act or omission that endangers the 
life, health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the 
exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty‟s subjects.‟4 
                                                     
1
 Spencer JR „Public nuisance – A critical examination‟ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Review 55-84 56. 
2
 Gray J „Public nuisance: A historical perspective‟ (http://www.nuisancelaw.com/learn/historical) (17 
March 2009). 
3
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM, & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 111. Private nuisance is also defined as „an act or omission or condition or state of affairs that 
materially inconveniences another in the ordinary comfortable use or enjoyment of land or premises‟ 
in Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 
115-145 par 163. 
4
 News Group Newspapers Ltd v SOGAT ’82 [1986] IRLR 337 346. See also Spencer JR „Public 
nuisance – A critical examination‟ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Review 55-84 55. Another definition of 
public nuisance is given in Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and others v Northern Metropolitan 
2000 (4) SA 337 (W) 380B-C as „a nuisance whose harmful effect is so extensive as to affect the 
general public at large, or at least a distinct class of persons within its field of operation.‟ In Milton JRL 
„The law of neighbours in South African law‟ 1969 Acta Juridica 123-269 128, public nuisance is 
defined as „a species of criminal offence amounting to an unlawful act which interferes with or 
endangers the life, health, property or comfort of the public.‟ Church J & Church J „Nuisance‟ in 
Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 115-145 par 163 define a public 
nuisance as „an act or omission or state of affairs that impedes, offends, endangers or 
inconveniences the public at large.‟ 
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 In general, a private nuisance affects an individual (or individuals) living in the 
immediate vicinity of the perpetrator, for instance, a neighbour or neighbours. In 
contrast, a public nuisance is constituted when a public right of the public5 is affected 
as a result of the nuisance. A public right is usually related to public health and 
safety or substantial inconvenience or annoyance to the public. Abrams and 
Washington6 suggest three distinguishing factors that separate public from private 
nuisance. The distinguishing factors can be summarised as follows: first of all, a 
public nuisance affects the general public as opposed to only neighbours in the 
vicinity of the perpetrator; secondly, public nuisance is an infringement of a public 
right7 in a public space instead of a private right on private land; and finally, 
proceedings for a public nuisance are instituted by an governmental authority - on 
behalf of private individuals who complained of a public nuisance - with the 
jurisdiction and locus standi to do so, rather than by private individuals, as in the 
case of private nuisance.8  
                                                     
5
 Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private 
nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399 364. 
6
 Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private 
nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399. 
7
 According to Prosser WL „Private action for public nuisance‟ (1966) 52 Virginia Law Review 997-
1027 1001 „It is not, however, necessary that the entire community be affected, so long as the 
nuisance will interfere with those who come into contact with it in the exercise of the public right.‟ 
According to Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison 
with private nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399 364, a public 
right can be defined as a right „usually relating to public health and safety or substantial 
inconvenience or annoyance to the public.‟   
8
 Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private 
nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399 364-365. 
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 The first factor that distinguishes public and private nuisance was illustrated in 
the English case of Attorney-General v PYA Quarries.9 In this case Lord Denning LJ 
expressed the following opinion with regard to the difference between private and 
public nuisance:  
„The classic statement of the difference is that a public nuisance affects Her Majesty‟s 
subjects generally, whereas a private nuisance only affects particular individuals. But 
this does not help much. The question, “When does a number of individuals become 
Her Majesty‟s subjects generally?” is as difficult to answer as the question “When 
does a group of people become a crowd?” Everyone has his own views. Even the 
answer, “Two‟s company, three‟s a crowd”, will not command the assent of those 
present unless they first agree on, “which two”. So here I decline to answer the 
question how many people are necessary to make up Her Majesty‟s subjects 
generally. I prefer to look to the reason of the thing and to say that a public nuisance 
is a nuisance which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that 
it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own 
responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the 
community at large.‟10 
 In this passage Lord Denning LJ expressed how difficult it is to ascertain the 
distinction between private and public nuisance. However, he is of the opinion that a 
private nuisance occurs when a specific or particular person is affected. On the other 
hand, a public nuisance occurs when the public in general is subject to an 
unreasonable act or omission, with those affected taking responsibility for the 
abatement of such a nuisance. If the unreasonable interference affects one 
individual or home in the vicinity or area where it occurs, then one could conclude 
that the nuisance is of a private nature. However, when the general public is affected 
by a bothersome activity, a public right is infringed and it constitutes a public 
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 [1957] 2 QB 169. Hereafter referred to as the Quarries case. 
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 Attorney–General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169 190. 
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nuisance. In the case of a public nuisance, the vicinity in which the affected 
members of the public experience a bothersome activity is not as important as in the 
case of a private nuisance dispute. 
 In the recent South African decision of Three Rivers Ratepayers Association 
and Others v Northern Metropolitan,11 Snyders J found the „public extent‟ of a public 
nuisance to be the main distinguishing factor between public and private nuisance. 
One could assume that the „public extent of the nuisance‟ refers to two things: first of 
all, the number of people affected by a nuisance; and secondly, affecting a public 
instead of a private right.  
 It is not exactly clear how many individuals it would take to satisfy the 
requirement of „public‟ in the context of public nuisance. Lord Denning LJ addressed 
this issue in the Quarries case, where he expressed the difficulty in determining what 
would constitute such a number. According to Lord Denning LJ, a public nuisance is 
constituted when the community at large is affected.12  
 In the earlier English judgement of R v De Berenger,13 Bayley J was of the 
opinion that „public‟ does not have to affect the community at large, but it is enough if 
it is prejudicial to a class of subjects.14 However, in the English case of R v Lloyd15 
three applicants affected by a nuisance were not enough to satisfy the requirement 
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 2000 (4) SA 377 (W). 
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 Attorney–General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169 190. 
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 [1814] 3 M & S 67. 
14
 Spencer JR „Public nuisance – A critical examination‟ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Review 55-84 62. 
15
 [1804] 4 Esp 200. 
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of being a „community at large‟16 or a „distinct class of persons.‟17 The Royal 
Commission of 183318 also expressed the difficulty of ascertaining what number of 
persons affected by an unreasonable interference would constitute a public 
nuisance. However, the Commission was of the opinion that some limit should be 
appointed. Thus one can conclude that some limit should be ascertained when 
establishing whether applicants satisfy the „public‟ requirement.  
 It could be said that the courts have the discretion to decide what number of 
applicants affected by a disturbance would meet the requirements of „public.‟ 
Furthermore, the number of people affected by an unreasonable interference has not 
caused substantial problems in the past.19 The question is not raised very often and 
is therefore not considered to be extraordinarily problematic. 
 In the light of the discussion, two distinct categories of nuisance have been 
identified, namely that of private and public nuisance. Both categories envisage 
unreasonable interferences infringing the rights of either a private individual or the 
public at large. Private nuisance is applicable to particular individuals whose private 
rights have been infringed, while  public nuisance is applicable in situations where a 
public right has been infringed that affects the public at large or a distinct class of 
persons.  
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 Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and Others v Northern Metropolitan 2000 (4) SA 337 (W) 
380B-C. 
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 R v De Berenger [1814] 3 M & S 67; ER 536. 
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 According to Milton, the Royal Commission was appointed in 1833. The Royal Commission‟s 
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nuisance in English law (1978) 145, 213. 
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 An overview of the history and development of the Common Law20 notion of 
public nuisance will establish the purposes for which, and the context in which, the 
notion of public nuisance originated and developed in English law. The analysis will 
provide the opportunity to compare the application of public nuisance (in judicial 
decisions) in English and South African law, and how far the Common Law remedy 
of public nuisance was promulgated into legislation.  
 
2.3 Historical overview of public nuisance in English law  
2.3.1 Introduction 
Public nuisance originated in English law during the 12th century as a tort-based 
crime called „tort against the land‟ and was used to protect the Crown against 
infringements. A public nuisance was primarily a criminal wrong, but it was later 
developed to accommodate plaintiffs with monetary compensation. Plaintiffs had to 
prove special or particular damage, as was decided in Sowthall v Dagger.21 This 
remedy was a tort and known as the „special injury rule.‟22 At the time the term 
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  When reference is made to Roman-Dutch common law it will be written in the lower case, while if 
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nuisance in English law (1978) 145. 
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„public nuisance‟ did not exist, nor did it have any legal meaning. Public nuisance, as 
a criminal wrong, was applied in the case of purprestures,23 a French term denoting 
an enclosure. Purprestures were interferences such as unlawful obstruction of 
highways, rivers and encroachments which caused injury or an unreasonable 
inconvenience upon royal lands. This suggests that a differentiating factor is that the 
effects of public nuisance are felt on public land or in public spaces, not primarily or 
just on private land. 
 The court of the sheriff‟s tourn was a criminal court that prosecuted 
perpetrators accused of intruding on royal domain. The sheriff‟s duty was to 
represent the King and ultimately preserve public peace and order.24  
 During the reign of King Edward III in the 14th century the notion of public 
nuisance was extended to the public through the protection of individual rights to use 
public property, such as having a safe passage on public roads25 and the abatement 
of noise and smoke in a market. Again, it can be said that public nuisance only 
applied on public land or in public spaces. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
[1681] T Jones 156; Baker v Moore [1696] (unreported) cited in Iveson v Moore [1699] 1 Ld Raym 
486 494. For the plaintiff to be successful, he had to prove special or particular damage that was 
different from damages suffered by the public at large. The remedy to claim a monetary amount for 
damages caused great confusion as to when an action should be based on private or public nuisance 
in the courts of the United States. See Hodas DR „Private action for public nuisance: Common law 
citizen suits for relief from environmental harm‟ (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly 883-908 884.  
23
 Milton JRL The concept of nuisance in English law (1978) 23. 
24
 Milton JRL The concept of nuisance in English law (1978) 21. 
25
 Schwartz VE & Goldberg P „The law of public nuisance: Maintaining rational boundaries on a 
rational tort‟ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541-583 541. 
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2.3.2 Early forms of public nuisances 
In the early 15th century the court‟s leet succeeded the court of the sheriff‟s tourn and 
continued prosecuting those accused of unreasonably interfering on the King‟s 
land.26 However, apart from the abovementioned nuisances, the court leet developed 
separate distinct nuisances (especially nuisances affecting the public health) such as 
dung heaps, refuse, ashes and soil.27 These nuisances were different from those 
prosecuted in the court of the sheriff‟s tourn, namely encroachment on walls, gates 
and hedges on royal domain. More forms of nuisances, such as domestic waste 
(such as urine) flung from windows, or butchers disposing of feathers, horns and 
offal in streets, that were previously unknown were prosecuted and classified as 
common nuisances.28 The introduction of these nuisances shaped the development 
of public nuisance for the betterment of public health, morality and ultimately public 
welfare. The court defined these nuisances as ad commune nocumenta, meaning 
„common nuisance‟,29 later to be known as „public nuisance‟, as it is known today.  
 The public could lodge a complaint of a public nuisance to the sheriff or later 
the Attorney-General, but nobody was allowed to institute proceedings for the 
abatement of a public nuisance on their own. The idea was that a common nuisance 
was a complaint by the King brought on behalf of the public.30  
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 In the beginning of the 18th century Hawkins published the first 
comprehensive book on criminal law entitled Pleas of the Crown. More importantly, 
Hawkins recognised the idea that common or public nuisance existed in terms of the 
Common Law. Hawkins defined a common nuisance as follows:  
„a common nuisance may be defined to be an offence against the public, either by 
doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of all the King‟s subjects, or by neglecting 
to do a thing which the common good requires.‟31 
 Bacon, in his book entitled New abridgement of the law (1736-1766),32 gave a 
more detailed list of offences prosecuted under the heading of common nuisance. 
These included gaming and bawdy houses, all common stages for rope-dancers, 
obstruction of a highway (by ditches, hedges, gates, logs), diverting navigable rivers, 
and setting up of brew houses, glass-houses, chandler‟s shops and swine sties in 
areas where these places would cause an inconvenience to the public.33 This 
illustrate that public nuisance affected any person subject to contact with an 
unreasonable interference originating from a public space or public land. 
 In Blackstone‟s Commentaries (1765)34 he added another nuisance to 
Bacon‟s list, namely that of offensive trades and manufacturers that are detrimental 
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 Hawkins W Pleas of the crown (1
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to the public. An example would be R v Pierce,35 where the defendant, who owned a 
soap boilery, constituted a nuisance while exercising his trade.36  
 At this point the interchangeable use of the words „common‟ and „public‟ 
nuisance has to be clarified. During the 18th and 19th centuries the notions of 
common and public nuisance were used interchangeably. It was later established 
that both terms had the same meaning. According to Spencer, „when the word 
“common” began to mean “ordinary”, rather than “of the community”, they were 
usually called public nuisances instead.‟37 
 All the above-mentioned nuisances were petty crimes that caused an 
unreasonable interference with the public health, safety and welfare of the 
community at large.38 According to Milton, the judges in the 18th and 19th century 
introduced new forms of common or public nuisances, discussed under the following 
heading, by expressing more sophisticated public interests39 derived from the idea of 
obstruction or annoyance of a public highway. The significant case law during the 
18th and 19th centuries introduced two important forms of nuisances, namely smells 
or odours and noise.  
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 Another example can be found in R v Pappineau [1762] 2 Str 678, where the defendant was found 
guilty of a public nuisance „in that he kept stinking hides near a public highway.‟ See Milton JRL The 
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2.3.3 Significant case law  
2.3.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses significant case law of both private and public nuisance. The 
questions in these cases were often not if a public nuisance were constituted but 
only that of a nuisance. The aim of the section is to illustrate that smells or odours 
and noise were introduced as nuisances during the 18th and 19th century. 
 
2.3.3.2 Smells 
R v Alfred40 was the first reported case where an action for a public nuisance, based 
on the smell emanating from a pig sty, was allowed and successful. The same cause 
of action was considered in R v White and Ward,41 where the defendants were 
charged for creating stinks and smells.42 However, it couldn‟t be proved that the 
smell affected the public at large and the argument of a public nuisance was 
rejected. According to Milton, Walter v Selfe43 is the leading case on odours 
constituting a nuisance during the 19th century.44 Knight Bruce VC was of the 
opinion that the basis for the classification of smells as a public nuisance was 
derived from the inherent right to an untainted and unpolluted stream of air.45 Knight 
Bruce VC concluded that the claim rested not so much upon the interest of physical 
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 [1611] 9 Co Rep 57. See Milton JRL The concept of nuisance in English law (1978) 398. 
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 [1757] 1 Burr 333. See Milton JRL The concept of nuisance in English law (1978) 398. 
42
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 [1851] 4 De G & Sm 315. 
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 Milton JRL The concept of nuisance in English law (1978) 400. 
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health or damage to property, but rather upon the interest in physical comfort as a 
normal incident of the occupation of land.46 It could be said that Knight Bruce VC 
suggests that the nuisance complained of is of a private opposed to a public nature. 
The nuisance only affected Walter, a private individual exercising his use and 
enjoyment of land opposed to the public at large in public space or on public land. 
 
2.3.3.3 Noise 
Milton is of the opinion that nuisance in the form of noise developed as a result of 
increased production of machinery and mechanical manufacturing during the 
Industrial Revolution in the 19th century.47  
 The first reported case during the 19th century was that of Elliotson v 
Feetham.48 The plaintiff successfully proved that heavy jarring, varying, agitating, 
hammering and battering sounds constituted a nuisance.49 Similarly, in Crump v 
Lambert50 Romilly J MR concluded that noise alone could be regarded as a 
nuisance. Romilly J MR thus concurred with the decision in Elliotson v Feetham51 
when he agreed that noise can constitute a nuisance.  
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 Other instances where noise, as a cause of action, was for example where 
noise originating from industrial operations;52 trades and occupations;53 construction 
works and building operations;54 entertainments;55 animals56 and various other 
sources.57 
 The above-mentioned interferences such as noise and smells are found in the 
most significant case law pertaining to public nuisance during the 19th and 20th 
century.58 However, one has to bear in mind that earlier forms of public nuisances 
such as obstruction of highways and navigable rivers, as well as the preservation of 
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 See Goose v Bedford [1873] 21 WR 449 (steam hammer); Beaumont v Emery [1875] WN 106 
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operation of machinery during night time was found to have constituted a nuisance.  
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public morality (rope dancers, gaming and bawdy houses), were (and still are) 
regarded as public nuisances.  
 Apart from these important cases signifying the development and recognition 
of public nuisance in English Common Law, there was other significant case law that 
did not recognise interferences to be public nuisances. These interferences are 
analysed below in 2.3.3.4. 
 
2.3.3.4 Interferences not recognised as nuisances 
Milton identifies four interferences that allegedly do not constitute a nuisance. These 
are actions creating fear, violating privacy, the prospect of experiencing an 
inconvenience and interference resulting in economic loss.  
 
2.3.3.4.1 Fear 
In Baines v Baker59 the applicant approached the court for an injunction against the 
construction of a small-pox hospital. The applicant argued that the construction of a 
small-pox hospital would constitute a nuisance. In his judgement Lord Hardwicke 
expressed the opinion that the fear of mankind, although it might be reasonable, 
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cannot be regarded as a nuisance. It is clear that the claim had to have had more 
substance and not merely be based on anxiety or fear.60 
 
2.3.3.4.2 Prospect 
The prospect of experiencing an inconvenience, especially in situations where new 
buildings are to be erected, does not automatically constitute a nuisance. Lord 
Hardwicke in Attorney-General v Doughty61 held that there is no Common Law rule 
prohibiting the construction of new buildings based on the grounds of the prospect of 
their effect on light and view. Lord Hardwicke went on to suggest that there would be 
no great towns if he had to grant injunctions based on the prospect of experiencing 
an inconvenience lodged by plaintiffs.62   
 
2.3.3.4.3 Economic loss 
The term economic loss could also be explained as the depreciation in value of land. 
During the 19th century, members of the public claimed to have been victims of 
nuisance which allegedly made them suffer economic loss. According to Milton, the 
Common Law never recognised economic loss as a ground to institute a successful 
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action for nuisance.63 The following case law illustrates this point. In Attorney-
General v Nichol64 Lord Eldon concurred with Lord Hardwicke that a diminution of 
the value of the premises is not a sufficient ground to constitute a nuisance.65 The 
later decisions of Jones v Tapling66 and Harrison v Good67 concurred with the 
reasoning of the earlier decisions that mere economic loss is an insufficient ground 
to constitute a nuisance.  
 It is not clear that applicants who alleged fear, prospect and economic loss 
were denied relief by the English courts because these allegations were not 
regarded as grounds for nuisance, specifically public nuisance. These cases merely 
illustrate that these alleged non-recognised interferences lacked the necessary 
evidence to prove the existence of a nuisance, be it a private or a public nuisance.  
 As it will appear from the discussion below, recognised unreasonable 
interferences characterised as public nuisances were later promulgated into 
legislation and known as statutory nuisance. The introduction of a legislative 
framework regulating public nuisances subsequently reduced the use of Common 
Law public nuisance. According to Milton, the diminishing number of reported cases 
was due to the enactment of statutory nuisance.  
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2.3.4 Statutory nuisance in English law 
Nuisance originated as a Common Law remedy. However, during the period of the 
Industrial Revolution (between 1760 and 1830) statutory provisions replaced some of 
the Common Law public nuisances. The Industrial Revolution led to increased 
urbanisation in the vicinity of major factories enabling employees to be closer to 
work. The population increased, which led to a devastating torrent of public 
nuisances.68 These nuisances caused the deterioration of public health for many 
reasons: the housing provided for employees did not have toilets or drains; residents 
disposed of filth into the streets; and the dense population increased the amount of 
smoke which polluted the air. Machinery in factories caused continuous unbearable 
noise during the day and night that negatively affected the broader public. 
 This led to legislative measures being put into place to regulate these public 
nuisances.69 In 1847 two statutes pertaining to public nuisance were enacted. The 
first is the Town Clauses Improvement Act of 1847,70 which was aimed at improving 
sanitary living conditions. This was accomplished through the appointment of an 
inspector of nuisance, an officer of health and a surveyor responsible for paving and 
draining. Furthermore, the Act ensured that perpetrators were prosecuted for any 
public nuisance.71 The second Act, namely The Police Town Clauses Act of 1847,72 
regulated the obstruction of highways and ensured that civilians guilty of 
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endangering the lives of the public at large were prosecuted. Between 1847 and 
1875 various other Common Law nuisances were regulated by legislation.73  
 These acts essentially served to ameliorate the appalling living conditions that 
arose as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Additionally, these acts provided a 
regulatory framework for the prosecution of Common Law nuisances such as smoke, 
noise, unhealthy conditions and the obstruction of highways. This resulted in the 
statutory regulation of Common Law public nuisances, subsequently referred to as 
statutory nuisance.  
 One can conclude that the regulatory framework, known as statutory 
nuisance, systematically substituted the Common Law public nuisance. It will later be 
established whether South Africa followed the same route by implementing a 
statutory framework to regulate common law public nuisances. It will further be 
established, in 2.5.4 below, whether the implementation of statutory nuisance 
reduced the number of reported case law pertaining to public nuisance. 
 As indicated, public nuisance was primarily seen as a criminal wrong. 
Perpetrators either faced a sentence or the payment of a fine for less serious 
wrongful actions. As it will appear below, not only was there an increase in the 
number of unreasonable interferences recognised as nuisances, but also an 
improvement in the remedies to plaintiffs. A brief overview of remedies extended to 
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successful plaintiffs who alleged a public nuisance as a cause of action is given 
below in order to determine whether South African law is different or similar to 
English law in this particular context.  
 
2.3.5 Remedies: Injunctions 
Public nuisance is primarily known as a crime and therefore subject to the 
prosecution of anyone posing a danger to the safety or health of the public at large. 
However, in the 18th and early 19th century private individuals sought an injunction as 
a remedy to abate a public nuisance. According to Spencer,74 applicants initially 
started to use an injunction, otherwise known as an interdict, as a supplementary 
remedy to that of criminal prosecution. This was because of the fear that the 
nuisance could cause irreparable damage by the time a criminal trial commenced.  
 The initial attempt to seek an injunction appeared in Baines v Baker,75 but 
failed when Lord Hardwicke denied awarding an injunction upon the application of a 
private individual. Lord Hardwicke wasn‟t sure whether the nuisance in the particular 
case amounted to a public or private nuisance. Since Lord Hardwicke was unsure, 
the jurisdiction of the court in which the case had to be decided was in question. The 
application was brought in the court of equity, which dealt with civil and not criminal 
proceedings pertaining to public nuisance. Lord Hardwicke was of the opinion that 
the suppression of a public nuisance was only possible if information was brought by 
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the Attorney-General.76 Therefore the judge held that nuisances affecting the public 
(being criminal offences) couldn‟t be enjoined in the court of equity. 
 However, after the decision in Baines v Baker,77 the later decisions of Mayor 
and Commonalty and Citizens of the City of London v Bolt,78 Attorney-General v 
Forbes79 and Attorney-General v Johnson80 established the practice of granting 
injunctions in public nuisance cases. There are two reasons to justify awarding an 
injunction, as appears from the case law. First of all, the judge in the Mayor case 
suggested that an injunction is a much more proper and effective remedy than a trial 
in the criminal court. Secondly, an injunction would prevent irreparable harm to the 
public or to the property of the applicants.81 This stance was affirmed in the Johnson 
case. 
 The relevance of the discussion is that injunctive relief for a public nuisance 
(affecting public safety, morality and health) was available in early English 
judgements and this approach, as it will appear, was adopted in South African law.  
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2.3.6 Conclusion 
It can be concluded that those found guilty of committing Common Law public 
nuisances were criminally liable and prosecuted. However, as appears from the 
discussion above, injunctions systematically replaced substituted criminal liability 
during the 19th century.  
 These nuisances unreasonably interfered with public health, order, morality 
and safety. The interferences ranged from noise, smoke, smells and odours, 
disposal of domestic waste and obstruction of highways. Importantly, a clear 
distinction between private and public nuisance can be established from the cases 
analysed above. The consequences of an existing public nuisance not only affect 
private individuals on private land but particularly those in a public space and public 
land. 
 By contrast, the courts also identified actions not recognised as nuisances 
such as fear, prospect and economic loss. However, these non-recognised 
nuisances are not relevant to this thesis because the courts reached their conclusion 
in a very unconvincing way. In essence, the courts only had to state that the 
applicants failed to prove the existence of a public or any nuisance according to its 
definition. Moreover, these cases are the only examples where the courts had 
reached this conclusion. 
 This historical perspective provides a better understanding of the doctrine of 
public nuisance. The historical perspective serves as a platform to discuss the 
analysis and development of public nuisance in South African law in 2.5 below.  
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 Before analysing the development of public nuisance in South African law, it is 
necessary first to establish by way of a comparative section on English and US law 
whether the doctrine enjoyed the same vitality in the 20th and 21st centuries as it had 
since its inception. 
 
2.4 Nuisance in the 20th century 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Milton‟s dissertation82 found the use of the Common Law notion of public nuisance in 
English law to be declining in the 20th century. The regulatory framework, known as 
statutory nuisance, substituted the Common Law notion of public nuisance. Milton is 
of the opinion that the implementation of more statutory nuisances, now regulating 
public health and safety in England, is the primary reason for the decline in the use 
of the Common Law notion of public nuisance.83 
 Only after an analysis of the adoption of public nuisance into South African 
law (2.5 below) would one be able to ascertain whether the introduction of statutory 
nuisance decreased reported South African case law pertaining to public nuisance, 
as it did in English law. However, in the following section a comparative study will 
serve as a means to determine whether the notion of Common Law public nuisance, 
besides that promulgated in legislation, still had a legitimate purpose in English law 
and in the United States of America during the 20th century. US law, like South 
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African law, also adopted the notion of public nuisance; therefore, it may be worth 
investigating what use the remedy had in the 20th century. In conclusion, it will be 
established whether this notion could legitimately be applied in South African law. 
 
2.4.2 The current use of public nuisance in English law 
The concept of public nuisance was developed in English law and can be defined as 
„the doing or failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or 
morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury 
to the public‟.84  
 The use of the public nuisance doctrine declined during the 20th century. The 
reason for this decline, according to Spencer, was that public nuisance offences had 
been comprehensively covered by statute.85 Milton supports Spencer, suggesting 
that the implementation of legislation particularly related to public health and zoning 
provisions led to a decline in the application of Common Law public nuisance 
doctrine in the last century.86  
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 Apart from the abovementioned statutes that precipitated the decline in the 
use of public nuisance, its use as an offence is further limited by the enactment of 
the Summary Act of 2005. Section 6 of this Act states: 
 
„Public nuisance 
(1) A person must not commit a public nuisance offence. 
          Maximum penalty- 10 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment. 
(2) A person commits a public nuisance if-  
(a) the person behaves in- 
(i) a disorderly way; or 
(ii) an offensive way; or 
(iii) a threatening way; or 
(iv) a violent way; and 
(b) the person‟s behaviour interferes or is likely to interfere with the peaceful 
passage through, or enjoyment of, a public place by a member of the public. 
(3) Without limiting subsection (2)-  
(a) a person behaves in an offensive way if the person uses offensive, obscene, 
indecent or abusive language; and  
(b) a person behaves in a threatening way if the person uses threatening 
language.‟ 
  The Act includes other unreasonable interferences which could also be 
categorised as public nuisances.87 Section 6 limits the adaptability and flexibility of 
the Common Law notion of public nuisance in that it can only be applied if one of the 
listed unreasonable actions is committed. This limitation has contributed to the 
decline of charges on the ground of the Common Law notion of public nuisance. 
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More importantly, for the purposes of this sub-section one could argue that section 6 
restricts any other application of public nuisance other than that which is 
encapsulated in the Act. 
 Apart from primarily constituting a criminal offence, public nuisance was also 
developed as a tort in English law. According to Hodas, „a private plaintiff could bring 
an action for public nuisance only if the plaintiff could show particular, personal 
damage not shared in common with the rest of the public‟.88 The remedy is applied 
with strict adherence to the given requirements and thus its capacity for use for any 
other purpose is restricted. 
 It appears from the analysis above that public nuisance has no further use in 
modern English law. However, in a recent article by researchers at the University of 
the West of England,89 it was argued that the Common Law remedy of public 
nuisance could be used to protect the environment against „uncontrolled scallop 
dredging‟90 and in such a way serve a legitimate purpose. In this case, dredging 
large numbers of scallops would ultimately cause damage to the seabed and to the 
ecosystem. This damage would affect the use of the seabed for recreational divers 
and commercial fisheries. According to the researchers, the available legislation 
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damages.‟ See University of West England ‟Public nuisance laws can control damage to ecosystems‟ 
http://info.uwe.ac.uk/news/UWENews/article.asp?item=1454 (29 June 2009).  
90
 In scallop dredging a dredger is towed along the bottom of the sea by a fishing boat in order to 
collect oysters, starfish and other species. 
52 
 
afforded little protection against damage to the ecosystem caused by dredging.91 
They therefore suggested that the Common Law remedy of public nuisance be used 
until legislative action could be taken.  
 In conclusion, it appears that legislation has comprehensively substituted the 
original aims of the Common Law public nuisance doctrine in English law. As a result 
the public nuisance doctrine has no further use in the 21st century. However, public 
nuisance might be developed to protect the environment in the absence of 
legislation. In South African law, therefore, in the absence of environmental and 
other legislation that protects public interests, the notion of public nuisance could 
possibly serve a legitimate purpose until legislation is amended or promulgated, as is 
suggested by the examples provided in English law.  
 
2.4.3 The current use of public nuisance in the United States   
The United States of America adopted the public nuisance doctrine from English 
law.92 Public nuisance originally served as a mechanism for prosecuting individuals 
who ran noisy businesses, helped a homicidal maniac, obstructed the road, and left 
a dead corpse on a doorstep, among many other unreasonable actions that are 
socially and morally wrong.93 As in English law, any unreasonable action was an 
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offence against Her Majesty‟s subjects and was defined as an „act not warranted by 
law, or omission to discharge a legal duty, which obstructs or causes inconvenience 
or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty‟s 
subjects‟.94  
 According to Abrams and Washington, the use of public nuisance according 
to its original aims declined in the US in the late 20th century. The regulation of public 
nuisance offences by means of statutory provisions precipitated the decline of the 
Common Law notion of public nuisance. This decline in the use of the remedy was 
experienced in both English law and, as will be discussed later, South African law. 
 Although many commentators suggest that the use of public nuisance has 
declined, Abrams and Washington, together with other academics, are of the opinion 
that public nuisance has enjoyed renewed vitality in modern times. Furthermore, 
these academics suggest that the flexibility of the Common Law public nuisance 
remedy and its adaptability creates a renewed purpose for this doctrine in United 
States law.95 
 In the United States public nuisance is provided for mainly in legislation 
(statutory nuisance).96 Schwartz and Goldberg state: „In the absence of regulation, 
public nuisance became a substitute for governments that “could not anticipate and 
explicitly prohibit or regulate through legislation all the particular activities that might 
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injure and annoy the general public”‟.97 Lawyers in the United States have filed 
lawsuits in the areas of environmental law98 and product liability,99 where public 
nuisance is not effectively provided for in legislation. In the absence or unavailability 
of environmental legislation, lawyers in the United States have used public nuisance 
as an alternative method to protect the wellbeing of the environment. During the 
1970s and 1980s public nuisance was used especially as a means to diminish the 
dangers of hazardous waste and to force corporations to clean up this waste.  
 The first of three illustrations of the use of public nuisance to limit dangers to 
the environment is United States v Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp100 (hereafter 
referred to as the Love Canal case). William Love, the respondent‟s predecessor, 
disposed of 40 million pounds of chemical waste in a trench three-quarters of a mile 
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long and thirty feet deep in Niagara Falls, New York. After the trench had been filled, 
Hooker sold the property to the Niagara Falls school board, who erected a school 
building on the ground. The toxic waste later surfaced and polluted ground and 
surface waters. A public health emergency was declared, leading to the evacuation 
of all the residents in the area surrounding the school and the demolition of the 
school building.101 In the absence of environmental legislation the United States 
government used public nuisance as a cause of action with the desired result of 
compelling Hooker Chemicals to remove the toxic dump. By the time the court 
addressed the issue in the Love Canal case, many other cases had used public 
nuisance as a cause of action to clean toxic dumpsites.102 The court granted a partial 
summary judgement on the allegation of a public nuisance, stating that the case 
offered a compelling set of facts and circumstances for finding its existence.103  
 The second example of how public nuisance served the purpose of protecting 
the environment occurred in South Carolina when lightning struck a tank filled with 
hydrochloric acid, belonging to the Suffolk Chemical company, and precipitated a 
spill. The tank leaked thousands of gallons of acid and as a consequence the 
community was ordered to evacuate the vicinity. At the time the accident occurred, 
the Department of Health and Environmental Control was in fact in its fifth day of 
hearings to determine whether the company should close as a result of causing a 
public nuisance. As a result of this accident, the Suffolk Chemical company agreed 
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to close permanently, without the court reaching a judgment.104 According to 
Harleston and Harleston, the flexibility and adaptability of the public nuisance 
doctrine was a more feasible cause of action than other environmental legislative 
measures available to enforce a clean-up or the closure of the company.105 In their 
article Harleston and Harleston conclude that public nuisance still has a legitimate 
purpose in United States law, although statutory provisions now regulate the majority 
of public nuisance offences. 
 The final example of the application of public nuisance legislation is the 
judgement in New York v Shore Realty Corporation.106 Shore Realty was the owner 
of property which had been contaminated by 70 000 gallons of toxic waste. Shore 
Realty bought the property despite being aware that it had been illegally filled with 
toxic waste. In fact, the authorities provided Shore Realty with a report stating that 
the property was a serious risk. A further 90 000 gallons of toxic waste was dumped 
on Shore Realty‟s property after the company had received this report.  The 
government then approached the court for relief on the basis that the toxic waste 
constituted a public nuisance. In conclusion, the court agreed with the government‟s 
allegations that a public nuisance had been constituted and ordered Shore Realty to 
remove the toxic waste. In commentary on the Shore case, Abrams and Washington 
suggested that even though the government could have relied on a statute107 to 
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force Shore Realty to clean up the toxic dumpsite, the preferred cause of action was 
to apply the public nuisance doctrine. Abrams and Washington conclude their article 
with the following statement:  
„Despite the adaptability and power of the public nuisance remedy, however, the 
number of reported public nuisance cases is quite small. This is partly because a 
good many cases are ultimately settled, but it may also be largely due to the lack of 
understanding of the law of public nuisance or even a lack of awareness of its 
availability. To the extent that there is confusion regarding the public nuisance and 
the tort of public nuisance, public officials may be deterred from recognising public 
nuisance as a useful weapon in the arsenal against environmental degradation.‟108 
 From the perspective of South African law, two of the statements in the above 
remark are largely true: (a) the small number of reported cases; and (b) the lack of 
understanding of the law of public nuisance.  As far as the confusion between public 
nuisance and the tort of public nuisance is concerned, it seems that South African 
law has never adopted the tort of public nuisance as there are no reported cases 
suggesting the contrary. As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, there is a lack of 
understanding of the law of public nuisance. 
 Apart from serving to protect and preserve the wellbeing of the general public, 
the public nuisance doctrine was developed to grant a private individual a remedy to 
recover damages. The developed public nuisance remedy was called the special 
injury rule, otherwise known as a tort of public nuisance. The individual claiming 
damages was obliged to prove he had suffered special or peculiar injury.109 The 
                                                     
108
 Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private 
nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399 399. 
109
 Sowthall v Dagger [1536] YB 27 Hen 8f 27 pl 10. In this case the defendant obstructed the King‟s 
highway, which prevented the plaintiff from reaching his close. The plaintiff then sued for damages. 
58 
 
special injury had to be more than that which the general public had suffered as a 
result of the same offence(s).  
 Apart from using public nuisance to limit an environmental threat to the 
general public; environmental lawyers in the United States have sought to use the 
special injury rule in order to file public nuisance class actions against companies, 
which had allegedly contributed to air pollution.110 The aim was to claim 
compensatory and punitive damages from product manufacturers. 
 In Diamond v General Motors Corp111 the court rejected the lawsuit, stating 
that „public nuisance theory is ill-suited for this type of litigation‟.112 The court offered 
three reasons for rejecting public nuisance as a cause of action for the purposes of 
claiming damages. Firstly, it noted that because there were existing statutes 
regulating air pollution, introducing public nuisance as an alternative remedy would 
have the effect of adopting „stricter standards over the discharge of air contaminants 
in the [United States]‟.113 Secondly, the court was of the opinion that only a 
government could institute proceedings for injunctive relief as it had a duty to protect 
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the public as a whole. If public nuisance were to be used to claim damages, then the 
supply of goods to those whom the plaintiff represented, namely, the general public, 
would be curbed. Finally, the court suggested that by using the tort of public 
nuisance, each individual in the class action would have to prove special or particular 
damage. In this case it would be well nigh impossible to prove that thousands or 
even millions had suffered a special injury.114 
 The use of public nuisance to claim damages was rejected in two other cases, 
City of Bloomington v Westinghouse Electrical Corp115 and Alaska Native Class v 
Exxon Corp.116 According to Antolini, although public nuisance is a powerful means 
of protecting the community against any environmental harm, the courts in the 
United States have not allowed „broad access to this powerful tort‟.117 Environmental 
lawyers have failed to achieve their desired result of claiming damages when using 
the notion of public nuisance.  
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 Public nuisance was also applied as a cause of action to claim damages in 
asbestos,118 tobacco,119 firearms,120 lead pigment and paint litigation.121 However, its 
application met with no success in these cases.  
 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
One can conclude, then, that United States law applied the public nuisance doctrine 
for purposes other than those for which it was originally designed. Firstly, 
government officials used public nuisance as a cause of action to effect the 
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abatement of serious threats to the health of the general public. Secondly, public 
nuisance was used to claim damages in class action lawsuits. 
 In the first type of application it appears that the courts allowed the application 
of public nuisance in Love Canal, Shore Realty and the situation in Suffolk Chemical 
Company for two reasons. Firstly, toxic waste poses a serious threat to the public 
health and has to be dealt with without delay: cleaning a toxic waste site is a matter 
of urgency and requires immediate attention. Secondly, the applicants were 
government officials who, instead of claiming damages on behalf of private 
individuals, approached the court to grant an order for the abatement of the toxic 
waste. The government‟s aim was to force the owners indirectly to clean up their 
contaminated property.  
 One could argue that on the basis of these two reasons, public nuisance 
could be used as a remedy in South African law (a) if the alleged nuisance 
constitutes an imminent danger to the health of the general public; and (b) if the 
applicants do not seek to claim damages but instead approach the court to force the 
owners of contaminated land, or those responsible for it, to clean it. The South 
African legal system has a number of environmental law statutes.122 However, if a 
situation arises where environmental legislation does not provide an effective 
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remedy or might not cover or limit dangerous environmental threats such as a toxic 
waste or any similar unreasonable act, it seems the public nuisance doctrine could 
be applied as an effective alternative method.  
 Regarding the second area of the development of public nuisance, apart from 
being unsuccessful as an alternative in the protection of the wellbeing of the general 
public, it seems also to have failed in class action law suits. The majority of the 
courts rejected applications of public nuisance. The main reason for this rejection 
was that the relief sought fell outside the original aims of the public nuisance 
doctrine. In the asbestos, tobacco, lead and pigment, and some of the environmental 
law cases the applicants‟ sole purpose was to claim damages rather than to limit the 
nuisance.  In fact, one could argue that the use of public nuisance in these cases 
was a last resort to claim damages rather than seek an effective remedy to limit 
unreasonable interferences. Therefore, a public nuisance is only constituted if the 
unreasonable interferences affect the public at large and originated in a public space 
or land opposed to private land or interest of the applicants.‟ 
 Even if the use of public nuisance had been an effective and successful 
remedy in the cases discussed above, the tort of public nuisance has not been 
adopted into South African jurisprudence.123 Therefore South African courts would 
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reject the use of public nuisance in class action law suits for the purposes of claiming 
damages against companies which have allegedly contributed to air pollution. 
  After having established the origin of public nuisance in English law and 
investigated its vitality in both English and US law during the 20th century, the 
subsequent section focuses on the adoption of public nuisance in South Africa. The 
aim of the analysis is to establish the purpose and field of application of public 
nuisance in South African law. 
 
2.5 Adoption of public nuisance in South African law 
2.5.1 Introduction 
According to Milton: 
„South African law has tended to accept and apply the concept of nuisance as it was 
evolved in English law. The term public nuisance had early been introduced into our 
law by way of legislation concerning public nuisance. Through this medium it became 
a familiar term in South African law.‟124 
 As indicated by Milton, the Common Law public nuisance remedy was derived 
from English law and was partly provided for in legislation and partly adopted in 
South African judicial decisions, as indicated in the discussion below.  
 The analysis of the remedy of public nuisance in early South African judicial 
decisions (from the late 19th to mid-20th century) will determine the original field of 
application of the public nuisance remedy in South Africa. The cases discussed in 
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this section are the first public nuisance cases since the remedy‟s adoption into 
South African law. Therefore, these cases are categorised as the first series of public 
nuisance cases discussed in 2.5.2 to 2.5.4. The relation between the application of 
public nuisance in English and South African case law, and the extent to which the 
Common Law remedy of public nuisance was incorporated into legislation, are also 
established.  
 
2.5.2 Early case law 
The term „public nuisance‟ was used in judicial decisions as early as the late 1800s. 
In Dickson v Town Council of Cape Town and another125 it was found that dirt in a 
barrel drain on the ground constituted a public nuisance and an interdict was granted 
accordingly.126 Similarly, in Dell v Town Council of Cape Town127 it was found that a 
public deposit of rubbish amounted to a public nuisance. However, in the case of 
Redelinghuys v Silberbauer128 the plaintiff tried to prevent the erection of a flour mill, 
arguing that it constituted a public nuisance. The application for the interdict failed as 
the applicant couldn‟t prove that the mill posed a threat to the health of the public or 
that it would cause an inconvenience to the rest of the neighbourhood. It could be 
argued that the remedy was denied in this case because the nuisance was held to 
be private rather than public, indicating that the remedy was still applied according to 
its original aims. In London & South African Exploration Co v Kimberly Divisional 
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Council129 the court granted an interdict against the construction of a tramline on the 
property of the London & South African Exploration Co for Mylchreest, based on the 
argument that the continual noise caused by the construction constituted a public 
nuisance. Although public nuisance is primarily regarded as a criminal offence, the 
case law illustrates how civil action was a popular means to suppress common 
(public) nuisances in South African law 
 
2.5.3 Significant later case law 
2.5.3.1 Introduction 
Based on the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that English nuisance law was 
adopted and accepted in South African law. However, it is not clear to what extent 
the notion of public nuisance was adopted into South African law. The case law 
analysed below – besides being the most significant case law pertaining to public 
nuisance in South African law – is fundamental when investigating the adoption of 
public nuisance in South African law. After a discussion of these significant cases, 
the essential characteristics of public nuisance in these two legal systems will be 
compared in order to determine to what extent the public nuisance doctrine was 
adopted in South African law. This comparison will illustrate that the essential 
characteristics of public nuisance in English Common Law were adopted in South 
African law.  
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2.5.3.2 Case law 
Certain public nuisances were seen as entailing a criminal wrong and the 
perpetrators prosecuted accordingly. In R v Paulse130 the defendant was convicted 
on the ground that his brothel was kept in such a manner that it constituted a public 
nuisance. The public was affected when it was found on the evidence that great 
damage had occurred to the persons residing in and passing through the 
neighbourhood of the house in question. The matter was taken on appeal, but the 
appellant failed to convince De Villiers J that the brothel was not kept in a disgraceful 
and disgusting manner. The appeal was dismissed. 
 Similarly, in R v CP Reynolds131 the court a quo found that the pollution of a 
public stream – which as we know from English law constitutes a public nuisance – 
does not constitute a public nuisance in South African law. However, the decision 
was overturned on appeal. The court held that such an action did amount to a public 
nuisance. Another example of public nuisance adopted into South African law as a 
criminal offence is Putt v Rex.132 The defendant was found guilty of erecting gates 
across a main road, which he closed and locked every twenty-four hours. In essence 
this was an obstruction of a highway and punishable under nuisance in English law 
as indicated in 2.3.1. In the court a quo the defendant was found guilty and 
summoned to pay a fine of 20 shillings. On appeal, it was found that section 30 of 
the Regulation of Railways133 made provision for gates at level crossings to 
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safeguard the public against injuries or fatalities caused by a train. The gates were 
only closed for seven minutes once every twenty four hours. The court was therefore 
of the opinion that this action couldn‟t be seen as a major continuous disturbance, 
but rather provide safety for the public. The conviction was quashed and the 
sentence set aside. 
 The abovementioned case law indicates that public nuisance was primarily 
seen as a crime in South African law. However, it will be established that, as in 
English law, injunctive relief and statutory nuisance systematically replaced criminal 
liability. 
 In Queensland Municipality v Wiehan134 the plaintiff approached the court for 
relief by way of the common law notion of public nuisance. In the Queensland case 
Wiehan alleged that a nuisance was caused by stray dogs. Wiehan argued that the 
Queensland municipality had a duty to control stray dogs together with the 
permission to kill the dogs. As a result of some of Wiehan‟s sheep being killed by 
stray dogs, Wiehan instituted proceedings against the Queensland municipality to 
collect and destroy the dogs. The result seems to have been that the Queensland 
municipality had not caused a public nuisance by allowing the stray dogs to roam 
unchecked. The court held that the defendant was unaware of the nuisance and 
never authorised the dogs to stray and cause damage to the plaintiff. Thus the court 
held that the defendant had no duty to abate a nuisance of which is it was innocent.  
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 To summarize, public nuisances were alleged in the following instances: 
where a brothel was kept,135 pollution of a public stream,136 dirt in a barrel drain on 
the ground,137 noise when exercising a trade such as a blacksmith138 and stray 
dogs.139 An overview of the abovementioned examples creates the impression that 
any offence interfering with the public health and safety would fall within the category 
of public nuisance.  
 Therefore, public nuisance was adopted in early South African case law and 
served two functions: firstly, regulating normal nuisances such as smoke, noise and 
obstruction of a highway, which interfered with the public health and welfare of the 
public at large; and secondly, to stop any unacceptable moral and social behaviour 
regarded as a criminal offence (like keeping a brothel).  
 
2.5.4 Statutory nuisance in South African law 
Legislation regulating public nuisances has been implemented since the adoption of 
nuisance into South African law during the late 19th century. Statutory nuisance in 
most instances replaced the common law notion of public nuisance. In Coetzee v 
R140 it was found that Coetzee was in contravention of section 5(11) of the Police 
Offences Act,141 which prohibited the obstruction of streets. Coetzee, who was a 
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blacksmith, disturbed the free-flowing traffic when blocking the streets with carts and 
shoeing horses whilst exercising his trade. His conviction in the court a quo was 
overturned on appeal, when Kotze J found that the public health or safety was not 
endangered. Kotze J was of the opinion that the alleged obstruction was merely a 
temporary use of a portion of the street to exercise his occupation.142 Thus the 
obstruction was not regarded as a public nuisance. 
 The judgement recognises statutory nuisance as a means to regulate public 
nuisances. These statutory provisions are implemented to ensure that public health 
and the safety of the public are protected. 
 Similarly, in Champion v Inspector of Police, Durban143 the appellant was 
convicted when he unlawfully used a building for public entertainment purposes 
when prohibited from doing so by section 76 of the General Bye-Laws. Section 76 
stated that „[n]o person being in any private premises within the Borough shall make 
any noise or disturbance so as to be a public nuisance in the neighbourhood of such 
private premises.‟144 
 The defendant was found guilty of causing an unreasonable amount of noise. 
The court concluded that a noise had to be of such a degree as to constitute a public 
nuisance before it could be prosecuted. On appeal, the court was of the opinion that 
the neighbours in the vicinity where the defendant operated his entertainment 
                                                     
142
 1911 EDL 341. 
143
 1926 47 NPD 133. 
144
 Besides regulating noise, another aim of the legislation was to regulate and ensure public safety by 
controlling the access of individuals to private and public places of entertainment. See Champion v 
Inspector of Police, Durban 1926 NPD 133. 
70 
 
business only complained of noise which caused an inconvenience and annoyance, 
but never contended that it amounted to a public nuisance. The appellant 
successfully proved that no public nuisance was constituted and his conviction was 
subsequently set aside.  
 The final example illustrating the implementation of statutory nuisance in 
South African law is the judgement of R v Cohen.145 The defendant contravened 
section 170(8) of a special by-law of the Cape Town municipality.146 Section 170(8) 
prohibited the keeping of a brothel in a scandalous manner and imposed a fine of 
£10 on any offender. The contravention led to the defendant being convicted and 
sentenced to a period of six weeks imprisonment for keeping a disorderly house for 
the purpose of fornication to the great damage and common nuisance of His 
Majesty‟s subjects.147 On appeal the court found that the normal keeping of a brothel 
would not be an offence. The court held that keeping a brothel would be regarded as 
a public nuisance if it is kept in a scandalous and indecent manner.148 Based on 
evidence from neighbours, the court found that the keeping of the brothel constituted 
a nuisance. 
 Despite the fact that public nuisances were suppressed by means of statutory 
nuisances – apart from the common law notion of public nuisance – the original aims 
adopted from public nuisance in English law remained intact. Statutory nuisance, 
similar to the purpose of Common Law public nuisance, regulated public safety, 
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morality and health. The aim of these statutory provisions was to regulate nuisances 
on public land and in a public space, not only nuisances affecting private land and 
private space. 
 Currently public nuisance is mostly used by municipalities and city councils to 
control nuisances that affect the public. It is mainly provided for in legislation 
(statutory nuisance)149 to regulate public nuisances,150 where a specific action or 
situation poses a threat, or where actual harm has already occurred to the broader 
public. The local authorities have to institute proceedings for the abatement of a 
public nuisance.151  
 
2.5.5 Conclusion 
One can conclude – after the analysis of both the English and South African law 
pertaining to the doctrine of public nuisance – that the definitions of all unreasonable 
interferences regarded as public nuisances in English law were adopted in South 
African law. These unreasonable interferences are noise, smoke, keeping a brothel, 
obstruction of public roads and disposing of waste which originated in a public space 
or public land such as a street opposed to private land. On the other hand, none of 
the early significant South African case law allowed fear, prospect and economic 
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loss as justifiable interferences that constitute public nuisances. These non-
recognised interferences were not allowed in the English law concept of public 
nuisance, and it seems South African courts (between the late 19th century and 
1975)152 adopted the same approach.153 
 Recognised unreasonable interferences were abated both by the institution of 
criminal and civil proceedings by local authorities. Initially the sheriff and later the 
Attorney-General154 were entrusted to institute such proceedings for the abatement 
of public nuisances in English law.  
 In both English and South African law perpetrators were either criminally liable 
– with liability in the form of a fine or imprisonment – or civilly liable by means of an 
injunction, in that perpetrators were asked to stop causing an unreasonable 
interference that resulted to be a public nuisance. However, one can conclude that 
the English law remedy known as the special injury rule155 was not adopted in South 
African case law. The remedy provided a victim with monetary compensation if a 
plaintiff could prove special or particular damage as a result of a public nuisance. 
The remedy was never granted in any decision, nor did a plaintiff approach the court 
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for relief using the special injury rule as a cause of action. Compensation can only be 
claimed if the remedies provided in the law of delict are applied. This is an illustration 
that nuisance law did not influence or change the law of delict, which originated from 
Roman Dutch law. 
 Statutory nuisance systematically replaced the common law notion of public 
nuisance in South African law, as it did in English law. Because of the 
implementation of these statutory measures that regulate unreasonable 
interferences affecting the public at large, there was less need for the application of 
the common law. This ultimately resulted in a decline in the use of the common law 
notion of public nuisance in disputes; this is seen in the small number of cases 
during the mid-20th century. Thirty-two years passed (1943156 to 1975157) before 
there was a reported case in South African law where a plaintiff sought relief arguing 
that a public nuisance had been constituted. Even during the early 20th century only 
a limited number of cases were reported, with the vast majority of them analysed in 
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this chapter. One can conclude that the implementation of statutory nuisance 
employed to curb and regulate public nuisances was successful. 
 One can conclude that the original aims to suppress an unreasonable 
interference by way of public nuisance was adopted and applied in early South 
African case law. However, as will appear from the next chapter, the notion of public 
nuisance was applied contrary to its original aims in more recent South African case 
law.158 In most of these cases, categorised as the third series discussed in 3.1 and 
3.2, private individuals in predominantly white residential areas formed landowners‟, 
farmers‟, ratepayers‟ and environmental associations and applied for an interdict to 
prevent future or present disturbances in the form of the establishment or 
formalisation of new residential settlements in their vicinity. The applicants alleged 
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that actions of the occupiers in the informal settlements, established in their vicinity 
would constitute a public nuisance. There are various arguments to support the 
argument that public nuisance doctrine was applied contrary to its original aims in 
these cases. First, the courts used the terms „private nuisance‟ and „public nuisance‟ 
interchangeably, which had the effect that the courts failed to clearly distinguish 
between a private and public nuisance. The courts‟ failure to acknowledge this 
distinction led to them finding the presence of a public nuisance, but not according to 
the definition of a public nuisance. Secondly, as a result of the successful 
implementation of statutory nuisance, the common law notion of public nuisance was 
systematically substituted. This is seen in the decline of reported case law in both 
English159 and South African law.160 Thirdly, in the recent South African cases 
applicants approached the court for the prevention or eviction of occupiers living in 
informal settlements. This matter is sensitive in the light of the historical, social, 
economic and political context in South Africa. There are similarities between 
prevention or eviction in the case law and discriminatory practices in the apartheid 
era.  
 An elaboration of the cases and the problems associated with them follows in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Recent South African case law 
3.1 Introduction 
Public nuisance was used for a different purpose from its original aim in a series of 
cases between 1989 and 2001.1 In this series, the application of public nuisance 
were only successful in two out of the five cases in the series. The public nuisance 
doctrine was applied to evict or prevent occupiers of an informal settlement from 
establishing themselves in the vicinity of predominantly white property owners. This 
use is contrary to the original aims of public nuisance, namely protecting the 
wellbeing (health and safety) of the general public. 
 As indicated in chapter 2, the public nuisance doctrine was originally, in what 
has before been described as the first series of cases,2 applied to protect the general 
public against any act which posed a threat to their health and safety by, for 
instance, prohibiting the pollution of a public stream3 and the erection of a gate 
across a main road.4 It was also originally applied to safeguard the public against 
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any actions which were socially and morally unacceptable by prosecuting the owners 
of brothels that were kept in a scandalous manner.5   
 There was one case in what has been described as the second series of 
cases,6 in which the applicant tried to use the doctrine for private purposes, contrary 
to its original aims. The applicant approached the court for an interdict to prohibit the 
establishment of a shopping mall in his vicinity. The court denied the interdict on the 
basis that the applicant could only succeed if he proved „injury, prejudice or damage 
or invasion of a right peculiar to himself and over and above that sustained by the 
members of the general public.‟7  
 In the third series of cases, similarly to the application of public nuisance in 
the second series of cases, applicants attempted to apply the public nuisance 
doctrine mainly for private purposes. This application of public nuisance deviated 
from its original aims as illustrated in the first series of cases. As indicated above, the 
application of public nuisance was only successful in two of the five cases during this 
third series of cases. Applicants alleged that the actions of occupiers who were or 
would be established in their vicinity would create a public nuisance. Applicants then 
approached the court to prevent or evict occupiers from establishing themselves in 
their vicinity. An analysis of these cases is undertaken in the main part of this 
chapter to illustrate why the result, namely the application of public nuisance, is a 
problem. 
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 The fourth and final series of public nuisance cases consist of two cases, 
namely Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs 
and others8  and 410 Voortrekker Road Property Holdings CC v Minister of Home 
Affairs and others.9 In both cases the applicants alleged that the presence of a 
refugee office in their vicinity contravened the City‟s zoning scheme and constituted 
a public nuisance. The courts found that the City‟s zoning scheme was contravened. 
On the issue of whether a public nuisance was constituted, the applicants 
complained that the presence of the refugee office created regular street blockages, 
noise, litter and violence. On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, 
the courts found that a nuisance was constituted, but the courts were of the opinion 
that a private instead of a public nuisance was constituted. However, the 
unreasonable actions that were complained of, together with the people affected 
thereby, are in fact in line with the definition of a public nuisance as opposed to a 
private nuisance. The reasons are set out in 3.4.  
 The following section discusses the facts and thereafter identifies the 
problems with the application of public nuisance in the second and third series of 
cases. Thereafter an elaboration of these problems is given followed by analysis of 
the fourth series of public nuisance cases. 
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3.2 Recent case law 
3.2.1 Case summaries 
Von Moltke v Costa Aroesa (Pty) Ltd10 was reported thirty-two years after the 
decision in the Queensland case.11 The applicant sought an interdict prohibiting the 
development of a township, shopping centre, game park and funicular railway in the 
Sandy Bay area. The applicant was the owner of a house in the area of Llandudno 
which, as Diemont J stated, „was approximately one mile as the crow flies – or 
perhaps I should say the sea gull flies‟12 – from the area commonly known as Sandy 
Bay. After being made aware of the respondent‟s developments in the Sandy Bay 
area, the applicant visited the respondent company‟s offices to establish the details 
of the development and was shown a model and brochure of the development 
scheme. This drove the „distressed‟ applicant to organise a petition for the prohibition 
of the development and file a written objection to the Secretary of the Provincial 
Administration. The applicant was aware in the meantime that bulldozing operations 
had already begun clearing land in Sandy Bay. 
 The applicant alleged that the bulldozing operations together with the future 
development in the Sandy Bay area would unreasonably interfere with the use and 
                                                     
10
 1975 (1) SA 255 (C). Hereafter referred to as the Von Moltke case. 
11
 In Queensland v Wiehan 1943 EDL 134, Wiehan argued that the Queensland municipality had a 
duty to control stray dogs, together with the permission to kill the dogs. As a result of some of 
Wiehan‟s sheep being killed by stray dogs, Wiehan instituted proceedings against the Queensland 
municipality to collect and destroy the dogs. The result seems to have been that the Queensland 
municipality had not caused a public nuisance by allowing the stray dogs to roam unchecked. The 
court held that the defendant was unaware of the nuisance and never authorised the dogs to stray 
and cause damage to the plaintiff.  
12
 Von Moltke v Costa Areosa 1975 (1) SA 255 (C) 256B. 
80 
 
enjoyment of his land. The applicant argued that the bulldozing and building plans 
would constitute a nuisance „to the surrounding area, that irreparable damage was 
being done to the natural vegetation and also that the sand dunes were being 
disturbed.‟13 The applicant approached the court for an interdict prohibiting the 
respondent (Costa Areosa) proceeding with the development in Sandy Bay and a 
further order to restore the property to its condition prior to the commencement of the 
bulldozing operations. An affidavit was filed by the Secretary of the Divisional 
Council. In the affidavit the Secretary stated that the approval of the development 
was still pending and that all objections would be considered at a future meeting. In 
response to the applicant‟s allegations, the director of Costa Areosa argued that the 
applicant did not have locus standi to institute proceedings regarding the matter and 
denied that the bulldozing operations could be seen as the first steps of the 
development. Mr Friedman, on behalf of the respondent, supported the argument 
initiated by the director of Costa Areosa that the applicant did not have locus standi 
to institute proceedings. He suggested the applicant had to prove that the bulldozing 
operations constituted a nuisance and that he was in fact affected by that nuisance 
in order to have locus standi to approach the court for relief. Mr Friedman denied any 
destruction of vegetation by the bulldozing operations and confirmed the vegetation 
to be alien, not indigenous.  
 Apart from the arguments presented by the respondents, Diemont J 
considered the considerable distance between the applicant (who resided in 
Llandudno) and Sandy Bay. Diemont J also considered that the applicant never 
proved the Sandy Bay area to be visible from his home, which would have enabled 
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him to view the bulldozing operations.  Furthermore, the applicant also never stated 
that he visited the Sandy Bay area, seeing that he never made this clear in his 
affidavit. 
 Based on these factors, Diemont J agreed with Mr Friedman that in order for 
the applicant to succeed he had to prove „injury, prejudice or damage or invasion of 
right peculiar to himself and over and above that sustained by the members of the 
public in general‟.14 Diemont J concluded that it was not enough for the applicant 
only to allege a nuisance, but that he had to prove that he has a special reason to 
approach the court for a remedy. Counsel for the applicant made two further 
arguments, which the court rejected. Both these arguments suggested that the 
actions of the respondent have contravened section 13 of the Township Ordinance 
Act of 1943 and Town Planning Regulations, respectively.  Again, the applicant could 
not prove any special injury15 that affected him and that could be regarded as 
common to the general public. The court found that the applicant did not have locus 
standi and therefore rejected both arguments and denied the relief sought.  
 One can assume that when an applicant alleges an unreasonable interference 
with his property, including that of the general public, he must prove „injury, prejudice 
or damage or invasion of right peculiar to him and over and above that sustained by 
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the members of the public in general‟.16 Once he has proved such an injury or 
invasion of a right, he will have locus standi to approach the court for relief. On the 
other hand, if he fails to prove an injury or invasion, he will have no locus standi to 
approach the court for any relief, as seen in the case above.  
 Since the issue at hand was whether the applicant had locus standi, the 
notion of common law public nuisance was never substantially applied in the case. 
However, the applicant tried to use the public nuisance doctrine to advance his 
private interest when trying to prevent the establishment of a shopping mall in his 
vicinity. Similar to the use of public nuisance in this, the second series of cases, 
applicants in the subsequent third series of cases also attempted to apply public 
nuisance to protect their private interests. Applicants used public nuisance to abate 
alleged unreasonable interferences with the aim of protecting their private interests, 
as opposed to the use of public nuisance in the first series of cases, where the 
unreasonable actions infringed the interest of the general public (health and safety). 
Therefore these applicants failed to meet the requirements of the definition of a 
public nuisance. However, the application of public nuisance in the second series of 
cases differs from that in the third series. In the second series of cases (the Von 
Moltke case) the applicants attempted to use public nuisance specifically to prevent 
the establishment of a shopping mall, while in the third series of cases the aim of the 
applicants was to prevent occupiers from establishing (or evict them from) an 
informal settlement in their vicinity on the basis that the settlement would cause a 
nuisance.  
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 East London Western Districts’ Farmers Association and others v Minister of 
Education and Development Aid and others17 is the first of five recent South African 
cases referred to as the third series of public nuisance cases. In this series of cases 
applicants used the notion of public nuisance to restrict members of informal 
settlements from inhabiting land situated in their vicinity. The use of the public 
nuisance doctrine in this third series of cases is similar to its use in the second 
series, in which the plaintiffs used the doctrine to protect their private interests 
instead of applying its original aims (as applied in the first series of cases), namely to 
prevent any actions which pose an imminent threat to the health and safety of the 
general public. However, its application in the third series is problematic in both 
substance and time, as will be explained. 
 In the East London case the plaintiffs claimed that the establishment of a 
needs camp (for black refugees) in their vicinity was an unreasonable interference 
with their inherent right of use and enjoyment of land The applicants (hereafter 
referred to as farmers) sought an interdict prohibiting the establishment of a needs 
camp in the vicinity of their properties, or evicting the refugees already living there. 
The respondents, the third respondent being the Director of Land Affairs,18 raised the 
defence of statutory authority when suggesting that the establishment of the needs 
camp was authorised by section 10 of the Development Trust and Land Act.19 Kroon 
J agreed with the argument raised by the respondents and upheld the defence of 
statutory authority. Kroon J suggested that, based on the facts, the applicants could 
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only request a review of proceedings based on allegations of gross 
unreasonableness.20 Therefore, the applicants failed in the court a quo.  
 On appeal Hoexter J (with Vivier and Steyn JA concurring) held that the 
needs camp constituted a public nuisance and that the appellants should have been 
entitled to an interdict prohibiting the establishment thereof rather than a review of 
proceedings, as was decided by Kroon J in the court a quo. As a point of departure, 
Hoexter J regarded the farmers and the members of the needs camp as neighbours. 
Based on this conclusion, Hoexter J applied the principle in Regal v African 
Superslate (Pty) Ltd,21 which established that a legal relationship exists between 
neighbours, which entails reciprocal rights and obligations.22 The court referred to 
Van der Merwe and Olivier,23 who suggested that each neighbour – whether a 
landowner or occupier – has the inherent right to the reasonable use and enjoyment 
of land. 
 Hoexter J quoted Milton for a definition of public nuisance. According to 
Milton, public nuisance, in the South African context, „has the simplified meaning of 
an ordinary nuisance so extensive in its effect or range of operation as to discomfort 
the public at large.‟24 Milton is of the opinion that an occupier or landowner whose 
proprietary right has been infringed by a public nuisance may sue in his own right. In 
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this case the applicants did not claim damages, but approached the court for an 
interdict to abate the public nuisance. The court had to inquire whether the needs 
camp would unreasonably affect the public at large or interfere with the personal 
property rights of use and enjoyment of land.  
 As a point of departure, the court determined whether the actions of the 
occupiers of the needs camp constituted a public nuisance. Kroon J in the court a 
quo held that a public nuisance was created by the actions of the occupiers, but 
upheld the statutory defence argued by the respondents. Kroon J was of the opinion 
that section 10 of DTLA was a valid authorisation for the interference with the 
applicants‟ private rights. On appeal, Hoexter J held that the court a quo’s conclusion 
– that the respondents had immunity to invade the private rights of the applicants – 
had to be reconsidered. Kroon J concluded that there was no legal principle in South 
African law that allows an administrative act to infringe individual rights just because 
the act is performed in the course of implementing a general policy.25 Hoexter J 
found that the court a quo was bound to resolve the issue by testing the validity of 
the defence of statutory authority and heard the application for an interdict. 
 Hoexter J considered whether the third respondent had discharged the onus 
of showing immunity under the DTLA for such interference with private rights.26 To 
determine whether the respondent had discharged the onus, the court analysed case 
law.27 In all the analysed cases the applicants alleged that the government, when 
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exercising its duties, interfered with common law rights. In response the respondents 
(usually a governmental body) argued that they were authorised by way of statute to 
interfere with the applicants‟ common law rights. The courts were of the opinion that 
the empowering legislation explicitly or tacitly authorised the government to interfere 
with the common law rights of third parties. The courts concluded that it would be 
impossible for the respondents to exercise their duties without reasonably interfering 
with the applicants‟ private rights. Such an interference is legitimate if it is done 
without any negligence and if it serves a public purpose. Although Hoexter J 
acknowledged that certain statutes empowering certain actions or works would 
necessarily and inevitably involve the disturbance of common law rights, he was of 
the opinion that in the present matter, the respondent did not discharge the onus of 
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showing immunity under the DTLA for such interference with private rights. 
According to Hoexter J, the third respondent failed to discharge the initial onus of 
proving that the establishment would inevitably and necessarily create a public 
nuisance.28 Hoexter J qualified his reasoning by stating that a public nuisance is not 
an automatic consequence when an informal settlement is established.29 In essence 
Hoexter J concluded that the third respondent could not prove that it would be 
impossible to establish an informal settlement without interfering with the common 
law rights of the applicants.30 The court was of the opinion that section 10 of the 
DTLA does not sanction any particular or specific settlement on trust land. The third 
respondent had to prove that a nuisance is a necessary consequence of any 
settlement, but failed to do so. The court, during its concluding remarks, stated that 
the „bureaucratic solution of problems, however intractable, must be achieved with 
due regard to the legitimate property rights of ordinary citizens.‟31 The court 
concluded that the rights of the farmers had to be balanced with the alleviation of the 
lot of the refugees.  
 The court awarded the appellants an order for the abatement of the public 
nuisance. Since it was not realistic to move the 8000 members of the needs camp, 
the court ordered that a fence be erected enclosing the camp from the farmers and 
that police patrol the vicinity on a more regular basis during the day and night. 
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 Viljoen J and Nestadt J disagreed with the majority judgement. Both had 
different reasons for not concurring with Judges Hoexter, Vivier and Steyn. Viljoen J 
raised two arguments. His first argument was that the English law of nuisance was 
not applicable in South Africa. On the basis of this argument he argued that the 
applicants misconceived their remedy.32 Finally, Viljoen J argued that the court acted 
ultra vires when delivering its judgement. Viljoen J suggested that the acquisition of 
trust land together with settlement of blacks on such land were executive acts which 
cannot be tested in a court of law. On the other hand, Nestadt J agreed with the 
decision in the court a quo that it was not necessary for the respondents to prove 
that the erection of a needs camp would inevitably cause a nuisance for the 
applicants.  
 The decision can be criticised on the basis of three reasons. Firstly, the court 
failed to establish whether the interferences constituted a nuisance. In fact, as far as 
the appeal court is concerned, no reference was made to any interference usually 
associated with causing a public nuisance, for instance, smoke and noise. Secondly, 
since the court established that a public nuisance was created, the second step 
would be to determine whether the applicants satisfied the definition of a public 
nuisance, namely whether the „nuisance [was] so extensive in its effect or range of 
operation as to discomfort the public at large‟.33 Instead, the court posed the 
question whether the personal use and enjoyment of the applicants‟ personal right to 
land had been infringed. Establishing whether the applicants‟ personal interest was 
affected did not satisfy the requirement that the interferences caused extensive harm 
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or discomfort to the public at large, seeing that the focus was primarily on a specified 
individual or small group‟s private rights as opposed to the public‟s interest. 
 Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners Association and others v Administrator 
Transvaal and others34 is the second in this third series of cases. In this case the 
applicants (an association representing residents and landowners of Diepsloot) 
alleged that the establishment of an informal settlement with squatters from an area 
known as Zevenfontein, together with other homeless households in their vicinity, 
would cause a (public) nuisance and as a consequence affect their right to the use 
and enjoyment of their respective properties. The applicants alleged that if the 
settlement would be established, its occupiers would cause extensive smoke (as a 
result of fires), dust (due to the absence of proper roads), pollution of underground 
water, increased crime in the vicinity and the decrease of the market value of their 
properties constituted a public nuisance. The applicants alleged that the decision of 
the Administrator of the Transvaal35 (the respondent) to establish the informal 
settlement was reviewable. The applicants sought a temporary interdict to prevent 
the establishment of the settlement from taking place. 
 The Administrator argued that the settlement would not cause a (public) 
nuisance and denied that there were any grounds for reviewing his decision.36 The 
Administrator relied on the Less Formal Township Establishment Act37 as a defence 
of statutory authority in order to justify his decision to establish an informal 
                                                     
34
 1993 (1) SA 577 (T). Hereafter referred to as the Diepsloot case. 
35
 Hereafter referred to as the Administrator. 
36
 1993 (1) SA (T) 578G. 
37
 113 of 1991. Hereafter referred to as the Township Act. 
90 
 
settlement in the applicant‟s vicinity. The Administrator countered the allegations 
advanced by the applicants, stating that firstly, Eskom would provide electricity and 
thus eliminate the unreasonable interference of smoke; secondly, proper water and 
sanitation would be provided, and finally, dust would be reduced or eliminated when 
collector roads received a 150mm layer of gravel, with other roads getting a 100mm 
layer.38 After having countered the applicant‟s allegations, the Administrator was of 
the opinion that the allegations claiming a (public) nuisance were irrelevant in law. 
De Villiers J was of the opinion that a decision cannot be made solely on the basis of 
the allegations themselves.39 He suggested that the extent of the alleged statutory 
authority as a defence, argued by the Administrator, ought to be investigated before 
a conclusion could be reached. 
 De Villiers J applied the test used in Johannesburg Municipality v African 
Realty Trust Ltd40 to determine „whether and to what extent the exercise of the 
powers conferred on the Administrator by the Township Act justifies an interference 
with the common law rights of third parties.‟41 De Villiers J concluded that the 
defence of statutory authority had to fail. He was of the opinion that, although the 
Township Act permitted the Administrator to establish a less formal settlement in a 
less formal manner,42 it never justified any interference with the common law rights 
of third parties. De Villiers J concluded that the Administrator had failed to prove that 
the establishment of the less formal settlement would not constitute a public 
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nuisance. De Villiers J applied the reasoning adopted by Hoexter J in the East 
London case that the creation of a public nuisance is not a necessary consequence 
of the mere fact of a settlement.43 On this basis, the court found that the 
Administrator failed to prove the absence of a public nuisance. The court granted the 
applicants an interim interdict with the aim of prohibiting the Administrator from 
proceeding with the resettlement of the squatters. 
 In the second judgement on appeal44 there were three important unresolved 
questions, the first being whether the Administrator‟s decision to establish an 
informal settlement was reviewable. On this question McCreath J found that the 
Administrator‟s decision was not reviewable. McCreath J concluded that the 
applicants did not satisfy the requirements45 for review, as provided in the judgement 
of National Transport Commission and another v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) 
Ltd.46  
 The second question before the court was whether the Township Act 
authorised the Administrator to invade the common law rights of third parties. It was 
concluded, after analysing the alleged nuisances raised by the applicants, that crime 
and air pollution would inevitably increase, no matter where the settlement was 
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established.47 The allegation of water pollution was no longer an issue, as it was 
settled before the adjudication of the final interdict.  On the issue of whether the 
decrease in the value of the applicants‟ property constituted a nuisance, McCreath J 
concluded the following:  
„if the nature of the settlement is such that it will of necessity affect the rights of the 
owners of the properties affected being those owners in the vicinity of the settlement, 
then the diminution in value is a consequence thereof and must be considered in 
conjunction with the legal principles relating to the exercise of statutory powers‟.48  
 Based on the conclusion made on the alleged nuisances, McCreath J was of 
the opinion that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the defence 
of statutory authority. After the respondents discharged the onus, McCreath J 
suggested that the onus shifted to the applicants with a new question:  
„whether the applicants proved that by the adoption of certain precautions reasonably 
practical, or by the adoption of another method, also reasonably practical, to achieve 
the purpose of the powers conferred on the Administrator, the extent of the 
interference will be lessened.‟49  
 In answering the above question, the court established that the Administrator 
could not have taken any other reasonable steps to abate interferences impacting on 
the common law rights of the third parties. Furthermore, the court found that the 
Administrator acted within his powers when choosing Diepsloot as the place to 
establish the settlement. The court was also of the opinion that as a result of 
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urbanisation, different socio-economic societies would inevitably have to live in the 
same vicinity in the future. 
 McCreath J concluded that the applicants had not proved that the 
Administrator could have taken other reasonably practical steps to prevent 
interference with the common law rights of third parties. The application for a final 
interdict failed. 
 On further appeal50 the appellants approached the court to review the 
question of whether the Administrator possessed the authority to alleviate 
homelessness at the expense of unreasonably interfering with the common law 
rights of neighbouring property owners. To review the Administrator‟s authority, 
Smalberger J formulated the question as follows: „whether the creation of a nuisance 
will be unlawful and constitute an actionable wrong.‟51 Smalberger J inquired whether 
the Township Act empowered the Administrator to create a nuisance. Smalberger J 
was of the opinion that the Township Act ought to be analysed against the 
background of significant developments that took place in South Africa with the 
purpose of dismantling the apartheid dispensation. These developments included the 
implementation of laws52 enacted to repeal legislation that promoted racial 
discrimination. After an analysis of case law53 and the Township Act, the court 
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concluded that the legislature was aware of the urgent need for housing and, as a 
consequence, the necessity to establish new settlements speedily and in an orderly 
fashion. The legislature was also aware of the inevitable problem of urbanisation and 
recognised the need for these squatters to be close to work. Finally, the legislature 
recognised that establishing an informal settlement in an urban area would be sub-
standard in terms of town planning and housing requirements, and would 
consequently necessarily decrease the value of the applicants‟ properties.54 After 
taking all these factors into consideration, the court was of the opinion that the 
legislature empowered the Administrator to interfere with the common law rights of 
third parties and therefore found that the settlement was authorised by the Township 
Act.  
 The remaining issue to be resolved was whether the location of the settlement 
was reviewable. After an analysis of the evidence, the court held that the location 
was not reviewable. Smallberger J held that, although that the settlement could have 
been located anywhere else, the relocation of the settlement was necessary to 
reconstruct our society against the background of apartheid. The court, in its 
conclusion, upheld the decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division (as it was then 
known) that the appellants could not prove gross unreasonableness in order to justify 
review. Since all the grounds for review failed, the judgement went against the 
appellants. The court dismissed the appeal.  
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 In Rademeyer and others v Western Districts Council and others55 the 
applicant claimed that the actions of occupiers of an informal settlement on land 
owned by the respondent constituted a nuisance. The applicant approached the 
court for an interdict to abate the alleged nuisance. The aim of the interdict was to 
prohibit the respondent from allowing the erection of more houses on the land as 
well as to force the removal of the existing occupiers.  
 As a point of departure, the court established that during the early phase of 
the housing settlement the respondent had no knowledge of, and had not given 
consent for, the existing occupiers to inhabit the land. It was concluded that at the 
time when proceedings were instituted to abate the alleged nuisance, the respondent 
was aware that occupiers had settled on the land and requested that proper water 
and sanitation services be installed until alternative accommodation could be found. 
Based on the respondent‟s knowledge and reaction, the court held that the 
respondent gave tacit consent for occupiers to stay on the land.  
 Council for the respondent argued that if the occupiers had consent to settle 
on the land, the provisions in the Extension of Security of Tenure Act56 applied to 
them. Nepgen J concurred with this argument and found that the occupiers satisfied 
the definition of an „occupier‟ in ESTA.57 This meant that an interdict could not be 
granted because, in the case of an eviction order, ESTA provides special protection 
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to those who qualify as occupiers under the Act. Therefore the court held that the 
application could not succeed. 
 However, Nepgen J stated that even if ESTA was not applicable, the relief 
sought would not be granted because the existence of a nuisance could not be 
proved. The court gave two reasons for reaching this conclusion. Firstly, the court 
followed the decision in the East London case that a nuisance must be of a 
continuous nature. Based on the evidence, the court was not convinced that this 
requirement was satisfied. Secondly, the applicants claimed that allowing the 
occupiers to stay would have serious consequences for the reasonable enjoyment of 
their property. The consequences included an increased security risk, increased 
crime and the imminent threat of a health hazard. In other words, the applicants 
alleged that these interferences would constitute a public nuisance. However, the 
court held that the installation of proper water and toilet facilities addressed the 
concern about a health hazard. The court found that the claims of increased crime 
and a possible security risk had to fail, since it could not be proved that the occupiers 
were criminals or that they would be susceptible to criminal activity. The existence of 
a nuisance could not be proved. The court dismissed the appeal.  
 In Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and others v Northern Metropolitan58 
the applicants approached the court for a mandatory interdict. They alleged that the 
actions of the occupiers, of an informal settlement in their vicinity, constituted a 
public nuisance. The applicants claimed that a nuisance was present because of a 
lack of water and sanitation, together with the threat of an increased risk of crime. 
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They further alleged that the establishment of the settlement caused many 
neighbours to suffer financial loss as well as experience of a great deal of anxiety.59 
The applicants wanted to prevent and evict occupiers from settling on the 
respondents‟ land by instituting proceedings for an interdict.  
 The respondent (Northern Metropolitan Council) did not deny the allegations 
but argued that they had acted bona fide, that the interference was not of their 
making and that reasonable practicable steps were taken to avoid an unreasonable 
interference with the property interests of the applicants.60  
 The court defined a public nuisance as „a nuisance whose harmful effect is so 
extensive as to affect the general public at large or at least a distinct class of persons 
in its field.‟61 However, the court went on to state:   
„In considering the legal principles involved in a situation of public nuisance, one has 
to consider the rules of private nuisance as the concept is no different in law except 
for the public extent of the nuisance.‟62 
 The court made no reference to the origins and functions of private and public 
nuisance in order to support the above statement, nor did the court refer to any 
authority that might have adopted the same reasoning.63 The court followed the rule 
in Regal v African Superslate,64 which dealt with a private nuisance. According to this 
principle, where third parties created a nuisance on the land of the respondent, an 
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interdict can only be awarded if the respondent had knowledge of the nuisance or, 
secondly, where he failed to take reasonably practicable steps to abate the 
nuisance.65 Since the respondent was aware of the nuisance, the remaining question 
was whether reasonably practicable steps were taken.   
 The respondent argued that by engaging with the applicants to find solutions, 
as well as deploying patrol units and a security guard to minimize the risk of safety 
hazards and crime, steps were taken to reduce or abate the unreasonable 
interferences complained of by the applicants. However, the court held that the 
respondent had not taken reasonably practicable steps to abate the nuisance. 
Although the court expressed its awareness of the homelessness situation in the 
country, it nevertheless granted an interdict for the occupiers to be evicted. The court 
held that a public nuisance was constituted and that reasonable practicable steps 
were not taken to abate the alleged nuisance. The court ordered that the squatters 
be evicted within 48 hours. 
 Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental 
Association and another (Mukhwevho intervening)66 is the last case in the third 
series of South African public nuisance case law. The applicants (an environmental 
association formed by residents of Kayalami Ridge) approached the High Court for 
an interdict prohibiting the establishment of a transit camp in their vicinity for 
members escaping the aftermath of a flood in the Alexandra Township. The 
applicants not only rely on public nuisance but primarily on statutory authority and 
compliance. However, the case is similar to the other cases discussed in this series.  
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 The applicants claimed that, in the absence of empowering legislation, the 
Minister of Public Works (respondent) lacked the authority to provide flood victims 
with temporary alternative accommodation.67 They contended that such an 
establishment would be in contravention of the relevant town planning scheme and 
environmental legislation.68 The respondent countered these allegations by arguing 
that it had a constitutional obligation to provide assistance to victims of the flood.  
 According to the respondent, the transit camp would serve a temporary 
purpose. However, the court was of the opinion that the camp would be established 
for an indefinite period. After having reached this conclusion, the court agreed with 
the argument raised by the applicants that „the legislation would not have been 
applicable if government's purpose was to provide temporary shelter for the 
Alexandra flood victims‟.69 The court made no reference to any environmental 
legislation or zoning scheme that would not be complied with, nor did it decide 
whether the decision to establish a transit camp without empowering legislation was 
unlawful.70 The High Court ruled in favour of the applicants and awarded an interim 
interdict.  
 Since the situation required immediate attention, the respondent appealed 
directly to the Constitutional Court. The Court identified the issues to be resolved. 
These issues were premised on the allegations made by the Kyalami Ridge 
residents. The first and primary issue was whether the erection of a transit camp 
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would be unlawful in the absence of empowering legislation. After the flood the 
government implemented policy in an attempt to provide relief for victims.71 The 
Court held that providing relief for victims in the event of natural disasters is an 
important component of governmental duties in a democratic state and that the 
implementation of policy was a necessary means to provide help in the absence of 
adequate legislation. The Court concluded that the respondent did not act contrary to 
the rule of law, nor did it circumvent any legislative measures enacted by 
Parliament.72 The applicant‟s argument failed.  
 The second issue was whether the transit camp would contravene the 
provisions of the following pieces of legislation: National Environmental Management 
Act (NEMA),73 the Township Planning and Townships Ordinance (Gauteng), National 
Building Regulation and Building Standards Act,74 and the Environmental 
Conservation Act (ECA).75 After an analysis of NEMA, the Court held that the 
applicants could not prove that the establishment of the transit camp would have a 
significant detrimental effect on the environment.76 Regarding the remaining 
legislation, the Court found that the allegations raised by the applicants are relevant 
to the implementation of the decision and not its validity. On the basis of the 
conclusion, the court decided that the state could and should still comply with all 
legislative procedures. 
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 Thirdly, the applicants contended that the respondent infringed their 
constitutional right to administrative action. The Court stated that for such a right to 
have been infringed, the administrative action would have had to be both unlawful 
and procedurally unfair. On the question of whether the administrative action was 
unlawful, the court held that it is not necessary to „consider whether the decision to 
establish a transit camp would affect the rights of the Kyalami residents‟77 and in 
effect rejected the contention made by the applicants. In determining whether the 
administrative action was procedurally fair, the Court had to establish whether any of 
the applicant‟s rights or legitimate expectations were affected or threatened.78 After 
an investigation, the Court concluded that the applicants‟ rights would not be affected 
by the establishment of a transit camp,79 and that the site was ideal for the purposes 
since thousands were living there already;80 it also rejected allegations that the 
neighbourhood‟s character and value would decrease.81 In conclusion, the Court 
held that the administrative action was procedurally fair.  
 The only remaining issue was whether the transit camp would constitute a 
nuisance. The court found that the applicants did not prove any injury or 
inconvenience to the reasonable use and enjoyment of their property.82 Thus the 
nuisance argument failed. In conclusion, the Court overturned the decision in the 
High Court and held that the respondent could establish a transit camp as urgent 
accommodation for victims of the flood. 
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3.3.2 Summary and remarks 
After the Von Moltke case, a third series of case law (between 1989 and 2001) 
brought about the revival of the public nuisance doctrine. However, the case law 
indicated a significant deviation from the doctrine‟s original aims, as it was altered to 
suit the intentions of the applicants. The case law can be divided into two groups, 
namely that from the pre-constitutional83 and from the post-constitutional era.84 In 
most of these cases categorised as the third series, private individuals in 
predominantly white residential areas formed landowners‟,85 farmers‟,86 ratepayers‟87 
and environmental associations88 and applied for an interdict to prevent present or 
future disturbances. The applicants alleged that this limitation of the right to the use 
and enjoyment with their land – through the actions of the occupiers in the informal 
settlements established in the vicinity of their properties – would constitute a public 
nuisance. The applicants in these cases argued that establishing or developing an 
informal settlement in the vicinity would jeopardise their health (in the form of smoke 
and noise pollution), pose a safety hazard (through increased crime) and decrease 
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the value of their property.89 The applicants sought to use the public nuisance 
doctrine as a means to prevent the establishment of the settlement or to evict the 
occupiers of informal settlements who were (or would) only inhabit state-owned land 
in their vicinity. 
 The use of the public nuisance doctrine as a cause of action was successful 
in two of the five decisions, namely East London and Three Rivers. In both cases the 
courts suggested that the applicants‟ private right in land had been infringed and 
that, according to the principles of neighbour law, they are entitled to the reasonable 
use and enjoyment of land. Despite the applicants‟ alleging the presence of a public 
nuisance, the above-mentioned courts never established the existence of a public 
nuisance according to its definition. This is because the courts in all cases in the 
third series wrongfully used the species of nuisance interchangeably. In other words, 
the courts viewed private and public nuisance as two similar entities and therefore 
found it unnecessary to distinguish between them. In the East London case the court 
found it impossible to evict 8000 squatters and therefore ordered that a fence be 
erected that would enclose the camp to separate it from the farmers and that the 
police should patrol the vicinity on a more regular basis during the day and night. But 
in the Three Rivers case the court ordered the eviction of the squatters. 
 Besides the interchangeable use of private and public nuisance in all third-
series cases, a further failure by the court in both the East London and the court a 
quo decision of Diepsloot cases could be noted here. In both cases the respondent 
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contended that it had a statutory authority90 to infringe the common law rights of the 
applicants. However, the courts, after having analysed the legislation, rejected the 
defence of statutory authority on the basis that, if the legislature had intended to 
infringe the common law rights, it would have made provision for compensation to 
the affected applicants. Van der Walt disagrees with the private law – or, as he refers 
to it, the individualistic – approach by the courts.91 He contends that the court relied 
heavily on the principles of neighbour law to protect the interests of the applicants as 
landowners, without having any regard for the social function of government policy to 
eradicate homelessness. On the basis of the dissenting judgments of Viljoen and 
Nestadt J in East London, Van der Walt illustrates two different approaches the court 
ought to have considered. Firstly, Van der Walt refers to the minority judgement of 
Viljoen J in East London in support of his explanation that „the acquisition of the farm 
in question and its use as informal settlement was effected as a direct result of 
government policy, and that as such it was not justiciable in a court of law except on 
the ground that it were ultra vires.‟92 In other words, Viljoen J was of the opinion that 
the applicants could not approach the court on the grounds that a nuisance was 
constituted. Viljoen further stated that if nuisance as a ground is allowed in this 
particular context, „the courts in this country would be inundated with applications or 
actions founded on nuisance.‟93  
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 Secondly, according to Van der Walt, Nestadt J „approached the matter from 
the perspective of administrative law, and argued that the majority erred in deciding 
that the respondent did not prove its defence of statutory authority.‟94 According to 
Nestadt, it was unnecessary for the respondent, in the execution of its powers, to 
show that the common law rights of landowners will be affected in order to get 
immunity from liability for nuisance.95 In other words, according to Van der Walt, 
Nestadt J is of the opinion that:  
„the exercise of the powers by the relevant authority is limited by the provision that it 
must be carried out without negligence, which means that the state would enjoy the 
immunity provided by statutory authority unless the applicants could prove negligence 
with regard to the choice of land for the settlement or the way in which the settlement 
was established or administered.‟  
 In contrast, the doctrine‟s use contrary to its original aims was not allowed in 
the Diepsloot,96 Rademeyer and Kyalami Ridge cases. The judgement in the 
Diepsloot case was based on the following policy considerations: firstly, the 
squatters had to be close to their place of employment; secondly, increased 
urbanisation would in effect force individuals of different socio-economic 
backgrounds to live together; and finally, the legislation in question (the Township 
Act) was at the time part of significant developments to dismantle the apartheid 
dispensation. It could be said that these developments were at the forefront of 
abolishing any practice or legislation that was racially discriminatory to previously 
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disadvantaged members of society. On the issue of whether the applicants‟ health 
and safety would be jeopardised, the court held that crime and air pollution are an 
inevitable consequence if an informal settlement is established. The court went 
further to suggest that the decrease in the value of the applicant‟s property is an 
integral part of the alleged nuisance and cannot be separated from it. This meant 
that (a) if the nuisance was allowed, the decrease of the value of the property would 
be justified; and, (b) if such a nuisance does not exist, the applicants would fail to 
contend that a nuisance could cause the decrease in the value of the property.  
 In the Rademeyer case it was decided that the squatters could not be evicted 
because they satisfied the definition of „occupier‟ in the Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act (ESTA).97 ESTA „protects a particular class of indigent persons who has 
or has had permission to live on rural and semirural land, against eviction from that 
land‟.98 None of the courts, in the third series of cases, specifically those cases 
adjudicated in the post-constitutional era, considered any anti-eviction legislation, 
except in the Rademeyer case. Therefore, the courts displayed a total disregard for 
anti-eviction legislation. The Rademeyer court dismissed any allegations that public 
nuisance was constituted. The court further contended that a public nuisance could 
have been avoided if the state installed (or was given time to do so) proper water 
and toilet facilities and improved the safety and security in the vicinity of the 
applicants (if such a risk was proved). The courts‟ approach in both Rademeyer 
(applying anti-eviction legislation) and Diepsloot (allowing the state time to abate the 
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public nuisance) avoids succumbing to the applicants‟ drastic demand to evict the 
occupiers. 
 In the Kyalami Ridge case the court found, without entering into an in-depth 
discussion, that the establishment of a transit camp would not constitute a public 
nuisance after having found that the applicants couldn‟t prove any interference with 
the right to reasonable use and enjoyment of land.  
 After highlighting the importance in each of the above discussed cases, one 
can assume that the judgement in the East London case is only significant because 
it was the first instance in which the public nuisance doctrine was applied for the 
benefit of the applicants‟ personal interests. Besides rejecting the court‟s reasoning 
in East London, both Diepsloot and Rademeyer adopted different approaches when 
dealing with the application of public nuisance. In contrast, one has to criticise the 
decision in the Three Rivers case. The case was adjudicated in terms of the 
constitutional dispensation but did not follow, as it should have, the Diepsloot case 
for its policy considerations or the Rademeyer case in which anti-eviction legislation 
was applied. 
 One can summarise the problems in applying the doctrine in the third series of 
cases in four points. Firstly, the courts failed to recognise the existence of a 
distinction between private and public nuisance. The failure to recognise a distinction 
inevitably caused the courts not to adjudicate the issue according to the definition of 
public nuisance, although applicants complained of such a nuisance. Secondly, 
besides failing to recognise a distinction between the two species of nuisance, the 
majority of the courts aimed to resolve the matter form a private or individual point of 
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view without considering any social factors. Thirdly, there is a clear indication of a 
decline in the use of public nuisance, after the Queensland case, seeing that the 
majority of public nuisance offences are now regulated by statutory provisions. 
Finally, and very significantly, the notion of public nuisance was used to bypass anti-
eviction legislation. This is highly questionable in a post-constitutional framework, 
which provides for secure tenure and access to housing.  Allowing the use of the 
public nuisance doctrine in an indirect manner (compared to its original aims) and in 
the light of it being regulated by legislation is a clear misuse of the doctrine. 
Furthermore, the application of public nuisance is a problem in light of the significant 
housing shortage in South Africa and arguably a reminder of past racially 
discriminatory practices that ought to be avoided in an open democratic South Africa 
based on human dignity, freedom and equality.99 
 After presenting these arguments, I aim to prove that the public nuisance 
doctrine should not be applied at all, or at least not in the way set out in the series of 
cases discussed above. The subsequent sections elaborate and discuss problems 
with the indirect application of public nuisance in the recent group of case law. 
 
3.3 Elaboration of problems  
3.3.1 Interchangeable use of private and public nuisance 
As indicated in chapter 2, nuisance can be divided in two categories, namely private 
and public nuisance. Courts in the third series of cases failed to distinguish between 
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a private and a public nuisance and used both species of nuisance interchangeably. 
This is problematic seeing that the applicants in this series of cases alleged the 
presence of a public nuisance, while the courts applied the test for a private 
nuisance and hence did not adjudicate the issue according to the definition of a 
public nuisance. 
 A private nuisance affects the reasonable enjoyment of the land of an 
individual (typically a neighbour) who resides in the vicinity of the neighbour.  A 
private nuisance „denotes an infringement of a neighbour‟s entitlement of use and 
enjoyment so that it affects her quality of life, i.e. ordinary health, comfort and 
convenience, by an ongoing wrong.‟100 Nuisances are usually caused by smoke, 
noise, water, vibrations, fumes or other detrimental activity invading the neighbour‟s 
property.  Each neighbour is „entitled to the use and enjoyment of her property, 
exercised in a reasonable manner to avoid unreasonable infringement of the 
neighbour‟s similar entitlement.‟101 Each owner has a reciprocal duty to act in a way 
that does not have a detrimental effect on a neighbouring owner‟s rights.102 In the 
case of private nuisance, the reasonableness test is applied, namely „whether a 
normal person, finding him or herself in the position of the plaintiff, would have 
tolerated the interference concerned.‟103 A successful applicant is entitled to an 
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interdict,104 abatement order,105 self-help106 or claim for damages.107 In other words, 
a nuisance is of a private nature when an individual, with a right vested in land or a 
building is subjected to an unreasonable interference. On the other hand, a public 
nuisance can be defined as „an act or omission or state of affairs that impedes, 
offends, endangers or inconveniences the public at large.‟108 The doctrine was 
originally used for the abatement of ordinary public nuisances (protecting the general 
public health and safety) such as smoke,109 noise110 and smells.111 These nuisances 
can be private nuisance too but is categorised as a public nuisance when they 
originate form a public space or on public land. It was also used to prosecute 
members of the public against actions that were morally and socially unacceptable, 
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such as keeping a brothel,112 obstruction of a road113 and polluting a stream.114 No 
reasonableness test is applied to determine whether a public nuisance was 
constituted. The perpetrator‟s action is unlawful if he or she is found guilty of causing 
injury, damage or inconvenience to the health and safety of the general public. 
Currently, the perpetrator‟s action is unlawful if it is found to be in conflict with certain 
statutory regulations. An interdict or abatement order is used to suppress or stop a 
public nuisance. 
 However, in the third series of cases some of the courts failed to recognise 
the distinction between these two separate species of nuisance. Courts rather used 
the notions of private and public nuisance interchangeably, without investigating 
which requirements the alleged nuisance would satisfy. In Three Rivers Snyders J 
stated that the concept of public nuisance is similar to that of private nuisance, 
except for the public extent of the nuisance.115 In his attempt to resolve the dispute, 
Snyders J applied the legal principles used to adjudicate a private nuisance, namely 
determining whether the private landowner‟s common law rights of use and 
enjoyment of land were infringed, instead of investigating whether the nuisance 
complained of satisfied the definition of a public nuisance. In fact, in all the case law, 
the courts based their enquiry solely on whether the affected neighbour‟s intrinsic 
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right of reasonable use and enjoyment of land had been infringed before delivering a 
judgement.116  
According to Abrams and Washington:117  
„[a] public nuisance does not necessarily involve an interference with the private 
enjoyment of property; rather the interference is with a public right, usually relating to 
public health and safety or substantial inconvenience or annoyance to the public.‟118   
 In other words, in the context of a private nuisance, only a private right is 
infringed. Such a right is infringed if the reasonable use and enjoyment of the 
individual‟s land had been infringed. In contrast, in the context of a public nuisance a 
public right is infringed. A public right is violated if, for instance, the health and safety 
of the public in general have been infringed. Moreover, in a public nuisance case 
                                                     
116
 In the East London Western Districts’ Farmers Association and others v Minister of Education and 
Development Aid and others 1989 (2) SA 63 (A) 66I the court stated that a landowner is entitled to the 
reasonable enjoyment of land for this is an intrinsic right of such an owner and nobody may 
unjustifiably interfere with it. The case was further decided on the basis that the constituted nuisance 
interfered with the legitimate property rights of citizens. See 75I for the basis of the judgement. In 
Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners Association and others v Administrator Transvaal and others 
1993 (1) SA 577 (T) 578F the court stated that the establishment of a settlement would constitute a 
nuisance and as a consequence affect the applicants‟ right to reasonable use and enjoyment of land. 
In Rademeyer and others v Western Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE) 1017F the 
court, with reference to the East London case, was of the opinion that in determining whether a public 
nuisance had been constituted, one has to establish whether the applicants‟ right to reasonable use 
and enjoyment of land had been infringed. In Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and another (Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) 1182I-
1183A the court stated: „Under the common law an owner of property ordinarily has no right to object 
to the use to which neighbouring property is put. The general rule is that the reasonable use of 
property by an owner is not subject to restrictions, even if such user causes prejudice to others.‟ 
117
 Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private 
nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399. 
118
 Abrams R & Washington V „The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private 
nuisance twenty years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359-399 364. 
113 
 
there are not necessarily any effects on private land or private rights, but even if 
there are, the effects go beyond that and are felt on public land and in public spaces. 
This is the fundamental distinguishing factor between a private and public nuisance. 
With the manifestation of this distinction, the aim is to illustrate that the courts failed 
to establish that such a public right was violated in a public space. None of the courts 
in the third series of cases made an effort to determine whether the nuisance 
complained of infringed upon the public right, namely the right to the health and 
safety of the community at large. 
 In using private and public nuisance interchangeably the courts further failed 
to distinguish between the purposes of the distinct species of nuisance. Although the 
primary remedies sought to abate both categories of nuisance are an interdict or 
abatement order, the purpose of the remedies in the case of private and public 
nuisance is different. In the context of a private nuisance, the purpose of the 
remedies is to protect the personal interest of the property owner, as opposed to a 
public nuisance, where the general public‟s interest is protected. Although private 
individuals are members of the public, the applicant who alleges a public nuisance 
has to prove that a public right had been infringed in a way that caused great injury 
or inconvenience to the public in general and does not merely have an impact on the 
interests of private individuals.  
 One could argue further that even if the courts found the existence of a public 
nuisance according to the original definition of a public nuisance, the decision to 
evict current occupiers or to prevent the establishment of a new development is a 
drastic measure. The state could prevent some of the problems complained of, for 
instance, by installing proper services (water, tarred roads, sanitary services and 
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electricity).119 If such services are not installed at already established settlements, 
then the courts ought to grant the state a grace period to make such alterations that 
would reduce or prevent any possibility of injury or inconvenience to neighbouring 
owners.  
 One can conclude that the courts‟ interchangeable use of private and public 
nuisance is problematic. It allowed the applicants alleging an infringement of their 
intrinsic right in land an option to exercise an alternative mechanism to abate an 
unreasonable interference. On the basis of a clearer distinction between the two, one 
could argue that the courts erroneously allowed a small specific group of neighbours 
(the applicants), who alleged an unreasonable interference with the reasonable use 
and enjoyment of their land, the use of public nuisance as a cause of action without 
determining that a public nuisance was constituted, according to its original 
definition.  
   
3.3.2 Private versus public approach 
In the first two decisions, ie East London and Diepsloot,120 the courts primarily 
sought to resolve the nuisance allegations advanced by the applicants from a private 
law or individual approach, without considering any social factors, for example, 
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alternative accommodation or the availability of employment or schools for 
occupiers. Courts in both these cases reasoned that landowners or lawful occupiers 
possess an intrinsic right to reasonable use and enjoyment of land that has to be 
protected against any infringements.121 Both decisions at the time illustrate the 
courts duty to fulfil the wishes of the sovereign parliament,122 which encouraged the 
protection of the landowners, who were predominantly white South African citizens. 
However, in the second judgement in the Diepsloot123 case McCreath J took a 
different approach. McCreath J considered social factors apart from applying a strict 
private law approach when considering the following factors: (a) the availability of 
employment for occupiers in the vicinity; (b) because of increased urbanisation, 
people from different cultures and backgrounds would inevitably have to share the 
same vicinity; and (c) finally, the legislation (in this case the Township Act) was 
enacted to abolish all practices associated with the apartheid regime. On appeal124 
Smallberger J concurred with the statements of McCreath J and added that at the 
time South Africa was engaged in developments to dismantle any legislation or 
practices which once gave effect to racial segregation. Smallberger J also stated that 
the legislature was aware of the already serious housing crisis and the urgent need 
to find accommodation for occupiers. 
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 Although the two appeal decisions of the Diepsloot case moved away from 
the so-called individualistic approach, applicants in Rademeyer, Three Rivers and 
Kyalami Ridge sought to protect their private rights as landowners. Apart from the 
two appeal decisions in Diepsloot, the courts continued to apply the principles of 
private nuisance to adjudicate a dispute where applicants alleged a public nuisance 
without considering social factors or governmental policy to provide housing and 
secure tenure to occupiers who do not have any rights normally associated with 
private law in relation to land. As Van der Walt states, „persons without any rights at 
all (such as unlawful squatters) have no chance against the right of an owner; in fact, 
they are never even allowed to enter the race.‟125 Importantly, as the case law 
shows, the applications were always aimed at protecting the individual interests of 
the property owners who were members of the associations that brought the 
applications. 
 In other words, the courts, by opting to use a private law approach, gave 
applicants the upper hand against the occupiers. In fact, it can also be argued that 
the applicants aimed purely to satisfy their personal desires by protecting their 
private rights in land. Courts are obliged, especially in the post-constitutional era, to 
consider all social factors, including government policy, and especially constitutional 
values before prohibiting occupation or evicting occupiers.  
 Moreover, Van der Walt is of the opinion that „the protection of individual 
rights cannot be undertaken or considered without having due regard for the public 
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interest in property.‟126 He states that there ought to be an equitable balance 
between the interest of the private landowner and those without any rights in terms 
of section 25 of the Constitution. In other words, the traditional private law approach 
should not be given any automatic advantage, which would inevitably be to the 
detriment of those without property rights, as was the case in the third series of 
public nuisance cases. Van der Walt contends that in the light of the Constitution, 
particularly section 25, „the constitutional property concept has to be different from 
the traditional private-law concept.‟127 
 Furthermore, the need to move away from the absolute protection of private 
ownership of land, together with the social factors provided as a guideline in 
Diepsloot, received stronger support with the institution of the Constitution and its 
entrenched provisions on land reform and housing. The provisions on land reform 
are given effect by the Extension of Security of Tenure Act128 (ESTA) and the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land (PIE).129 Sachs J in 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,130 supports this different approach 
when referring to Horn J in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land 
and Shelter and Others131 
„He held that the term also implies that a court, when deciding on a matter of this 
nature, would be obliged to break away from a purely legalistic approach and have 
regard to extraneous factors such as morality, fairness, social values and implications 
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and circumstances which would necessitate bringing out an equitably principled 
judgment.‟ 
 This brings us to the next sub-section, which deals with instances of some of 
the courts ignoring these anti-eviction provisions provided for in ESTA and PIE. 
Moreover, not only did some of the courts fail to acknowledge and apply these 
provisions, but in fact the applicants sought to avoid these provisions and in effect 
approached the court to obtain an indirect eviction order based on the grounds of 
nuisance.  
 
3.3.3 Circumventing anti-eviction legislation  
The Bill of Rights specifically promotes land reform in section 25(5)–(9) of the 
Constitution.132 The land reform programme provides protection to those who were 
subject to past racially discriminatory laws or practices (predominantly black South 
Africans).133 The land reform framework in section 25(5)–(9) and legislation 
promulgated to give effect to it – such as ESTA and PIE – now provide rules and 
procedures that have to be followed before anyone can be evicted from their place of 
occupation. These rules and procedures are in effect bypassed by the use of public 
nuisance in recent decisions such as Three Rivers.  
 However, the first anti-eviction legislation was introduced only during 1997 
(ESTA), followed by PIE in 1998. Therefore, the legislation could only have been 
applied in the cases of Rademeyer, Three Rivers and Kyalami Ridge. However, 
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none of these cases except Rademeyer applied the relevant anti-eviction legislation, 
namely ESTA. The court in the Rademeyer case established that the occupiers 
satisfied the requirement of having acquired consent (tacitly) to occupy the land. 
Consequently, the court allowed the occupiers to enjoy protection under ESTA, 
which meant they could not be evicted. Although the anti-eviction legislation was 
applied in the Rademeyer case, it ought to be a cause for concern that there was no 
investigation, against the background of the facts in the Three Rivers or Kyalami 
Ridge decisions, to determine whether occupiers qualified to be protected under the 
two legislative measures. In fact, the mere effort to use public nuisance to 
circumvent anti-eviction legislation, no matter what the facts are, is certainly a 
problem, as there is an urgent need for housing and a reciprocal duty for private 
landowners to act responsibly, especially in view of transformation and increased 
urbanisation.134 
 According to Van der Walt these nuisance-based evictions (as he refers to 
them) should be a cause for concern on two accounts.135 Firstly, the use of the public 
nuisance remedy to bypass anti-eviction legislation leaves occupiers of informal 
settlements homeless in a process that is reminiscent of previous discriminatory 
practices,136 which should be avoided at all costs, as Van der Walt states:137 
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„Given the history of forced removals and the explicit commitment in the Constitution, 
and in the land reform programme as a whole, to eradicating the legacy of apartheid 
land law and preventing its recurrence, we have to be conscious of and sensitive to 
this particularly unhappy history, and bear in mind that a substantial part of the land 
reform programme is aimed at dismantling the very structures and imbalances 
brought about, and cemented into current land holding patterns, through something 
akin to indirect planning and nuisance evictions.‟ 
 Moreover, Van der Walt states that „apartheid land allowed evictions and 
forced removals that uprooted millions of black South Africans and left them 
politically, socially and economically marginalised and vulnerable. Land reform laws 
are meant to stop and where possible reverse this process.‟138 Van der Walt is of the 
opinion that greater caution is needed where landowners aim to prevent new 
housing developments in a time where South Africa is plagued with 
homelessness.139 In order to avoid a repetition of evictions and forced removals such 
as occurred during the apartheid period, in this new constitutional dispensation the 
courts should be hesitant and sensitive when adjudicating an issue relating to 
nuisance. 
 According to Van der Walt, the second cause for concern arises when 
nuisance evictions are inevitable and justified should not be applied outside the post-
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constitutional land reform framework. In all the third series cases applicants alleged 
that their private right to land in their capacity as private landowners had been 
infringed. As a result many of the courts considered resolving the issue by applying 
the principles of neighbour law. Not only did the courts fail to distinguish between the 
two distinct species of private and public nuisance, but this individualistic approach 
was applied outside the context of the constitutional provisions in some of these 
cases. Van der Walt expresses the opinion that the relevant constitutional provisions, 
namely sections 25(5)-(9) and 26 together with statutory provisions, dealing with land 
reform must be taken into consideration in adjudicating nuisance-based evictions. 
Van der Walt AJ finds further support in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers,140 where Sachs J expressed the view:  
„[T]hose seeking eviction should be encouraged not to rely on concepts of faceless 
and anonymous squatters automatically to be expelled as obnoxious social 
nuisances. Such a stereotypical approach has no place in the society envisaged by 
the Constitution; justice and equity require that everyone is to be treated as an 
individual bearer of rights entitled to respect for his or her dignity.‟ 
  In other words, simply using public nuisance as an alternative measure to 
evict occupiers not only bypasses section 26(3) together with ESTA and PIE, but 
contravenes the spirit, purport and object of the Constitution. These provisions ought 
to be considered in all cases seeking to evict occupiers. Although these anti-eviction 
provisions were applied in Rademeyer, they should have been considered in Three 
Rivers and should also be taken into account in any future case pertaining to 
nuisance evictions. Van der Walt‟s statement is supported by Scott, who states: 
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„My suggestion is, however, that [a] court could make such orders, where it has found 
that there was a nuisance, provided that it takes into consideration that the 
procedures of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act and the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act have to be followed by the person 
against whom the order is given. In this way the courts will also show sensitivity to 
both the plight of the homeless and the rights of land owners.‟141 
 It could further be argued that the applicants‟ indirect approach to evict the 
occupiers could have been because the normal proceedings of an eviction 
application are time consuming, too expensive and it would be more difficult to get 
such an order in the light of the anti-eviction legislation. Although „the common law 
favours current landowners by allowing them to obtain eviction orders relatively 
speedily and easily, while the land reform laws favour the security of tenure of non-
owners by placing various substantive and procedural prohibitions‟142, these 
prohibitions in effect restrict the landowners from obtaining an eviction order. 
 Therefore, because the application of public nuisance in this third series is 
problematic, Van der Walt states that this common law remedy ought to be 
„reconsidered in the view of the urgent and extreme nature of the South African land 
issue.‟143 He suggests that public nuisance ought to be non-applicable or „requires 
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substantial reconsideration and reinterpretation in the current field of land use 
development, planning and provision of housing.‟144  
 
3.3.4 Public nuisance offences regulated by legislation 
A further question as to why the future use of public nuisance ought to be 
reconsidered or reinterpreted in the light of the Constitution is the fact that protection 
of public health and safety is now mostly promulgated in legislation regulated by 
local authorities. Public nuisance offences have been regulated by legislation since 
their adoption in South African law.145 Regulation by way of legislation increased until 
the majority of offences were entrenched in statutory provisions. There are many 
examples of such legislation, for instance section 24 of the Constitution,146 the 
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National Environmental Management Act: Air Quality Act,147 the Health Act,148 the 
Aviation Act149 and the Atmospheric Pollution Act.150  
 Therefore there have to be extraordinary circumstances in order to use the 
Common Law notion of public nuisance to apply for an interdict to abate a nuisance 
that is largely regulated by legislation already. Such extraordinary circumstances 
were not proved in the second and third series of cases. The fact that there is no 
other reported cases where the notion of public nuisance was used after 1943 
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suggests that the legislation that has been promulgated to protect residents against 
new developments in their vicinity was largely successful. This indicates that the 
recent use of public nuisance as a cause of action is therefore questionable and 
problematic, since the majority of offences which the applicants complained of, such 
as continuous interferences (smoke, noise, pollution together with that of safety and 
security), are now mostly regulated by legislation.   
 
3.3.5 Remarks 
The use of public nuisance in its revival after 45 years in the Queensland case is 
problematic for various reasons. As indicated above, the courts used the two 
separate species of nuisance interchangeably. In so doing, they not only confused 
two distinct doctrines, but also left the door open for applicants to use public 
nuisance as a cause of action to advance their personal intentions. It can be said 
that the applicants in the third series of case law used public nuisance to satisfy a 
private rather than a public right in a public space. 
 The use of public nuisance as an indirect mechanism to evict poor, black 
homeless people is a serious problem as it does not comply with the entrenched 
constitutional values of land reform151 and the right of access to adequate 
housing.152  
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 Furthermore, the majority of public nuisance offences are entrenched in 
legislation and regulated with great success. The introduction of statutory provisions 
to regulate these offences has had an impact on the use of the common law notion 
of public nuisance, which explains the decline in reported case law after 1943.  
 Therefore, the fact that the offences are now regulated by legislation makes 
one consider why the doctrine was revived and whether it still serves a legitimate 
purpose in South African law. On the basis of the finding that the application of public 
nuisance is problematic, one can either (a) apply the notion of public nuisance on the 
condition that courts reinterpret this remedy in the light of the new constitutional 
dispensation, or (b) it should not be applied at all.153 
 However, it appears that public nuisance might still serve a legitimate purpose 
against the background of the new constitutional era after the decisions in both 
Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
others154 and 410 Voortrekker Road Property Holdings CC v Minister of Home Affairs 
and others.155 Unfortunately, in both cases, although the facts indicate that a truly 
public nuisance was probably constituted, the court again failed to distinguish 
between private and public nuisance and as a result confused the legal principles of 
these two separate doctrines.  
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3.4 Intercape and Vootrekker 
3.4.1 Case summaries  
In Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
others the majority of applicants, together with the first and third respondent, own or 
occupy premises in Montreal Drive, situated in the Airport Industria, Western Cape. 
The first applicant is Intercape Mainliner, a luxury bus operator. Intercape occupies 
and owns various premises in the vicinity of the respondent. These premises include 
a head office (fifteenth applicant), a maintenance centre for buses, a call centre 
(tenth applicant) and a training centre.156 The first respondent is the Minister of 
Home Affairs. The Department of Home Affairs (hereafter referred to as DoHA) rents 
premises for the purposes of running a refugee office on erf 115973 of the third 
respondent, Cila.   
 The applicants allege that the operation of the refugee office by the DoHA 
contravenes the applicable zoning scheme of the City of Cape Town and that it 
constitutes a nuisance. The refugee office was located in Customs House (Cape 
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Town) prior to its relocation to the Airport Industria. The office was forced to move as 
a result of its failure to provide the refugees with the „necessary facilities and proper 
opportunities to submit applications‟.157 The court found that the DoHA failed to 
provide a venue large enough to accommodate the volume of asylum seekers. This 
matter was adjudicated in Kiliko and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others.158  
 However, the situation did not improve when the office relocated to Montreal 
Drive in the Airport Industria. In fact, the situation seems to have worsened, seeing 
that it now also affected the normal use of the surrounding premises. This is seen in 
the evidence given by the applicants who, as stated earlier, alleged that the refugee 
office contravened the City of Cape Town‟s zoning scheme and constituted a 
nuisance.  According to the facts, the office was visited by approximately four to five 
hundred asylum seekers on a daily basis. Seeing that officials at the DoHA can only 
help a limited number of people per day, they remained there overnight in order to be 
in the front of the queue the following day. As a consequence, there was an 
increased amount of litter, the streets were filled with remains of material to provide 
shelter and there was always a remainder of human waste and food. The large 
crowd of asylum seekers attracted illegal street vendors, who contributed to the 
increased amount of litter in the streets. The applicants complained that the 
increased littering and presence of human waste would constitute a serious health 
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risk, seeing that there were no refuse and sanitation facilities available to rectify the 
unhealthy conditions.159  
 The applicants further complained that the refugee office contributed to an 
increased level of noise. The noise generated by the crowd of approximately four to 
five hundred people was more than an industrial area would normally have to 
tolerate. Taxis which provided asylum seekers with transport to and from the office 
were a further source of noise, as they played loud music and hooted excessively to 
attract potential customers and warn people to clear the streets as they moved to or 
from the office.160 Another source of noise was the large crowds outside the office, 
who screamed and shouted frantically. The noise stemmed from situations where 
tensions between asylum seekers and criminals were about to erupt into violence. 
The police, who were called upon to restore order, made use of teargas, pepper 
spray and rubber bullets which caused the crowd to scatter in various directions, with 
some entering the premises of the applicants.161  
 Applicants further complained that the operation of the refugee office 
detrimentally affected safety and security in the area. Although asylum seekers were 
robbed and mugged by criminal elements, the applicants only reported incidents 
where their employees were victim to the same crimes, adding physical violence and 
intimidation to the list of complaints. In fact, conditions were of such a nature that 
some of the employees resigned and clients became disinclined to visit their 
premises. Moreover, the police interference as a consequence of the tensions 
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between the asylum seekers and criminal elements posed an imminent threat to all 
who used the street and surrounding properties.162 
 Regular blocking of the roads by taxis, predominantly as a result of illegal 
parking, was intolerable and subsequently added to the applicants‟ list of complaints. 
Intercape, being a bus company, complained that free-flowing traffic was no longer 
possible after the office had been opened. Traffic and police vehicles called upon to 
restore order in times of anarchy contributed to blocked roads.163 
 The first issue the court addressed was to determine whether the refugee 
office contravened the zoning scheme. The court established that Montreal Drive is 
subject to the Land Use and Planning Ordinance164 (hereafter referred to as LUPO) 
and that the scheme was zoned for „Industrial General‟ purposes.  
 In August 1999 Cila applied to have the conditional use of Place of Assembly‟ 
extended to permit the DoHA to disburse unemployment funds. However, the 
applicants complained that the respondents did not comply with three of the 
conditions set out by the City‟s Urban Planning Committee (CUPC) before the 
premises could be used for the purposes that had been applied for. The three 
conditions were that 45 parking bays had to be provided; that there be a waiting 
room for at least 60 people and that a „revised building plan in accordance with the 
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Development Plan (Plan 3) attached to the report, be submitted to the Central 
Service Area for approval to ensure compliance with the National regulations‟.165 
 After having established that the state was bound by LUPO, the court 
determined whether the department‟s use of the premises as offices was in line with 
the consent given by the city. Based on the application Cila made to the City, the 
court found that it was never the City‟s intention to give permission to sanction such 
use, that the refugee office fall under the auspices „as offices‟.166 Furthermore, 
because of the respondent‟s non-compliance with the zoning scheme, the court had 
to determine whether the refugee office satisfied the three conditions required by the 
CUPC in response to Cila‟s application. The court found that: (a) the condition which 
required provision for 45 parking bays was violated; (b) it was inconclusive to 
establish whether there had been a waiting room for 60 people and additional 
ablution facilities; and (c) no revised building plan was submitted with plan 3, which 
meant that this condition was violated.167 On the issue of whether the respondents 
complied with the zoning scheme, the court found the scheme had been 
contravened. 
  The most interesting and relevant part of the judgement, for the 
purposes of this thesis, is the issue whether a nuisance was constituted. While the 
court was ready to grant relief on the basis that the zoning scheme had been 
contravened, it still addressed the cause of action based on nuisance. Without 
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identifying which of the two categories of nuisance would be applicable, the court 
accepted that the alleged nuisance was of a private nature when it stated:  
„In the context of the present case, the term nuisance connotes a species of delict 
arising from wrongful violation of the duty which our common law imposes on a 
person towards his neighbours, the said duty being the correlative of the right which 
his neighbours have to enjoy the use and occupation of their properties without 
unreasonable interference‟.168  
 The court then determined whether the use of the premises as a refugee 
office was an „unreasonable interference in the right of neighbouring owners and 
occupiers‟.169 The court accepted the majority of the material as evidence presented 
by the applicants. The material indicated that the streets were filled with large 
crowds, that violence erupted as a result of tensions between asylum seekers and 
criminals, that illegal parking disturbed the easy flow of traffic, the presence of illegal 
street vendors, and the remains of litter and human refuse in the street. The court 
was of the opinion that it is common sense that a crowd of four to five hundred 
individuals would produce levels of noise exceeding what would normally be 
expected to be endured in an industrial area. A video of approximately twenty 
minutes showed a violent fight and captured the noise of the crowd and hooting of 
vehicles, and shows congested streets, the condition of the mobile toilets and the 
litter.170 Although the duration of the nuisance was at times only two to three hours, 
the court still regarded the nuisance to be of a continuous nature and unacceptable 
and  intolerable.  
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 Mr Albertus, acting on behalf of the respondents, replied to these allegations 
by stating that the large crowds in the street had to be dealt with by the law 
enforcement agencies such as the traffic and police officers. However, the court was 
of the opinion that (a) the gathering of such a large crowd was a consequence of the 
setting up of the refugee office; (b) even if the law enforcement agencies were to act, 
the nuisance would still remain; (c) law enforcement agencies are pressed for 
resources and the situation required them to be there on a permanent basis, which 
would be impossible; and (d), the law enforcement agencies‟ help would only be of a 
temporary nature and would not help eliminate the terrible conditions.171 
 The court distinguished the facts in the East London case172 from the facts it 
had to deal with. The court was of the opinion that in the East London case the 
unreasonable interference was an action by the respondent which infringed the 
rights of a neighbouring owner (applicant). On the other hand, on the facts in dispute, 
the unreasonable interferences not only affected the neighbouring owners, but in fact 
„attract people to public areas immediately adjoining the property‟.173 However, the 
court stated that this distinction does not matter. 
 The court then investigated whether litter and obstruction of roads are not in 
themselves unlawful. In their investigation the court referred to English case law to 
resolve this matter. The court accepted that although Regal v African Superslate 
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(Pty) Ltd174 rejected the adoption of English law into South African law, the concept 
of nuisance in both these systems of law is based on reasonableness.175 In its 
analysis of English case law the court illustrated that „an individual‟s actions‟ may 
give rise to an actionable nuisance, even though the nuisance is caused by persons 
who are attracted to the premises and congregate in the street.176 
 Mr Albertus, acting on behalf of the respondents, argued that the applicants 
could not expect the tranquillity of a leafy residential area in an industrial area.  
However, the court rejected this argument, suggesting that the ongoing activity was 
not typical of conditions in an industrial area and should not to be tolerated in the 
area. Although the court acknowledged the high social utility of the refugee office in 
promoting the general welfare, it contended that the refugee office should attend to 
its duties without unreasonably interfering with the business activities of others.177 
 The court concluded that the continuous activity was objectively 
unreasonable. Therefore, the court found that a nuisance was constituted.  
Consequently the court ordered that using the premise for the purposes of a refugee 
office was unlawful and granted an interdict as an order to cease the operation of the 
office. The court, however, suspended the interdict and allowed the DoHA time to 
find alternative premises.   
 The second case, namely Voortrekker road, is a direct consequence of the 
Intercape decision. After moving from their premises in the Airport Industria, the 
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DoHA occupied alternative refugee offices in Maitland. Once again the applicants‟ 
argued that the refugee office contravened the City of Cape Town‟s zoning 
regulations and created a nuisance. Similarly to Intercape, the court found the 
contravention of the zoning scheme and the existence of a nuisance, but again failed 
to distinguish between a private and public nuisance. Once again, the court granted 
an interdict that obliged the DoHA to cease the unlawful operation of the refugee 
office.  
 However, different to the decision found in the Intercape case, the court gave 
the DoHA an option to address illegalities and thereby regulate the operation of the 
office at its current location, oppose to find alternative accommodation. The court 
was of the opinion that it would be impracticable to close the refugee office 
immediately. 
 
3.4.2 Remarks  
Although the court was correct to conclude that a nuisance was constituted, it erred 
when it automatically assumed, without relying on the facts to establish the character 
of the nuisance, that the unreasonable activities constituted a private nuisance. 
Therefore, the court failed to distinguish between a private and a public nuisance. As 
stated before, Church and Church define a public nuisance as nuisance „of which the 
harmful effect is so extensive as to affect the general public at large or at least a 
distinct class of person within its field of operation‟.178 It was clear from the evidence 
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that it was not only the applicants but anyone – for example, clients, employees and 
visitors – who set foot in the vicinity of the refugee office would be negatively 
affected by having to endure noise, face the possibility of being mugged and robbed, 
be exposed to a health risk and be prevented from using the road as a result of 
illegal parking or road blockage. Furthermore, as stated above, Abrams and 
Washington define a public right as:  
„[a] public nuisance does not necessarily involve an interference with the private 
enjoyment of property; rather the interference is with a public right, usually relating to 
public health and safety or substantial inconvenience or annoyance to the public.‟179   
 Based on this definition, one can ascertain that the nuisance affected a public 
right and not necessarily or merely a private right. Furthermore, the nuisance 
occurred in a public space, namely the street. A street is a place where the 
community at large can be in contact with the alleged unreasonable interferences.  In 
fact, the first series of South African public nuisance cases covered the majority of 
unreasonable interferences complained of in the Intercape case, namely pollution180 
(whether it is litter or human waste), noise181 and the obstruction of roads occurred in 
a public space or public land.182 These first series of cases rightfully categorised 
these interferences as a public nuisance after having analysed the facts in the 
particular context. One can therefore reach the conclusion that the court erred in 
assuming that a private instead of a public nuisance had been constituted. The 
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nuisance originated in a public space, namely the street. Therefore the nuisance 
complained of was a public nuisance and not a private nuisance. 
 The judgment can be criticised for failing to distinguish between the 
categories of nuisance but, more importantly, that it missed the opportunity to apply 
the public nuisance doctrine for its original purposes, especially after its indirect 
application in the third series of public nuisance case law, discussed above. As 
indicated above, these original purposes were applied in the first series of South 
African public nuisance case law. On the other hand, the fourth series of cases 
illustrates that public nuisance could still, depending on the situation, have a purpose 
to fulfil in South African law.  
 Furthermore, both cases were decided under LUPO, which raises the 
question whether the application of public nuisance was necessary or relevant at all. 
Therefore, it could be argued that public nuisance is only applicable in the absence 
of statutory or any other legislation such as LUPO which cover existing or future 
public nuisance offences.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In analysing the third series of case law my aim was to illustrate that the use of 
public nuisance was applied contrary to its original aims, namely protecting the well-
being of the general public. Its application was rather used to evict occupants or 
prevent prospective occupiers from settling in the vicinity of the applicants; in so 
doing the applicants sought to circumvent anti-eviction legislation. Furthermore, the 
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effect of bypassing the anti-eviction legislation is reminiscent of forced removals 
during the apartheid era.  
 Seeing that public nuisance offences have been encapsulated in legislation 
and are regulated successfully, the question has to be asked whether the remedy 
still has a legitimate purpose in South African law. After having analysed the 
Intercape case, it could be argued that the original aims of public nuisance could still 
be applied in South Africa. All the facts in that case, especially the unreasonable 
interferences complained of, contravened laws (LUPO) and had constituted a public 
nuisance. However, the judge failed to establish that the unreasonable interferences 
constituted a public nuisance. Instead, the judge erroneously applied the principles 
of private opposed to public nuisance.  
 It can be concluded that public nuisance should only be applied in 
circumstances where its application is not misused to benefit particular parties. The 
indirect use in the third series of case law is unjustifiable and could be 
unconstitutional. This raises the question of whether the use of the public nuisance 
doctrine, as it was applied in the third series of case law, meets the requirements of 
section 25(1),183 (2)184 and section 26(3)185 of the Constitution. This test is done in 
the following chapter. 
                                                     
183
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms 
of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.  
184
 Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that „property may be expropriated only in terms of law 
of general application (a) for a public purpose or public interest; and (b) subject to compensation.‟ 
185
 Section 26(3) of the Constitution provides that „no one may be evicted from their home, or have 
their home demolished, without an order of the court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.‟  
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Chapter 4: Constitutional compatibility of public nuisance 
doctrine 
4.1 Introduction 
Up to this point, four series of public nuisance cases have been analysed in chapters 
2 and 3. As indicated in chapter 2, the first series of cases strictly applied the original 
aims of public nuisance doctrine according to its definition, namely, „an act or 
omission that endangers the life, health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or 
to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her 
Majesty‟s subjects‟.1 In other words, the original aims of public nuisance doctrine are 
to protect against any actions that would pose a threat to the health and safety of the 
public, as well as to protect the public against any immoral behaviour. 
 The remaining three series of public nuisance cases are analysed in chapter 
3. The second of these consists in actual fact of only one case, namely, the Von 
Moltke case. In this case the applicant approached the court for an interdict to 
prevent the building of a shopping mall in the vicinity of his home. The applicant 
alleged that the erection of the mall constituted a public nuisance. The court rejected 
the interdict on the basis that the applicant could not prove „injury, prejudice or 
damage or invasion of a right peculiar to himself and over and above that sustained 
                                                     
1
 News Group Newspapers Ltd v SOGAT ’82 [1986] IRLR 337 at 346. See also Spencer JR „Public 
nuisance – A critical examination‟ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Review 55-84 55. Church J & Church J 
„Nuisance‟ in Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) LAWSA 19 (2006) 115-145 par 163 define a 
public nuisance as „an act or omission or state of affairs that impedes, offends, endangers or 
inconveniences the public at large‟. 
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by the members of the general public‟.2 In other words, the applicant sought to obtain 
an interdict to abate an alleged nuisance but intended essentially to protect his 
private rights as a landowner rather than the well-being of the general public, thus 
failing to comply with the requirements for success in alleging public nuisance. 
 In the third series of public nuisance cases, as in the application in the second 
series, applicants approached the court for an interdict to protect their private interest 
as landowners, in these cases the applicants alleged that the establishment of an 
informal settlement in their vicinity would create a public nuisance. They complained 
that the presence of an informal settlement would constitute a health risk, endanger 
their safety and decrease the value of their properties. They thus approached the 
court to obtain an interdict to prevent the establishment of the informal settlements, 
or alternately to evict the squatters. However, the application of public nuisance in 
this series was not successful in all the cases.3   
 The most recent cases concerning public nuisance are the Intercape4 and 
Voortrekker cases.5 These cases are regarded as the fourth series of public 
nuisance cases. As indicated in chapter 3, the courts in both cases found that the 
presence of a refugee office contravened the city‟s zoning system and constituted a 
nuisance. The nuisances complained of were regular street blockages, noise, 
                                                     
2
 258D-E. 
3
 The application of public nuisance was rejected in the decisions of Diepsloot Residents and 
Landowners Association and Another v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (3) SA 336 (A); Rademeyer and 
others v Western Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE) and Minister of Public Works 
and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Another (Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 
(3) SA 1151 (CC). 
4
 (20952/08) [2009] ZAWCHC 100 (24 June 2009). 
5
 (26841/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 87 (3 May 2010). 
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violence and litter in a public place. As explained in 3.4.2, these unreasonable 
interferences were more likely to comply with the definition of a public nuisance than 
private nuisance in that the general public was indeed affected, on a public street. 
Nevertheless, the court decided both cases on the basis of private nuisance, without 
properly distinguishing private from public nuisance. In both cases this made no 
difference to the decisions, as the cases were ultimately decided on the basis of 
legislation. 
 As illustrated in chapter 3, it could be argued that the application of public 
nuisance doctrine between 1989 and 2001,6 referred to as the third series of public 
nuisance cases, is problematic. In chapter 3 it was established that, on the basis of 
the analysis conducted in the first series of public nuisance cases, the applicants in 
the third series applied the common law notion of public nuisance contrary to its 
original aims. The unreasonable interferences7 of which applicants complained were 
those usually associated with the creation of a public nuisance. But, as the 
applicants‟ intention was always to advance their own private interests as 
                                                     
6
 See East London Western Districts Farmers’ Association v Minister of Education and Development 
Aid 1989 (2) SA 63 (A); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and Another v 
Administrator Transvaal 1993 (1) 577 (T); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and 
Another v Administrator Transvaal 1993 (3) 49 (T); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association 
and another v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (3) SA 336 (A); Rademeyer and Others v Western 
Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE); Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and 
others v Northern Metropolitan 2000 (4) SA 377 (W); Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami 
Ridge Environmental Association and Another (Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC).  
7
 The applicants complained that the establishment of an informal settlement in their vicinity would 
cause an increased risk to health (owing to dust from gravel roads together with a lack of sanitary and 
water facilities), increased crime (owing to a lack of security and an increasing number of unemployed 
occupiers in the township) and that the economic value of their property as landowners would 
decrease. 
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landowners, failing to prove the infringement of the public‟s right to health and safety, 
it could be argued that they did not satisfy the public extent required by the definition 
of public nuisance. Therefore, as indicated in chapter 3, applicants failed to prove the 
existence of a public nuisance in the third series of cases. More importantly, 
applicants used public nuisance doctrine not primarily to limit the unreasonable 
interferences but rather to obtain an interdict to evict squatters or to prevent the 
establishment of informal settlements. In so doing, public nuisance was used to 
bypass anti-eviction legislation. Under normal circumstances, it takes some time to 
obtain an eviction application; it is also expensive and difficult to obtain in the light of 
anti-eviction legislation. Therefore, the applicants attempted to use public nuisance 
doctrine as an indirect eviction remedy, which was contrary to its original aims. 
 In addition, the land reform framework provided in section 25(5)-(9) of the 
Constitution of 1996,8 which promotes equitable access to land, security of tenure 
and restitution to those who were subject to past racially discriminatory practices, 
has been violated by the application of public nuisance doctrine in the third series of 
cases. These „nuisance based evictions‟9 are reminiscent of the previous 
discriminatory practice of forced removals during the apartheid era. In essence, 
allowing public nuisance as a means to evict or prevent the establishment of 
homeless occupiers‟ amounts to the deprivation of land. Therefore, this chapter 
seeks to determine whether the common law notion of public nuisance is compatible 
with the Constitution, and ultimately to determine its legitimacy in a post-apartheid 
                                                     
8
 Hereafter referred to as the Constitution. 
9
 See Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours: Landownership, land reform and the property 
clause‟ (2002) 19 SALJ 816-840 825. 
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South Africa. I aim to prove that the use in the second and third of public nuisance 
doctrine in South African law constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of land and ought 
thus to be deemed unconstitutional.  
 According to section 2 of the Constitution, common law that is inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights is invalid. On the other hand, section 39(2) encourages the 
development of the common law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution. Read with section 39(2), section 173 gives the inherent power to 
specified courts to develop the common law. However, the development of public 
nuisance as a common law remedy is uncertain, as it is not clear whether it has any 
further use in South African law, especially in the light of the case law discussed in 
chapter 3 and the increased importance of statutory regulation.  
 The future use or application of the public nuisance remedy will be determined 
after testing its constitutional compatibility against section 25(1). Section 25(1) 
provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.10 Van der Walt 
defines a deprivation as the restriction of the „owner‟s use and enjoyment, 
exploitation and disposal of the property‟.11 There are two requirements for an 
arbitrary deprivation in section 25(1). Firstly, the deprivation must take place in terms 
of a law of general application. Secondly, no law may permit arbitrary deprivation. 
Van der Walt AJ suggests that, together with the two requirements, there is a third 
implicit requirement that a „deprivation should serve a legitimate public purpose or 
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 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
11
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 124-125. 
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public interest‟.12 According to Van der Walt, the requirement of „law of general 
application‟ in section 25(1) refers not only to legislative provisions but applies also in 
cases of common or customary law.13 
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance14 is the most authoritative case on the application of section 25. When 
applying this provision to the application of public nuisance, specifically in the third 
series of cases, I aim to prove that the occupiers were arbitrarily deprived of land. 
The means employed, namely, public nuisance, is an arbitrary mechanism to 
achieve the ends, which were to dispossess permanently the occupiers of the land.  
 The FNB case will therefore serve as the yardstick to determine whether the 
application of public nuisance meets the requirements of sections 25(1) and (2). On 
the one hand, I will test one or two cases from each series of public nuisance cases 
against the framework provided in the FNB case to determine whether the use of 
public nuisance amounted to an arbitrary deprivation in each of the series. In so 
doing, I will be able to establish whether the use of public nuisance ought to be 
disallowed entirely in terms of section 2, or developed in terms of section 39(2) to 
give effect to the object, spirit and purport of the Constitution. 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 137. 
13
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 144. 
14
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); hereafter referred to as the FNB case. 
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 Before testing the constitutional compliance of public nuisance against the 
requirements of section 25 of Constitution, one must determine its applicability with 
regard to a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. 
 Section 25 is subject to section 8 of the Constitution, which regulates the 
applicability of the Bill of Rights.15 Section 8(2) provides that a provision of the Bill of 
Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right.  Section 25 is horizontally applied where there is a dispute between 
landowners in the absence of state involvement. In the second series of cases 
namely, Von Moltke16 it can be said that section 25 ought to be horizontally applied 
between the plaintiff and those responsible for constructing a shopping mall in the 
plaintiff‟s vicinity. Therefore, section 8(2) provides authority for the horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights in this type of dispute. However, in the third series of 
cases, the state was always involved in that it was the party who implemented the 
settlements and it was always the second party to the dispute. Therefore, there is no 
horizontal issue in this series. Similarly, in series one17 and four18 the state is a party 
and the application is brought for the public, which means there is no horizontal 
issue in those cases. In fact, in any true public nuisance case, if the state and the 
public are not involved there is no public nuisance case. This is proved in the Von 
Moltke case; the court rejected the application of public nuisance where the state 
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 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 525. 
16
 Von Moltke v Costa Areosa 1975 (1) SA 255. 
17
 CP Reynolds v R (1901) 22 NLR 89. 
18
 Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others (20952/08) 
[2009] ZAWCHC 100 (24 June 2009).  
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and the public were notinvolved. Therefore, horizontal application should be no issue 
on public nuisance cases. 
  
4.2 General application of the FNB methodology 
In the FNB case, the applicant was First National Bank (FNB), a financial institution 
that sells and leases vehicles. FNB leased two vehicles and sold another to 
companies in an instalment sale agreement. Three of FNB‟s vehicles were detained 
under section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act (hereafter referred to as the Act).19 
The companies to which FNB leased and sold these vehicles owed tax to the first 
respondent (SARS). In terms of section 114, SARS established a lien over the 
vehicles in relation to the debt. The implication was that the Commissioner could sell 
in execution of the tax debt the goods belonging to a third party, without a court 
order. In such a case, according to the legislation no nexus is required between the 
debtor and the goods belonging to a third party. The only requirement in this case 
was that the debtor was in possession of these goods.20 
 FNB challenged the constitutionality of section 114 of the Act that allowed the 
Commissioner, in order to collect debts owed, to sell goods without a prior 
judgement or other authorisation by the court. This section also allowed the 
Commissioner to sell the goods of a third party even if he had no connection to the 
                                                     
19
 Act 91 of 1964. See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC) par 2. 
20
 Par 4. 
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debt.21 FNB contended that section 114 of the Act constituted an unjustified 
infringement of its constitutional rights, namely to have access to the courts in the 
settlement of disputes, the protection of property and freedom to choose a trade.22  
 FNB argued that the retention of the goods amounted to an expropriation 
without the payment of compensation as required by section 25(2)(b) of the 
Constitution.23 However, Ackermann J determined that expropriation is a species of 
deprivation. This meant that if the deprivation could not be justified in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution, section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act would be 
unconstitutional. If it could be justified, then the question would be whether it was an 
expropriation. This would be determined by applying the test set out in section 
25(2)(a) and (b). 
 According to Ackermann J, the most important question was „whether in the 
absence of a relevant nexus between the goods and the customs debtor, the sale by 
the Commissioner – under section 144 of the Act – of goods of someone who is not 
a customs debtor amounts to an unjustifiable infringement of the owner‟s section 25 
property rights‟.24 As indicated above, section 25(1) of the Constitution25 provides 
that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
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 Par 4. 
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 Par 5.  
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 Par 26. 
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 Par 38. 
25
 Constitution of 1996. 
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  Ackermann J formulated a framework that consists of seven questions which 
ought to be asked when applying section 25 of the Constitution: 
a) Does that which is taken away from FNB by the operation of section 114 
amount to ‟property‟ for [the] purpose of section 25? 
b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the Commissioner? 
c) If there has, is such a deprivation consistent with the provisions of section 
25? 
d) If not, is such deprivation justified under section 36 of the Constitution? 
e) If it is, does this amount to expropriation for the purpose of section 25? 
f) If so, does the deprivation comply with requirements of section 25(2)(a) 
and (b)? 
g) If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36?26  
 On the first question designed to adjudicate issues regarding section 25, the 
court found that corporeal movable property, namely, the vehicles owned by FNB, 
could be regarded as property in terms of section 25.  SARS responded that FNB‟s 
ownership of the vehicles was nothing more than a contractual device which 
reserves ownership of the vehicles in question.27 In other words, SARS contended 
that FNB, as the rights holder of the property, had to use and enjoy it in order to 
claim constitutional protection under section 25.28 However, the court found that 
limited use and enjoyment is irrelevant when determining whether an object falls 
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 Par 46. 
27
 Par 53. 
28
 Par 54. 
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within the ambit of constitutional property. In conclusion, the court stood by its finding 
that the right FNB had to the vehicles constituted property in terms of section 25. 
 On the second question, the court defined a deprivation as „any interference 
with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property in respect of the person 
having title or right to or in the property concerned‟.29 On the basis of this definition, it 
is clear that FNB had been deprived as it had suffered an interference with its use 
and enjoyment or exploitation of its private property. After establishing that section 
14 of the Act complied with the requirement of law of general application,30 the court 
proceeded to determine what was meant by „arbitrary‟. Analysing comparative law,31 
Ackermann J defined arbitrary as „meant by section 25 when the law referred to in 
section 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in 
question or is procedurally unfair‟.32 
 Ackermann J went on to define „sufficient reason‟ as follows: 
„a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means 
employed, namely the deprivation in question and ends sought to be 
achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question. 
b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered. 
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 Par 57. 
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 Par 61. 
31
 Paras 63-96. 
32
 Par 100. 
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c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the person whose 
property is affected. 
d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of 
the deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent of the 
deprivation in respect of such property. 
e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or 
a corporeal moveable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established 
in order for depriving law to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation than 
in the case when property is something different and the property right less 
extensive. This judgment is not concerned at all with incorporeal property. 
f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the 
incidents of ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more 
compelling than when the deprivation embraces only some incidents of 
ownership and those incidents only partially. 
g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature 
of the property in question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be 
circumstances when sufficient reason is established by, in effect, no more 
than a mere rational relationship between means and ends; in others this 
might only be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that 
required by section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to 
be decided on all the relevant facts of each particular case, always bearing in 
mind that the enquiry is concerned with „arbitrary‟ in relation to the deprivation 
of property under section 25.‟33  
 Applying this test for arbitrariness, Ackermann J stated that section 114 of the 
Act amounted to an arbitrary deprivation. He went on to say that section 114 
arbitrarily deprives a person‟s property under the following circumstances:  
„(a) where the person has no connection with the transaction giving rise to the 
customs debt; (b) where such property also has no connection with the 
customs debt; and (c) where such person has not transacted with or placed 
the customs debtor in possession of the property that induced the 
Commissioner to act to his detriment‟.34  
 On the basis of these conclusions, the court found that there exist no nexus, 
or differently formulated, no sufficient reason, for section 114 to deprive persons 
other than the customs debtor of their property. Therefore, the deprivation was 
arbitrary for the purpose of section 25(1).35 
 As indicated in the method designed by Ackermann J, once a deprivation has 
been found to be inconsistent with section 25(1) it must be determined whether the 
deprivation is justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution. In terms of section 
36(1): 
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„the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
a) the nature of the right; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.‟36 
 Ackermann J found that the deprivation was not justifiable under section 36. 
He stated that the infringement by section 114 of section 25(1) „was not reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom‟.37 In terms of section 36(1)38 (also known as the limitations clause), a 
limitation of a constitutional right will occur „if it is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom‟. 
According to Van der Walt, it is unlikely that any deprivation that fails the non-
arbitrariness test can ever be justified in terms of section 36(1) on two accounts.39 
Firstly, as in section 25(1), section 36(1) also requires law of general application. 
Van der Walt is of the opinion that „if a deprivation failed the section 25(1) test 
because it was not imposed by law of general application it must also fail the section 
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 Section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996. 
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 Par 113. 
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 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
39
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 55. 
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36(1) test‟.40 Secondly, he contends that it would similarly be „unlikely if not 
impossible to hold that a deprivation is reasonable as meant in section 36(1) once it 
has been described as arbitrary for one of the reasons set out in FNB‟.41 
 The provision was therefore declared unconstitutional. According to the 
court‟s 7 questions formulated by Ackermann J - when applying section 25 of the 
Constitution - the next step is to consider whether there was an expropriation if the 
deprivation was either constitutionally valid or justifiable. According to van der Walt, it 
is highly unlikely that a deprivation that is found to be arbitrary will be an 
expropriation or, even if it is, that it will comply with the requirements in section 25(2) 
and (3).42 It was nevertheless done in Nhlabati v Fick,43 where the court assumed 
(without deciding) that the deprivation was an expropriation and that (as there was 
no provision for compensation) it was in conflict with section 25(2), but decided that 
even then it would not comply with section 25(3) but will be justifiable in terms of 
section 36 for the same reason why it would be justifiable as an arbitrary deprivation.  
 The FNB methodology will be applied in the following subsection to determine 
whether public nuisance meets the requirements of section 25.  
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 55. 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 55. 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 237. 
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 2003 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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4.3 General application of the FNB methodology to public nuisance 
In order to establish this, the use of public nuisance in each of the four series of 
cases (as discussed in chapters 2 and 3), will be subject to scrutiny in terms of 
section 25. Only then will one have ascertained whether the common law notion of 
public nuisance is inconsistent and invalid in terms of section 2 of the Constitution, 
ought to be developed in terms of sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution, or 
ought only to be applied in certain instances, possibly by the implementation of 
legislation.  
 For purposes of this chapter, a case from each series will undergo 
constitutional scrutiny to determine whether public nuisance was applied contrary to 
its original aims and arguably inconsistent with the Constitution. Series two and three 
will be grouped and together undergo constitutional scrutiny seeing that it will be 
argued that there is no nexus between the purpose of the law in question, namely 
public nuisance doctrine, and the means sought, namely protecting private rights 
against infringement of use and enjoyment of land. In the third series of public 
nuisance cases, prospective occupiers were denied access to land and, even worse, 
at times current occupiers were evicted. As has been demonstrated in the section 
above, the FNB case provides the methodology to determine whether a deprivation 
is inconsistent with section 25(1). Section 25(1) provides that no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.44 According to Van der Walt, the requirement 
of „law of general application‟ in section 25(1) refers not only to legislative provisions 
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 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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but also to common or customary law.45 Therefore, deprivation caused by the 
common law notion of public nuisance meets the requirement of law of general 
application.   
 According to the methodology created in FNB,46 the first two steps to 
determine the constitutional compliance in terms of section 25 are (a) to determine 
whether that which was taken away amounts to property and (b) whether there has 
been a deprivation. In terms of the first requirement, Ackermann J stated that it is 
„practically impossible to furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a 
comprehensive definition of property for purposes of section 25‟.47In the FNB case 
the court accepted that corporeal property and land are definitely included as 
property in terms of section 25.48 Furthermore, the court suggested that the more 
entitlements are affected, the stronger the justification for a deprivation is required.49   
However, in Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,50 the court found that there 
was no universal formulation to describe property but added that property in terms of 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 144. 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 
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 Par 51. 
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 Par 51. 
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section 25 should allow sufficient scope to include all rights and interests that have to 
be protected according to international standards.51  
 According to FNB, land is property in terms of section 25.52 In the present 
matter, occupiers‟ occupations were lawful, except in one instance.53 The occupiers 
were either authorised by legislation, namely given a statutory right,54 or in one 
instance, received tacit consent by governmental authorities55 to inhabit land.  
 The second requirement in the FNB methodology is to prove that they had 
been deprived of property. Ackermann J defines a deprivation as „any interference 
with the use and enjoyment or exploitation of private property in respect of the 
person having title or right in the property concerned‟.56 In the present matter, 
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occupiers satisfied the deprivation requirement. On the one hand, occupiers who 
already inhabited land were deprived of their property by being deprived of the 
possession they had. On the other hand, section 26(1)57 entitles everybody to have 
access to adequate housing while section 26(3)58 protects any individual from being 
evicted, in other words deprived of their home, without an order of the court made 
after considering all the relevant circumstances. Occupiers were denied access to 
land and in so doing deprived of their section 26(1) and 26(3) rights. 
  The application of public nuisance, specifically in the third series of public 
nuisance cases, is arguably an insufficient reason for depriving occupiers of land as 
its use was contrary to its original aims in that it did not satisfy the public extent as 
required in the definition of public nuisance. Furthermore, public nuisance was 
applied as a means to evict or bar occupiers from land. In essence, the issue is 
whether public nuisance doctrine could ever satisfy the requirements in section 
25(1); in other words, assuming that it will always establish a deprivation of property 
(in preventing someone from using property in some way they are otherwise entitled 
to), whether the reason for the deprivation would ever justify the deprivation of 
property that enforced abatement of the nuisance would involve. The subsequent 
section establishes that in series two and three, public nuisance had been applied for 
the purposes of protecting the private interest of the applicants, as opposed to the 
well-being of the public at large.  The first and fourth series should show that it is 
possible - but not if applied for the wrong reasons, as in the second and third series 
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– to apply the public nuisance doctrine. In the first and fourth series, the Intercape 
Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others59 and 
CP Reynolds v R60 cases illustrate that the notion of public nuisance could be used if 
the nuisance infringed the health and safety if the community at large in a public 
space opposed to private land. In those cases, the reason for forcing the affected 
property holder to abate the nuisance, namely to protect the public against a serious 
threat involving its safety or health or morals, could justify the deprivation of property 
that it would bring about.   
 To decide whether there is a sufficient reason for the deprivation, „a 
complexity of relations‟ has to be considered, including the relationship between the 
means employed and the ends sought to be achieved; the relationship between the 
purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected; and the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property 
and the extent of the deprivation.61 
 
4.4 Constitutional scrutiny: Series two and three 
4.4.1 The Von Moltke case62 
Von Moltke is the only case in the second series of public nuisance cases.  In Von 
Moltke, the applicant alleged that the construction of a shopping mall and 
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subsequent bulldozing of buildings in his vicinity would constitute a nuisance on the 
basis that it would infringe and ultimately deprive him of his use and enjoyment of 
land. In other words, the applicant sought to protect his own private rights as 
opposed to those of the public at large. He further alleged that the preliminary 
bulldozing of the land and erection of the mall would constitute a nuisance to 
neighbours in the surrounding areas and in the process result in damage to the 
vegetation and sand dunes. However, the court found that the applicant could not 
prove any „injury, prejudice or damage or invasion of right peculiar to himself and 
over and above that sustained by the members of the public in general‟.63 The 
application was rejected.  
 According to the FNB methodology, in order to determine an arbitrary 
deprivation, one should ask whether the law in question, namely the common law 
notion of public nuisance, provides a sufficient reason for the applicant‟s alleged 
deprivation. In other words, is there a nexus between the means sought, the use of 
public nuisance as a cause of action and the ends, namely to abate an alleged 
infringement or threat to the applicant‟s property and that of his neighbours in the 
surrounding area? In this case there is no nexus. The application of public nuisance 
doctrine in this case would have established arbitrary deprivation because the only 
nexus that would justify the deprivation, protection of public health and safety 
narrowly understood, was absent. Moreover, seeing that he complained about the 
infringement of the use and enjoyment of his private property, as opposed to public 
land or a public place, the applicant should have alleged the infringement of a private 
instead of a public nuisance. Therefore it was correct that the court rejected the 
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application. Forcing the respondents to abate the alleged nuisance in this case 
would have caused a deprivation of property that could not have been justified by its 
purpose and would therefore have been arbitrary. 
 
4.4.2 The Three Rivers case64  
The application of public nuisance in Three Rivers, from the third series of public 
nuisance cases, is the next case in which a possible deprivation in conflict with 
section 25(1) will be determined. In this third series of public nuisance cases there is 
a complex relationship between landowners, the state and occupiers. Therefore, 
apart from the means and ends test applied in Von Moltke, the FNB methodology - 
formulated to determine whether an deprivation is arbitrary - further requires an 
investigation into the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
person whose property is affected, as well as the relationship between the purpose 
of the deprivation and the nature of the property and the extent of the deprivation. 
 As indicated in chapter 3, in the third series of cases public nuisance was 
applied with reference to a specific set of facts with a specific aim, either to prevent 
occupiers from residing in informal settlements on state-owned land in the 
applicants‟ vicinity, or evicting them. Applicants approached the court as farmers, 
residents, ratepayers and environmental associations. In the present matter, Three 
Rivers, a ratepayers‟ association, complained that the presence of the occupiers of 
an informal settlement in its vicinity constituted a public nuisance. The applicants 
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alleged that a lack of water and sanitation together with increased crime would 
infringe their private rights as landowners. They further alleged that the informal 
settlement caused a decrease in the value of their properties and caused them fear 
and anxiety. On the basis of these allegations the applicants sought an interdict with 
the aim of evicting the occupiers. Applicants used the doctrine of public nuisance as 
a cause of action to obtain an interdict and consequently to evict the occupiers. The 
court defined a public nuisance as a nuisance whose harmful effect is so extensive 
as to affect the public at large or at least a distinct class of persons in its field. 
Thereafter, the court concluded that the legal principles of public nuisance are similar 
to that of a private nuisance because the concept is no different in law except for the 
public extent of the nuisance. Consequently, the court applied the legal principles of 
private nuisance and followed the rule formulated in Regal v African Superslate.65 
According to this rule, in the case of a third party creating a nuisance on the land of 
the respondent, an interdict can only be awarded where the respondent had 
knowledge of the nuisance or where the respondent took reasonable steps to abate 
the complained nuisance. 
 The respondents (Northern Metropolitan) contended that they had taken 
reasonable steps to avoid unreasonable interferences with the applicant‟s property 
interests. They argued that they had provided patrol units to avoid any safety 
concerns and had engaged with the applicants to find solutions. In conclusion, the 
court found that the respondents had failed to take such steps and ordered that the 
occupiers be evicted within 48 hours. 
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 According to the FNB methodology, the most problematic question to be 
asked, when determining the existence of an arbitrary deprivation, is whether the law 
in question, namely public nuisance doctrine, provides sufficient reason for the 
deprivation that would follow if the application was successful: is there a nexus 
between the means sought, namely the use of public nuisance as a cause of action, 
and the ends, namely to prohibit or evict occupiers residing in informal settlements 
situated in the applicants‟ vicinity? One could argue that the application of public 
nuisance, not only in Three Rivers but in all the cases in the third series, arbitrarily 
deprived occupiers of land in terms of section 25(1) and was therefore 
unconstitutional.  
 The nature of the property is vacant land, which the occupiers inhabited either 
lawfully or unlawfully. As stated above, applicants alleged that the settlement of 
occupiers would increase smoke, noise and crime as well as constitute a health 
hazard. On that basis, the applicants argued that a public nuisance was constituted 
and they therefore approached the court to deprive occupiers them from gaining 
access to the land by either preventing occupation or evicting occupiers. Therefore, 
the applicants, otherwise referred to as landowners, sought to deprive the occupiers 
of their access to land. Landowners aimed to protect their land by claiming their right 
to uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the land. In other words, landowners were 
relying on their guarantee not to be deprived of their land in terms of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution. 
 On the other hand, occupiers were also affected as they were either 
prohibited from gaining access to or evicted from land. Those already in possession 
of land have occupation, of which they are deprived when evicted. Even though they 
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might not have had a right in terms of the traditional approach in private law, they 
could also contend that they too are deprived of land in the sense that they were 
either prohibited from occupying or were evicted from land. In fact, occupiers receive 
protection in terms of section 25(5)–(9) of the Constitution. Amongst other things, 
these provisions provide access to66 and security of tenure in land.67  Furthermore, 
these provisions specifically protect those who were subject to racially discriminatory 
practices in the past. Poor black occupiers, such as the occupiers in the third series 
of cases, who were affected by these evictions or who were prevented from settling 
in the vicinity of the applicants are mostly those who had been subject to past 
discriminatory practices and consequently fall within the ambit of the protection 
provided in section 25(5)-(9).  
 However, to prohibit and, more seriously, evict occupiers is a rather extreme 
deprivation in the given context. Therefore, it is argued that the law in question, 
namely the application of a public nuisance does not provide sufficient reason for the 
particular deprivation in question in terms of section 25(1). The reasons are set out 
below.  
 As correctly defined in Three Rivers, a public nuisance is a nuisance the 
harmful effect of which is so extensive as to affect the general public or at least a 
distinct class of persons in its field. However, in the present matter, applicants did 
not meet the requirements of a public right to the extent required by the definition of 
public nuisance. Their use of public nuisance was always aimed at advancing their 
own private interests rather than that of the general public: they used public nuisance 
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as a facade to protect their own private interest as land owners. The applicants failed 
to prove the infringement of a public right, namely the health and safety of the public 
at large. In other words, as indicated above, the effect was that the public nuisance 
doctrine was indirectly used by affected landowners to evict or prohibit the settling of 
occupiers in their vicinity because they failed to prove the existence of a public 
nuisance according to its definition.  
 This argument is further supported by the fact that very little public nuisance 
case law between 1943 to the present time is available. This is the result of the 
successful regulation of public nuisance offences by way of legislation, otherwise 
known as statutory nuisance. Therefore, the use of common law public nuisance in 
this context is suspicious as there are alternative legislative means for applicants to 
achieve their desired result, namely, to abate unreasonable interferences.  
 Furthermore, two arguments may be proffered: (a) the nuisance could have 
been abated or avoided if proper water and sanitary services were installed together 
with electricity in order to prevent excessive smoke, and patrol units were introduced 
to curb increased crime; and (b) in the light of entrenched constitutional values in 
section 25(5)-(9) of the Constitution, which promote access to, and security of, land 
for this particular affected group of people, the extent of the deprivation was 
excessive. Moreover, section 26(3), together with the anti-eviction legislation, namely 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act68 (ESTA) and the Prevention of Illegal 
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Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)69, provide substantial and 
procedural requirements for the eviction to be taken into account before such a 
deprivation is allowed 
 Applicants used public nuisance not to abate unreasonable interferences 
normally associated with public nuisance offences, but to bypass anti-eviction 
legislation, ESTA and PIE. Provisions in both PIE and ESTA were enacted to give 
effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution.  Van der Walt explains that „once 
legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right in the Constitution, litigants must 
rely on the legislation – and may not rely directly on the constitutional provision – 
when bringing action to protect that right against infringement‟.70 He goes further, 
stating that this is the subsidiarity rule which excludes the direct application of the 
„infringed‟ constitutional provision once legislation has been enacted to give effect to 
that right.  
 ESTA is applicable in the case of lawful occupiers inhabiting rural land. As 
indicated in chapter 3, ESTA „protects a particular class of indigent persons who has 
or has had permission to live on rural and semirural land, against eviction from that 
land‟.71 In effect, if one satisfies the definition of an occupier in ESTA this would 
prevent a court from granting an eviction order. According to section 6(1) of ESTA, 
an „occupier shall have the right to reside on and use the land on which he or she 
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resided and which he or she used on or after 4 February 1997, and to have access 
to such services as had been agreed upon with the owner or person in charge, 
whether expressly or tacitly‟.   
 PIE, on the other hand, protects unlawful occupiers who inhabit urban or rural 
land against eviction. Section 4(6) requires that before an eviction order is granted, a 
court must be of the opinion „that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all 
relevant circumstances, including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, 
disabled persons and households headed by women‟. PIE has the objective of 
ensuring that courts promote constitutional values and consider all relevant 
circumstances before allowing an eviction order. Rademeyer, Three Rivers and 
Kyalami Ridge were all subject to section 26(3), together with either ESTA or PIE 
only, given the facts and context, where these anti-eviction measures were 
applicable. 
 ESTA was successfully applied in Rademeyer. The court rejected an eviction 
order on the basis that the requirements for such an order had not been met. 
However, seeing that the occupiers were unlawful in Three Rivers, PIE could have 
been applied but the court did not consider the constitutional protection afforded in 
section 26(3) and specifically PIE.  
  Therefore, bypassing these two legislative measures to obtain an eviction 
order indirectly, without complying with the constitutionally sanctioned anti-eviction 
legislation, is inconsistent with section 26(3) of the Constitution. Strict procedural and 
substantive requirements are set out in section 26(3), but the applicants blatantly 
ignored these. Instead, they sought an easier option by using public nuisance as a 
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primary premise to obtain an eviction, with the abatement of unreasonable 
interferences such as smoke, noise, endangered health and safety as the vehicle for 
achieving their private intentions.  
  Van der Walt suggests that „given the recognised need for, and importance 
of, these provisions in the larger framework of land reform measures, any situation 
where evictions can be enforced without complying with, or even seriously 
considering, these provisions is a cause for concern‟.72  
  In other words, simply using public nuisance as an alternative measure to 
evict occupiers not only bypasses section 26(3) as well as ESTA and PIE, but also 
contravenes the spirit, purport and object of the Constitution. These provisions ought 
to be considered in all cases seeking to evict occupiers. Although applied in 
Rademeyer, these anti-eviction provisions should have been considered in Three 
Rivers, and in any future case pertaining to nuisance evictions. 
 The application of public nuisance in this series of cases is a complete 
deviation from its original aims as applied in the first and second series of cases. For 
the reasons set out above, no rational and constitutionally legitimate link between 
public nuisance as the means employed, and the end sought, namely, the prohibition 
of occupiers from settling in the vicinity of predominantly white private landowners, or 
their eviction, can be established.  
 After having applied the framework provided in the FNB case, it must be said 
that the law, namely public nuisance in question does not provide sufficient reason 
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for the particular deprivation in question. The law, namely public nuisance, aims to 
protect the health and well-being of the general public but does not serve as an 
alternative eviction mechanism for landowners. In other words, landowners alleged 
that whenever occupiers constituted a nuisance they could be evicted on the 
grounds of smoke, noise, lack of water and sanitation as well as diminution of the 
value of their properties. Landowners did not have any regard for the severe housing 
backlog73 and, more importantly, disregarded the constitutional protection provided in 
section 25(5)-(9), section 26(1)74 and 26(3).75 On the basis of the reasons given 
above, it must be said that the use of public nuisance in the third series of cases is 
not in line with section 25.  
 According to the framework provided in FNB, after a deprivation has been 
declared arbitrary, it should be determined whether it is justified under section 36 of 
the Constitution. On the basis of the contentions of Van der Walt, one can conclude 
that the use public nuisance, in the second and third series of cases,76 would 
probably not be justifiable in terms of section 36(1). Therefore, its use is 
unconstitutional in terms of section 25(1). 
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4.5 Constitutional scrutiny: series one and four 
4.5.1 Introduction  
After having established that the application of public nuisance in series two and 
three had been applied illegitimately, one has to ask the question whether the law 
public nuisance can still have a legitimate use. Ought it to be entirely abolished, or 
can it be adapted for purposes other than as a means of an indirect eviction, 
otherwise known as a nuisance eviction? At this stage, it is difficult to answer these 
questions as the following situations exist. On the one hand, the application public 
nuisance, in the second and third series of public nuisance cases, has been applied 
contrary to its original aims. Its application is not in line with the object, spirit and 
purport of the Constitution of 1996, making it illegitimate. This argument is further 
supported by the fact that the majority of public nuisance offences are now regulated 
by legislation. On the other hand, however, the subsequent section will establish that 
the application of public nuisance in the cases of Reynolds77 and Intercape, serving 
as examples for the first and fourth series respectively, was legitimate and might 
therefore signify the possibility of using the doctrine in the future. 
 
4.5.2 The Reynolds case 
The Reynolds case, discussed in chapter 2, falls into the first series of public 
nuisance cases and is selected to undergo constitutional scrutiny in terms of section 
25(1). In this case a summons was issued against the defendant in his capacity as 
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the Managing Director of R Brothers on the basis that their company constituted a 
public nuisance. It was alleged that R Brothers disposed of treacle and other waste 
products into a public river and consequently polluted it. The defendant was accused 
of detrimentally affecting the health of the inhabitants in the vicinity of the river as 
well as of any member of the public who came into contact with it. The court a quo 
found that there is no offence or crime in either statute or common law to punish a 
perpetrator accused of polluting a public river.  
 However, on appeal, the court found that the pollution of a public stream, 
especially streams situated on the coast, constituted a grave danger to the public. In 
the absence of law reports and any other authority, the court relied on Voet as 
support. According to Voet, ‘the pollution of water, lakes, and the like, is a public 
offence.‟78 On the basis of this statement by Voet, the court found that the charge in 
the summons is an offence which may be punished under the law of the colony. 
 The question to be asked here is whether such a deprivation is consistent with 
the provisions of section 25 - was the deprivation, namely prohibiting the defendant 
from disposing waste into a public river, situated adjacent to his land, an arbitrary 
deprivation? As stated earlier, the test for an arbitrary deprivation is to determine 
whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation. On the basis of the facts, the 
law in question, namely common law public nuisance doctrine, provides sufficient 
reason for the alleged deprivation, which in this case was to stop the defendant from 
polluting a public river, which infringed the health and safety of the public at large. 
There does thus exist a nexus between the means employed, namely the use of 
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public nuisance as a cause of action, and the ends sought, that is the abatement of a 
future threat to the community at large. There is a rational link between the means 
employed and the end sought, in that the public nuisance doctrine was employed to 
achieve its original aims, those of protecting the health and safety of the general 
public. The deprivation, if there was any, was therefore justified in terms of section 
25. 
 
4.5.3 The Intercape case  
Intercape is one of two cases79 in the fourth series of public nuisance cases. The 
applicants (Intercape) alleged that a refugee office in their vicinity contravened the 
City of Cape Town‟s zoning policy and constituted a nuisance. Having established 
that the zoning policy had been contravened; the court investigated the presence of 
a nuisance caused by the operation of the refugee office. Applicants complained that 
the large number of asylum seekers who visited the refugee office on a daily basis 
attracted vendors, criminal elements and taxis and in so doing, caused an increase 
in noise, violence, litter and street obstructions. Violence broke out when asylum 
seekers, victims of muggings, fought the criminal elements responsible. Applicants 
further alleged that a lack of sanitation and the regular presence of human waste in 
the street posed a danger to their health. In essence, these alleged nuisances are a 
classic example of a public nuisance as it was applied in the first series of cases. 
The operation of the refugee office constituted a direct infringement of the general 
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public‟s right to health (by way of litter and human waste) and safety (increased 
muggings and violence) because any pedestrian or driver who was a client or 
employee of Intercape, or in fact any ordinary citizen, was subject to the violence, 
noise, litter and street obstructions. In other words, these interferences fit the 
definition of public nuisance rather than private nuisance. Although in the end the 
court concluded that a nuisance had been constituted, the court suggested it was a 
private rather than a public nuisance.  
On the basis of the analysis above - that the nuisance is a public as opposed 
to a private nuisance - it will be assumed that a public nuisance was constituted and 
as a result this assumed application of public nuisance in the Intercape case will 
undergo constitutional scrutiny in terms of section 25. Now, as illustrated in the 
previous cases, in terms of section 25(1) in order to establish the existence of a 
arbitrary deprivation is to determine whether there is sufficient reason for the 
deprivation. On the basis of the facts, the law in question, namely common law 
public nuisance doctrine, provides sufficient reason for the alleged deprivation, which 
in this case was to stop the operation of the refugee which operation led to violence, 
litter, street blockages and noise in a public space, namely the street.  The original 
aims of public nuisance are to protect the public at large against the infringement of 
the health and safety of the public at large. This was successfully done in the 
Intercape case.  
However, in the Intercape case, the court reached a conclusion before 
addressing the allegations of nuisance. The court found that the respondents 
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contravened the zoning scheme in terms of the Land Use and Planning Ordinance80 
(hereafter referred to as LUPO). It could be argued that the application of public 
nuisance was not necessary seeing that the legislation covered the problem 
adequately. Therefore, it seems public nuisance is only applicable in the absence of 
legislation providing adequate cover for nuisance related offences. 
 Both cases in series one and four passed constitutional scrutiny in terms of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. This is an illustration that the application of public 
nuisance might still serve a legitimate purpose in the absence of statutory nuisance. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the application public nuisance in the four series of cases has been 
subject to scrutiny in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Using the 
methodology formulated in the FNB case, my objective was to determine whether 
public nuisance doctrine provides a sufficient reason for the deprivation in question.  
In both series two and three private landowners complained of an 
infringement of their vested rights to the use and enjoyment of their land. In series 
two the court concluded that the one landowner did not prove that there had been 
any injury or harm to him or the broader public. In other words, the landowner failed 
to meet the requirements for alleging a public nuisance. Instead, seeing that he was 
the only one affected, it is more likely that he ought to have alleged the existence of 
a private nuisance and not of a public nuisance. Similarly, in the third series of 
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cases, groups of private landowners alleged the presence or future existence of a 
public nuisance with the aim of protecting their private interest in their land. 
Applicants alleged that occupiers who were or would have been situated in their 
vicinity would constitute a public nuisance. However, as indicated in 3.3.1, the 
intention of these landowners was always to advance their own private interests. As 
a result, the application of public nuisance in series two and three did not meet the 
requirements in section 25(1) of the Constitution as there was insufficient reason for 
the particular deprivation. The deprivation was therefore arbitrary. When tested 
against the requirements of section 36(1) of the Constitution, it was found that the 
deprivation was not justifiable and consequently unconstitutional. Therefore, any 
application of public nuisance which is not in line with the definition of such nuisance 
– and more importantly, is used to bypass anti-eviction legislation – is 
unconstitutional and should not succeed in a court of law.  
 Furthermore, according to van der Walt, „this does not mean that evictions 
based on a lack of compliance with planning laws or on public nuisance cannot or 
should not take place, but it does mean that such evictions have to be treated with 
great care and a healthy shot of scepticism and hesitance.‟81 Van der Walt contends 
that if a court is faced with a nuisance eviction case, it should ask certain questions 
before granting such an order. This framework is essential, especially in the light of 
nuisance-based evictions. The questions are as follows: 
„does the eviction involve a single or group of occupiers; whether the 
respondents occupy state or private land, and (if it is private land) whether 
                                                     
81
 Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours - Landownership, land reform and the property clause‟ 
(2002) 112 SALJ 816-840 827. 
175 
 
they own land themselves or occupy it with the landowner‟s consent; whether 
the occupation is lawful or unlawful in general (apart from planning laws); 
whether the nuisance is related to public safety and health or to formalities; 
and whether the settlement could be formalized as an alternative to evicting 
the occupiers.‟82  
 In contrast, the application of public nuisance in series one and four passed 
constitutional muster in terms of section 25. These cases illustrate the original aims 
of the public nuisance doctrine, namely to preserve the health and safety of the 
public at large. In the R v CP Reynolds, the defendant was found guilty of a public 
offence when he polluted a public river. It is clear that because the nature of the river 
was public, the community at large had access to it and would be detrimentally 
affected if the water was polluted. Therefore, the nuisance occurred in a public space 
as opposed to a private area accessible only to those who own the land. Similarly, in 
the fourth series of cases, the facts clearly indicate that the public at large were 
affected and that exposed litter, noise and endangered public health and safety 
because the nuisance occurred in a public space, namely the street. The community 
at large had access to the street and were as a result automatically subject to 
violence, humans waste, litter, noise and blockages of roads. According to Prosser, 
street blockages are a common example of a public nuisance.83  
 In essence, series one and four can be separated from the second and third 
series on the following basis: in order for a nuisance to be categorized as a public 
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83
 Prosser WL „Private action for public nuisance‟ (1966) 52 Virginia Law Review 997-1027 1002. 
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nuisance, it ought to have occurred in a public space in a way that would have 
infringed the rights of all who came into contact with it, as opposed to only affecting a 
particular individual or group of people in the enjoyment of their private property. In 
series two and three landowners sought to protect only their own use and enjoyment 
of private land in a private space opposed to their proving the nuisance had occurred 
in a public space affecting the community at large. Furthermore, according to 
Prosser,84 a single complainant, as in the second series of cases, is insufficient to 
represent the public at large. In fact, one can go as far as to say that a large group of 
private landowners, as was the situation in the third series of cases, does not 
necessarily represent the community at large. Instead the focus ought to be on the 
space in which the infringement occurs or would exist and on whether the health and 
safety of the community at large were affected. 
 It is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, contrary use of the law 
of public nuisance in the third series of cases, namely to evict and prohibit 
occupation, and on the other hand, instances where there is a case of a genuine 
public nuisance. Therefore the application of public nuisance is still possible in 
instances where a nuisance occurs in a public space that would as a consequence 
infringe the rights to health and safety of the public at large.  
 However, in both the cases of Intercape and Voortrekker, the alleged 
nuisances were covered by planning legislation, namely LUPO.85 Therefore, it could 
be said that the common law remedy of public nuisance would only be applicable 
where it is not covered by statutory nuisance or any other legislative measure which, 
                                                     
84
 Prosser WL „Private action for public nuisance‟ (1966) 52 Virginia Law Review 997-1027 1001. 
85
 15 of 1985. 
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directly or indirectly, has the purpose to abate existing or future public nuisance 
offences. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of the thesis is to establish whether the public nuisance doctrine still has a 
legitimate purpose in post-apartheid South African law. This question has been 
investigated by analysing the history of public nuisance; doing a comparative study 
of English and US law in the 20th century; analysing the adoption of public nuisance 
into South African law; examining recent South African cases in which the notion of 
public nuisance was applied; and finally, testing the constitutional compatibility of the 
public nuisance doctrine. The conclusions reached at the end of each investigation 
are summarised below. 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
5.2.1 The history of public nuisance and its adoption in early South African law on 
public  nuisance 
The history of public nuisance and its adoption in early South African law are 
discussed in chapter 2. This chapter offered definitions of private and public 
nuisance and provided an analysis of the differentiating factors between private and 
public nuisance. The rest of the chapter covered two main themes: an historical 
overview of the origins and development of the public nuisance doctrine in English 
and US law, followed by a discussion on the adoption and development of public 
nuisance in South African law. The following conclusions were reached. 
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 After analysing the history of the Common Law notion of public nuisance it 
was concluded that those found guilty of committing such a nuisance were criminally 
liable and prosecuted. The common feature of these nuisances is that they 
unreasonably interfered with public health, order, morality and safety. The 
interferences ranged from noise, smoke, smells and odours, disposal of domestic 
waste and obstruction of highways. Importantly, a clear distinction between private 
and public nuisance can be established from the cases analysed above. The 
consequences of a public nuisance not only affect private individuals on private land 
but particularly those in a public space and on public land, regardless of their 
ownership or use of private land. Distinguishing between a private and public space 
or land is the legitimate ground for the distinction between the two kinds of nuisance 
and for the existence of a separate remedy for public nuisance. 
 After having investigated the history of the Common Law notion of public 
nuisance, a comparative study on English and US law was undertaken in chapter 2 
to establish whether the doctrine enjoyed the same vitality in the 20th and 21st 
centuries as it had since its inception. The following conclusions were reached.  
 It was found that legislation has comprehensively substituted the original aims 
of the Common Law public nuisance doctrine in English law. As a result the public 
nuisance doctrine has practically no further use in the 21st century. However, it has 
been suggested that the public nuisance doctrine might be developed to protect the 
environment in the absence of legislation. In South African law, therefore, in the 
absence of environmental and other legislation that protects public interests, the 
notion of public nuisance could possibly serve a legitimate purpose in protecting 
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certain public interests until suitable legislation is amended or promulgated, as is 
suggested by the examples provided in English law.  
 In United States law, it was found that the public nuisance doctrine was 
applied for purposes other than those for which it was originally designed. Firstly, 
government officials used public nuisance as a cause of action to effect the 
abatement of serious threats to the health of the general public. Secondly, public 
nuisance was used to claim damages in class action lawsuits. In the first type of 
application it appears that the courts allowed the application of public nuisance in a 
few cases relating to toxic waste for two reasons.1 Firstly, toxic waste poses a 
serious threat to the public health and has to be dealt with without delay: cleaning a 
toxic waste site is a matter of urgency and requires immediate attention. Secondly, 
the applicants were government officials who, instead of claiming damages on behalf 
of private individuals, approached the court to grant an order for the abatement of 
the toxic waste. The government‟s aim was to force the owners indirectly to clean up 
their contaminated property. However, it is important to note that the doctrine of 
public nuisance was applied in the absence of legislation enacted to regulate public 
nuisance offences. 
 One could argue that on the basis of these two reasons, public nuisance 
could still be used legitimately as a remedy in South African law (a) if the alleged 
nuisance constitutes an imminent danger to the health of the general public; (b) if the 
applicants do not seek to claim damages but instead approach the court to force the 
                                                     
1
 See United States v Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp 776 F2d 410 (2d Cir 1985); New York v 
Shore Realty Corporation 759 F 2d 1032 (2d Cir 1985) and the situation in Suffolk Chemical 
Company. 
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owners of contaminated land, or those responsible for it, to clean it and (c) in the 
absence of legislation enacted to regulate public nuisance offences. The South 
African legal system has a number of environmental law statutes.2 However, if a 
situation arises where environmental legislation does not provide an effective 
remedy or might not cover or limit dangerous environmental threats such as a toxic 
waste or any similar unreasonable act, it seems the public nuisance doctrine could 
be applied to provide an effective alternative remedy.  
 In a second area of the development of public nuisance, namely as an 
alternative remedy to claim damages in class action lawsuits, its application failed in 
United States law. The majority of the courts rejected applications of public nuisance 
in these cases. The main reason for this rejection was that the relief sought fell 
outside the original aims of the public nuisance doctrine. In the asbestos, tobacco, 
lead and pigment, and some of the environmental law cases, the applicants‟ sole 
purpose was to claim damages rather than to limit the nuisance. One could argue 
that the use of public nuisance in these cases was a last resort to claim damages 
rather than to seek an effective remedy to limit unreasonable interferences. In fact, 
the notion of public nuisance can only be used to abate a nuisance rather than claim 
compensation. Therefore, a public nuisance is only constituted if the unreasonable 
                                                     
2
 Section 24 of the Constitution of 1996 states that: „Everyone has the right to an environment that is 
not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of 
present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that – (i) prevent 
pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development‟. Other fundamental legislative measures governing environmental concerns are the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 and the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 
1989. 
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interferences affect the public at large and originated in a public space or land 
opposed to private land or interest of the applicants. 
 Even if the use of public nuisance had been an effective and successful 
remedy in the cases discussed above, the tort aspect of the doctrine of public 
nuisance has not been adopted into South African jurisprudence.3 Therefore South 
African courts would reject the use of public nuisance in class action law suits for the 
purposes of claiming damages against companies which have allegedly contributed 
to air pollution. 
  After having established the origin of public nuisance in English law and 
investigated its vitality in both English and US law during the 20th century, I 
commenced with an analysis of the adoption of the public nuisance doctrine in South 
Africa. The aim of the analysis was to establish the purpose and field of application 
of public nuisance in South African law. The following conclusions were reached. 
 After the analysis of public nuisance case law in South Africa it was 
established that all unreasonable interferences regarded as public nuisances in 
English law were adopted in South African law. These unreasonable interferences 
are noise, smoke, keeping a brothel, obstruction of public roads and disposing of 
waste which originated in a public space or public land, such as a street, as opposed 
to private land. 
                                                     
3
 South African law adopted a large amount of English law specifically in the area of nuisance and 
neighbour law in general. However this adoption did not affect the law of delict which predominantly 
remained Roman Dutch law.  See Du Bois F & Reid E „Nuisance‟ in Zimmermann, Visser DP, Reid K 
Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (2004) 577; Van der Merwe D „Neighbour law‟ in 
Zimmermann R & Visser DP Southern Cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 759-
762 and 783-784. 
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 Unreasonable interferences were abated both by the institution of criminal and 
civil proceedings by local authorities. Initially the sheriff and later the Attorney-
General4 were entrusted to institute such proceedings for the abatement of public 
nuisances in English law. In both English and South African law perpetrators were 
either criminally liable – with liability in the form of a fine or imprisonment – or civilly 
liable by means of an injunction, in that perpetrators were asked to stop causing an 
unreasonable interference that resulted to be a public nuisance. However, one can 
conclude that the English law remedy known as the special injury rule5 was not 
adopted in South African case law. The remedy provided a victim with monetary 
compensation if a plaintiff could prove special or particular damage as a result of a 
public nuisance. The remedy was never granted in any decision, nor did a plaintiff 
approach the court for relief using the special injury rule as a cause of action. 
Compensation can only be claimed if the remedies provided in the law of delict are 
applied. This is an illustration that nuisance law did not influence or change the 
South African law of delict, which originated in Roman Dutch law. 
 Statutory nuisance systematically replaced the common law notion of public 
nuisance in South African law, as it did in English law. Because of the 
implementation of these statutory measures that regulate unreasonable 
                                                     
4
 An „injunction was brought in the name of the Attorney-General rather than the victim of the offence, 
although it was really the victim who sued.‟ See Spencer JR „Public nuisance – A critical examination‟ 
(1989) 48 Cambridge Law Review 55-84 66. 
5
 YB 27 Hen 8 fo 26 fo pl 10 (1536). This rule was adopted in an unreported decision in English law. 
The plaintiff had to prove special or particular damage that was different from damages suffered by 
the public at large in order to have a successful claim. The remedy to claim a monetary amount for 
damages caused great confusion as to when an action should be based on private or public nuisance 
in the courts of the United States. See Hodas DR „Private action for public nuisance: Common law 
citizen suits for relief from environmental harm‟ (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly 883-908 884. 
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interferences affecting the public at large, there was less need for the application of 
the common law remedy of public nuisance. This ultimately resulted in a decline in 
the use of the common law notion of public nuisance in disputes; this is seen in the 
small number of cases where the remedy was applied during the mid-20th century. 
Thirty-two years passed (19436 to 19757) before there was a reported case in South 
African law where a plaintiff sought relief arguing that a public nuisance had been 
constituted. Even during the early 20th century only a limited number of cases were 
reported, with the vast majority of them analysed in chapter 2. One can conclude that 
the implementation of statutory nuisance employed to curb and regulate public 
nuisances was successful. In essence, South African law adopted the notion of 
public nuisance but its usefulness was reduced through the promulgation of 
legislation that regulated most of the interferences previously dealt with as public 
nuisance. 
                                                     
6
 Queensland Municipality v Wiehan 1943 EDL 134. 
7
 Von Moltke v Areosa Costa 1975 (1) SA 255 (C). The decision of Von Moltke v Costa Aerosa (Pty) 
Ltd 1975 (1) SA 255 (C) is one exception where the Common Law remedy of public nuisance was 
used in the period between 1943 and 1989. The applicant contended that eradicating vegetation (in 
his vicinity) for the development of a new shopping mall would constitute a public nuisance. He 
applied for an interdict to restrain a public nuisance and had to show special injury/reason in order to 
have locus standi. The applicant failed because he could not show that „he is suffering or will suffer 
some injury, prejudice or damage or invasion of right peculiar to himself and over and above that 
sustained by the members of the public in general‟: 258D-F. It could be argued that because the court 
required the applicant to prove special injury, it indirectly applied the special injury rule discussed in 
2.3.1 above.   
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5.2.2 Recent case law 
Chapter 3 analysed the application of public nuisance in three series of cases: an 
isolated case in 1975,8 a selection of cases between 1989 and 2001,9 and finally, 
two cases between 200910 and 2010.11 I particularly analyzed the second and third 
series of case law to illustrate that public nuisance was applied contrary to its original 
aims, namely protecting the wellbeing of the general public. The following 
conclusions emerged.  
 In the Von Moltke case, described as the second series of cases,12 the 
applicant tried to use the doctrine for private purposes, contrary to its original aims. 
The applicant approached the court for an interdict to prohibit the establishment of a 
shopping mall in his vicinity. The court denied the interdict on the basis that the 
applicant could only succeed if he proved „injury, prejudice or damage or invasion of 
a right peculiar to himself and over and above that sustained by the members of the 
general public.‟13  
 After the Von Moltke case, a third series of case law (between 1989 and 
2001) brought about the revival of the public nuisance doctrine. However, the case 
law indicated a significant deviation from the doctrine‟s original aims, as it was 
                                                     
8
 Von Moltke v Costa Aroesa (Pty) Ltd 1975 (1) SA 255 (C). Referred to as the second series of 
cases. 
9
 See footnote 6 in chapter 4. 
10
 Intercape Ferreira Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others Case no 
20952/08 (24 June 2009) (WCHC). Referred to as the fourth series of cases. 
11
 410 Voortrekker Road Property Holdings CC v Minister of Home Affairs and others Case no 
(26841/09) WCHC (3 May 2010). Referred to as the fourth series of cases. 
12
 Von Moltke v Costa Areosa 1975 (1) SA 255 (C). 
13
 258D-E. 
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altered to suit the intentions of the applicants. The case law can be divided into two 
groups, namely cases from the pre-constitutional14 and from the post-constitutional 
era respectively.15 In most of these cases categorised as the third series, private 
individuals in predominantly white residential areas formed landowners‟,16 farmers‟,17 
ratepayers‟18 and environmental associations19 and applied for an interdict to prevent 
present or future disturbances. The applicants alleged that this limitation of the right 
to the use and enjoyment with their land – through the actions of the occupiers in the 
informal settlements established in the vicinity of their properties – would constitute a 
public nuisance. The applicants in these cases argued that establishing or 
developing an informal settlement in the vicinity would jeopardise their health (in the 
form of smoke and noise pollution), pose a safety hazard (through increased crime) 
and decrease the value of their property.20 The applicants sought to use the public 
nuisance doctrine as a means to prevent the establishment of the settlement or to 
                                                     
14
  In East London Western Districts farmers’ association v Minister of Education and Development 
Aid 1989 (2) SA 63 (A) and in Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and Another v 
Administrator Transvaal 1993 (1) 577 (T); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and 
Another v Administrator Transvaal 1993 (3) 49 (T); Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association 
and Another v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (3) SA 336 (A). 
15
 In the cases of Rademeyer and others v Western Districts Councils and others 1998 (3) SA 1011 
(SE); Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and others v Northern Metropolitan 2000 (4) SA 377 (W); 
Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Another 
(Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC).   
16
 In the Diepsloot case. 
17
 In the East London case. 
18
 Three Rivers case. 
19
 Kyalami Ridge case. In the Rademeyer case the private individuals never formed a formal group, 
but brought a joint application for the removal of occupiers believed to be causing a nuisance. 
20
 For example, in the Diepsloot case. 
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evict the occupiers of informal settlements who were (or would) only inhabit land in 
their vicinity. 
 The use of the public nuisance doctrine as a cause of action was successful 
in two of the five decisions, namely East London and Three Rivers. In both cases the 
courts suggested that the applicants‟ private right in land had been infringed and 
that, according to the principles of neighbour law, they were entitled to the 
reasonable use and enjoyment of land. Despite the applicants‟ alleging the presence 
of a public nuisance, the above-mentioned courts never established the existence of 
a public nuisance according to its original definition.  
 In contrast, the doctrine‟s use contrary to its original aims was not allowed in 
the Diepsloot,21 Rademeyer and Kyalami Ridge cases.22  
 After highlighting the importance in each of the above discussed cases, I 
assumed that the judgement in the East London case is only significant because it 
was the first instance in which the public nuisance doctrine was applied for the 
benefit of the applicants‟ personal interests. Besides rejecting the court‟s reasoning 
in East London, both Diepsloot23 and Rademeyer24 adopted different approaches 
                                                     
21
 Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners Association and others v Administrator, Transvaal and others 
1993 (3) SA 49 (T). 
22
 See 3.2.2. 
23
 The judgement in the Diepsloot case was based on the following policy considerations: firstly, the 
squatters had to be close to their place of employment; secondly, increased urbanisation would in 
effect force individuals of different socio-economic backgrounds to live together; and finally, the 
legislation in question (the Township Act) was at the time part of significant developments to 
dismantle the apartheid dispensation. See 3.3.2. 
24
 In the Rademeyer case it was decided that the squatters could not be evicted because they 
satisfied the definition of „occupier‟ in the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA).
24
 ESTA 
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when dealing with the application of public nuisance. In contrast, one has to criticise 
the decision in the Three Rivers case. The case was adjudicated in the context of the 
constitutional dispensation but did not follow, as it should have, the Diepsloot case 
for its policy considerations or the Rademeyer case, in which post-constitutional anti-
eviction legislation was applied. 
 I then summarised the problems in applying the doctrine in the third series of 
cases in four points. Firstly, the courts failed to recognise or apply the distinction 
between private and public nuisance. The failure to recognise this distinction 
inevitably prevented the courts from adjudicating the issue according to the original 
definition of public nuisance, although applicants complained of such a nuisance. 
The courts failed to recognise the distinction between these two separate species of 
nuisance. Courts rather used the notions of private and public nuisance 
interchangeably, without investigating which requirements the alleged nuisance 
would satisfy. As a result, the courts based their enquiry solely on whether the 
affected neighbour‟s intrinsic right of reasonable use and enjoyment of land had 
been infringed before delivering a judgement. In effect, the courts‟ left the door open 
for applicants to use public nuisance as a cause of action to advance their personal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
„protects a particular class of indigent persons who has or has had permission to live on rural and 
semirural land, against eviction from that land‟.
24
 None of the courts, in the third series of cases, 
specifically those cases adjudicated in the post-constitutional era, considered any anti-eviction 
legislation, except in the Rademeyer case. Therefore, the courts displayed a total disregard for anti-
eviction legislation. The Rademeyer court dismissed any allegations that public nuisance was 
constituted. The court further contended that a public nuisance could have been avoided if the state 
installed (or was given time to do so) proper water and toilet facilities and improved the safety and 
security in the vicinity of the applicants (if such a risk was proved). See 3.3.2. 
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interests. It can be said that the applicants in the third series of case law used public 
nuisance to satisfy a private rather than a public right in a public space. 
 Secondly, besides failing to recognise the distinction between the two species 
of nuisance, the majority of the courts aimed to resolve the matter from a private or 
individual point of view without considering any social factors.25 By opting to resolve 
the matter from a private law point of view, the courts protected the rights of 
landowners who had a private right in land. On the other hand, the occupiers had no 
right in land and in effect had no chance against the rights of the landowners. 
According to Van der Walt, individual rights cannot be protected without having any 
regard for public interest in property. He states that there ought to be an equitable 
balance between the interest of the private landowner and those without any rights in 
terms of section 25 of the Constitution. In other words, the traditional private law 
approach should not be given any automatic advantage, which would inevitably be to 
the detriment of those without property rights, as was the case in the third series of 
public nuisance cases. Van der Walt contends that in the light of the Constitution, 
particularly section 25, „the constitutional property concept has to be different from 
the traditional private-law concept.‟26 
                                                     
25
 In Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association and Another v Administrator Transvaal 1993 
(3) 49 (T) McCreath J considered social factors apart from applying a strict private law approach when 
considering the following factors: (a) the availability of employment for occupiers in the vicinity; (b) 
because of increased urbanisation, people from different cultures and backgrounds would inevitably 
have to share the same vicinity; and (c) finally, the legislation (in this case the Township Act) was 
enacted to abolish all practices associated with the apartheid regime. 
26
 Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property clause (1997) 55. 
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 Thirdly, there is a clear indication of a decline in the use of public nuisance, 
after the Queensland case, seeing that the majority of public nuisance offences are 
entrenched in legislation and regulated with great success. The introduction of 
statutory provisions to regulate offences such as noise, smoke and violence has had 
an impact on the use of the common law notion of public nuisance, which explains 
the decline in reported case law after 1943.  
 Finally, and very significantly, the notion of public nuisance was used to 
bypass anti-eviction legislation. This is highly questionable in a post-constitutional 
framework, which provides for secure tenure and access to housing.  Allowing the 
use of the public nuisance doctrine in an indirect manner (compared to its original 
aims) and in the light of it being regulated by legislation is a clear misuse of the 
doctrine.  
 According to Van der Walt these nuisance-based evictions (as he refers to 
them) should be a cause for concern on two accounts.27 Firstly, the use of the public 
nuisance remedy to bypass anti-eviction legislation leaves occupiers of informal 
settlements homeless in a process that is reminiscent of previous discriminatory 
practices,28 which should be avoided at all costs.  
                                                     
27
 Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours: Landownership, land reform and the property clause‟ 
(2002) 19 SALJ 816-840 826. 
28
 See http://africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/blsalaws.htm (accessed 17 February 2010). For 
example the Groups Areas Act 41 of 1950, which „forced physical separation between races by 
creating different residential areas for different races and which led to forced removals of people living 
in „wrong‟ areas, for example in District Six in Cape Town.‟ Similarly, The Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 „Gave the Minister of Native Affairs the power to remove blacks from public 
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 The second cause for concern arises when nuisance evictions are inevitable 
and justified should not be applied outside the post-constitutional land reform 
framework. In all the third series cases applicants alleged that their private right to 
land in their capacity as private landowners had been infringed. As a result many of 
the courts considered resolving the issue by applying the principles of neighbour law. 
Not only did the courts fail to distinguish between the two distinct species of private 
and public nuisance, but this individualistic approach was applied outside the context 
of the constitutional provisions in some of these cases. The relevant constitutional 
provisions, namely sections 25(5)-(9) and 26 together with statutory provisions, 
dealing with land reform must be taken into consideration in adjudicating nuisance-
based evictions. 
 Therefore, I concluded that on the basis of the finding that the application of 
public nuisance is problematic, one can either apply the notion of public nuisance on 
the condition that courts reinterpret this remedy in the light of the new constitutional 
dispensation, or it should not be applied at all.29 
 After analysing the decisions in the second and third series of cases, I 
commenced with an analysis of the fourth series of cases, namely Intercape Ferreira 
Mainliner (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others30 and 410 
Voortrekker Road Property Holdings CC v Minister of Home Affairs and others.31 
                                                                                                                                                                     
or privately owned land and to establish resettlement camps to house these displaced people. See 
http://africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/blsalaws.htm (accessed 17 February 2010). 
29
 Van der Walt AJ „Living with new neighbours: Landownership, land reform and the property clause‟ 
(2002) 19 SALJ 816-840 828.  
30
 (20952/08) [2009] ZAWCHC 100 (24 June 2009). Referred to as Intercape. 
31
 (26841/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 87 (3 May 2010). Referred to as Voortrekker. 
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 Unfortunately, in both cases, although the facts indicate that a truly public 
nuisance was probably constituted, the court again failed to distinguish between 
private and public nuisance and as a result confused the legal principles of these two 
separate doctrines. However, the courts failed to establish explicitly that the 
unreasonable interferences constituted a public nuisance. Instead, the courts 
erroneously applied the principles of private, as opposed to public nuisance. 
Furthermore, the facts in these cases, especially the unreasonable interferences 
complained of, contravened legislation (LUPO) that regulates the public nuisances 
complained of. The courts decided the two cases with reference to both nuisance 
and the relevant legislation, without indicating what the relationship between the two 
sources are and whether the legislation replaces the common law remedy.  
 It can be concluded that public nuisance should only be applied in 
circumstances where its application is not misused to benefit particular parties. 
Furthermore, the notion of public nuisance can only be applied in the absence of any 
legislation - such as LUPO in the above mentioned cases - regulating public 
nuisance offences such as noise, smoke and public violence.  
 The indirect use in the third series of case law is unjustifiable and could be 
unconstitutional. This raised the question of whether the use of the public nuisance 
doctrine, as it was applied in the third series of case law, meets the requirements of 
section 25(1),32 (2)33 and section 26(3)34 of the Constitution. In chapter 4, the 
                                                     
32
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms 
of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.  
33
 Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that „property may be expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application (a) for a public purpose or public interest; and (b) subject to compensation.‟ 
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application of public nuisance in all four series of cases was subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. The conclusion is set out below. 
 
5.2.3 Constitutional compatibility of public nuisance 
In chapter 4, a case from each series underwent constitutional scrutiny to determine 
whether public nuisance was applied contrary to its original aims and inconsistently 
with section 25(1) of the Constitution. Section 25(1) provides that no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.35The FNB case36 provides the methodology 
to determine whether a deprivation is inconsistent with section 25(1). According to 
the methodology in the FNB case, a deprivation is inconsistent with section 25(1) 
when the law (in this case the common law doctrine of public nuisance) does not 
provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question.  
 Furthermore, to decide whether there is a sufficient reason for the deprivation, 
„a complexity of relations‟ has to be considered, including the relationship between 
the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved; the relationship between 
the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected; and the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
34
 Section 26(3) of the Constitution provides that „no one may be evicted from their home, or have 
their home demolished, without an order of the court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances.‟ No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. not sure where quote ends 
35
 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
36
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property 
and the extent of the deprivation.37 
 Series two and three were grouped together for purposes of constitutional 
scrutiny. It was established that there is no nexus between the purpose of the law in 
question, namely public nuisance doctrine and the means sought, namely protecting 
private rights against infringement of use and enjoyment of land.  In both 
series two and three private landowners complained of an infringement of their 
vested rights to the use and enjoyment of their land. In series two the court 
concluded that the one landowner did not prove that there had been any injury or 
harm to him or the broader public. In other words, the landowner failed to meet the 
requirements for alleging a public nuisance. Instead, seeing that he was the only one 
affected, it is more likely that he ought to have alleged the existence of a private 
nuisance and not of a public nuisance. As a result, it was established that the 
application of public nuisance, in series two, did not meet the requirements in section 
25(1).  
 Similarly, in the third series of cases, groups of private landowners alleged the 
presence or future existence of a public nuisance with the aim of protecting their 
private interests in their land. Applicants alleged that occupiers who were or would 
have been settled in their vicinity would constitute a public nuisance. Prospective 
occupiers were denied access to land and, even worse, at times current occupiers 
were evicted.  
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 The conclusion reached was that there was insufficient reason for the 
deprivation that resulted from the application of the public nuisance doctrine in these 
cases. The following reasons were given. Firstly, applicants did not meet the 
requirements of a public right to the extent required by the definition of public 
nuisance. The applicants failed to prove the infringement of a public right, namely the 
health and safety of the public at large. In other words, as indicated above, the effect 
was that the public nuisance doctrine was indirectly used by affected landowners to 
evict or prohibit the settling of occupiers in their vicinity because they failed to prove 
the existence of a public nuisance according to its definition.38  
 This argument was further supported by the fact that very little public nuisance 
case law between 1943 to the present time is available. This is the result of the 
successful regulation of public nuisance offences by way of legislation, otherwise 
known as statutory nuisance. Therefore, it was established that the use of common 
law public nuisance in this context is suspicious as there are alternative legislative 
means for applicants to achieve their desired result, namely, to abate unreasonable 
interferences.39  
 Furthermore, two arguments were proffered: (a) the nuisance could have 
been abated or avoided if proper water and sanitary services were installed together 
with electricity in order to prevent excessive smoke, and patrol units were introduced 
to curb increased crime; and (b) in the light of entrenched constitutional values in 
section 25(5)-(9) of the Constitution, which promote access to, and security of, land 
for this particular affected group of people, the extent of the deprivation was 
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excessive. Moreover, section 26(3), together with the anti-eviction legislation, namely 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act40 (ESTA) and the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)41, provide substantial and 
procedural requirements for the eviction to be taken into account before such a 
deprivation is allowed.42 ESTA and PIE were both enacted to give effect to section 
26(3) of the Constitution. Therefore, bypassing these two legislative measures to 
obtain an eviction order indirectly, without complying with the constitutionally 
sanctioned anti-eviction legislation, is inconsistent with section 26(3) of the 
Constitution. Strict procedural and substantive requirements are set out in section 
26(3), but the applicants blatantly ignored these. Instead, the applicants‟ sought an 
easier option by using public nuisance as a primary premise to obtain an eviction, 
with the abatement of unreasonable interferences such as smoke, noise, 
endangered health and safety as the vehicle for achieving their private intentions.  
As a result, the application of public nuisance in series three did not meet the 
requirements in section 25(1) of the Constitution. The deprivation was therefore 
arbitrary. When tested against the requirements of section 36(1) of the Constitution, 
it was found that the deprivation was not justifiable and consequently 
unconstitutional. Therefore, it was concluded that any application of public nuisance 
which is not in line with the definition of such nuisance – and more importantly, is 
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used to bypass anti-eviction legislation – is unconstitutional and should not succeed 
in a court of law.  
 However, according to van der Walt, „this does not mean that evictions based 
on a lack of compliance with planning laws or on public nuisance cannot or should 
not take place, but it does mean that such evictions have to be treated with great 
care and a healthy shot of scepticism and hesitance.‟43 Van der Walt contends that if 
a court is faced with a nuisance eviction case, it should ask certain questions before 
granting such an order. This framework is essential, especially in the light of 
nuisance-based evictions. The questions are as follows: 
„does the eviction involve a single or group of occupiers; whether the respondents 
occupy state or private land, and (if it is private land) whether they own land 
themselves or occupy it with the landowner‟s consent; whether the occupation is 
lawful or unlawful in general (apart from planning laws); whether the nuisance is 
related to public safety and health or to formalities; and whether the settlement could 
be formalized as an alternative to evicting the occupiers.‟44  
 In contrast with the cases discussed so far, the application of public nuisance 
in series one and four passed constitutional muster in terms of section 25. These 
cases illustrate the original aims of the public nuisance doctrine, namely to preserve 
the health and safety of the public at large. In the R v CP Reynolds, the defendant 
was found guilty of a public offence when he polluted a public river. It is clear that 
because the nature of the river was public, the community at large had access to it 
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and would be detrimentally affected if the water was polluted. Therefore, the 
nuisance occurred in a public space as opposed to a private area accessible only to 
those who own the land. Similarly, in the fourth series of cases, the facts clearly 
indicate that the public at large were affected and that exposed litter, noise and 
endangered public health and safety because the nuisance occurred in a public 
space, namely the street. The community at large had access to the street and were 
as a result automatically subject to violence, humans waste, litter, noise and 
blockages of roads. According to Prosser, street blockages are a common example 
of a public nuisance.45 However, in both the cases categorized as the fourth series, 
the court reached found that the noise, violence, street blockages and litter 
contravened legislation, namely LUPO. Therefore, it seems the notion of public 
nuisance can only be applied in the absence of any legislation covering public 
nuisance offences.  
 In essence, series one and four can be separated from the second and third 
series on the following basis: in order for a nuisance to be categorized as a public 
nuisance, it ought to have occurred in a public space in a way that would have 
infringed the rights of all who came into contact with it, as opposed to only affecting a 
particular individual or group of people in the enjoyment of their private property. In 
series two and three landowners sought to protect only their own use and enjoyment 
of private land in a private space opposed to their proving the nuisance had occurred 
in a public space affecting the community at large. Furthermore, according to 
Prosser,46 a single complainant, as in the second series of cases, is insufficient to 
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represent the public at large. In fact, one can go as far as to say that a large group of 
private landowners, as was the situation in the third series of cases, does not 
necessarily represent the community at large. Instead the focus ought to be on the 
space in which the infringement occurs or would exist and on whether the health and 
safety of the community at large were affected. 
 It is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, indirect use of the law 
of public nuisance in the third series of cases, namely to evict and prohibit 
occupation of occupiers and in so doing by-pass anti-eviction legislation and on the 
other hand, instances where there is a case of a genuine public nuisance as 
established in the fourth series of cases. Therefore the application of public nuisance 
is still possible in instances where a nuisance occurs in a public space that would as 
a consequence infringe the rights to health and safety of the public at large. 
Furthermore, it would only be possible to apply the notion of public nuisance where it 
is not covered by legislation covering public nuisance offences such as smoke, 
noise, litter and violence which originated in a public space.  
 However, in both the cases of Intercape47 and Voortrekker,48 the alleged 
nuisances were covered by planning legislation, namely LUPO.49 Therefore, it could 
be said that the common law remedy of public nuisance would only be applicable 
where it is not covered by statutory nuisance or any other legislative measure which, 
directly or indirectly, has the purpose to abate existing or future public nuisance 
offences. 
                                                     
47
 See footnote 13 above. 
48
 See footnote 14 above. 
49
 15 of 1985. 
200 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the history, development and future of 
public nuisance in light of the Constitution. It was established that the notion of public 
nuisance originated in English law and subsequently adopted into South African law. 
Between its inception in South African law and 1943 the notion of public nuisance 
was applied in line with its original aims, namely to protect the health and safety of 
the general public. However, it was further established that the application of public 
nuisance in series two50 and three51 had not been applied according to its original 
definition and as a result caused various problems. In fact, it was found that the 
indirect application of public nuisance in these series of cases is unconstitutional in 
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
 On the other hand, the application of public nuisance in series one and four 
passed constitutional muster in terms of section 25. These cases illustrate the 
original aims of the public nuisance doctrine, namely to preserve the health and 
safety of the public at large. Furthermore, the fourth series if cases illustrate that 
public nuisance might still serve a legitimate purpose in South African law. However, 
both cases in the fourth series were decided in terms of planning legislation and not 
the notion of public nuisance. 
 The question left to be answered is: what is the future of public nuisance in 
South African law? In the light of this question, I put forward three recommendations 
that are aimed at addressing this issue.  
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 Firstly, when faced with complaints of an alleged public nuisance, courts 
should: (a), distinguish between private and public nuisance in order to avoid using 
these two distinct species of nuisance interchangeably; (b) establish whether the 
alleged nuisances are in line with the definition of a public nuisance, namely to 
protect the health and wellbeing of the community at large; and (c) establish whether 
the nuisance occurred only or mostly on private land, as opposed to public land or 
public space.  
 Secondly, the application of public nuisance should not be used as an indirect 
means to evict occupiers. The notion of public nuisance applied in this way is 
unconstitutional.52 However, according to van der Walt, „this does not mean that 
evictions based on a lack of compliance with planning laws or on public nuisance 
cannot or should not take place, but it does mean that such evictions have to be 
treated with great care and a healthy shot of scepticism and hesitance.‟53 
Furthermore, Van der Walt formulated a framework which courts should adopt before 
granting an eviction order.54  
 Finally, as indicated in the fourth series, the notion of public nuisance can still 
serve a legitimate purpose in South African law. But, it should be applied only in the 
absence of legislation covering nuisance offences as established in the fourth series 
of cases together with English and United States law in 2.4 above.55  
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 In essence, the notion of public nuisance has a future in South African law if it 
is applied in the absence of statutory nuisance or any other legislation covering 
public nuisance offences and where it is not used as an alternative mechanism to 
evict occupiers. Furthermore, the courts should in future, when dealing with an 
alleged public nuisance, always distinguish between a private and public nuisance to 
avoid using the two distinct species of nuisance interchangeably. 
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